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Abstract
It is a fact that software has bugs. These bugs can lead to failures. Especially dependabil-
ity and security failures are a great threat to software users. This thesis introduces four
novel approaches that can be used to automatically harden software at the user’s site.
Automatic hardening removes bugs from already deployed software. All four approaches
are automated, i.e., they require little support from the end-user. However, some sup-
port from the software developer is needed for two of these approaches. The presented
approaches can be grouped into error toleration and bug removal. The two error tol-
eration approaches are focused primarily on fast detection of security errors. When an
error is detected it can be tolerated with well-known existing approaches. The other two
approaches are bug removal approaches. They remove dependability bugs from already
deployed software. We tested all approaches with existing benchmarks and applications,
like the Apache web-server.
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1 Introduction
It is a fact that software is deployed with bugs. Barry Boehm and Victor R. Basili state
that: “About 40 to 50 percent of user programs contain nontrivial defects.” [15] These bugs
can lead to failures that decrease the dependability, the availability, and the security of a
system. Studies have found that 5% to 24% of all failures in deployed high-performance
systems can be contributed to software [101].
Software failures can be catastrophic: “In the last 15 years alone, software defects have
wrecked a European satellite launch, delayed the opening of the hugely expensive Denver
airport for a year, destroyed a NASA Mars mission, killed four marines in a helicopter
crash, induced a U.S. Navy ship to destroy a civilian airliner, and shut down ambulance
systems in London, leading to as many as 30 deaths.” [69] Additionally, software failures
have an economical impact. The National Institute of Standards and Technology estimates
that in the U.S. software failures cost $59.5 billion annually [86].
The reasons why software is deployed with bugs are many-fold. Most prominent are
economical, legal, and technical reasons as well as the human factor. Software makers
have the ability to remove bugs in already deployed software by patching. This ability
alone is an economical motivation to release early and fix later [6]. It is still an unresolved
problem if software makers should be liable for their product’s failures [30]. Up to now
it is common practice that software makers explicitly exclude their liability for software
failures in their licence agreements.
From a technical point of view a recent study suggests that the likelihood of bugs
depends on the used components [79]. Other studies show that certain programmers
introduce more bugs than others [60, 102].
As already stated, the industry standard to deal with bugs is to deploy software patches
that remove bugs. But these patches are not sufficient, because first, not every bug is fixed
and second, there is a window of exposure between detecting a bug and the application
of a patch which removes this bug. The same economical reasons that lead to release a
product with bugs encourage software makers to only fix most severe bugs, for example,
a security vulnerability is more likely to be removed than a bug that can lead to a crash
failure. Even if bugs are removed by patches from the software makers, there is a window
of exposure. In 2008 the computer company Apple needed in average 9 days (worst-case
156 days) after the publication of a vulnerability for Apple’s web browser Safari until a
patch was publicly available [47]. On the other hand, users do not always apply patches
instantaneously. For web browsers not more that 80% of the Firefox users and 46% of
the Opera users had the most up-to-date version of their browser running on any day of
2007 [49]. A survey showed that 67.5% of Oracle database professionals do not install
critical security patches [105]. Reasons for not applying patches are that patches incur
the risk of new bugs [85] and that patching is sometimes uncomfortable for the software’s
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user [34]. If a system is certified, then applying a patch can mean to loose the certification
for this system.
Automatic hardening of software gives the user the ability to remove bugs and to tolerate
failures independently of the software makers. Two general approaches of automatic
hardening exist:
Automatic Bug Removal Automatic bug removal uses dynamic and/or static analysis
to find and analyze bugs in a given software. The found bugs are removed by
automatically deriving patches from the previous analysis. These patches do not
only help the user, but can also serve as bug reports to the software makers [131].
We presented automatic bug removal in [117, 119].
Error Tolerance Automatic bug removal cannot remove all possible bugs. Hence, it is
necessary to tolerate bugs at runtime. There is a lot active research in that direction,
e.g., [96, 94, 124, 84, 108, 50, 99]. The common goal is that the effects of bugs become
not visible to the user. All of these approaches have in common that they rely on
error detection with low performance overhead. Therefore, they apply light-weight,
but incomplete error detection. We will show how to use speculation to implement
heavy-weight more complete error detection with low performance overhead [42, 43,
121, 122, 120].
1.1 Terminology
This thesis uses the terminology definitions of [8]. Since this thesis focuses on software
the following definitions are adapted to software. An application is a computer program
that provides a service. It interacts with other applications, hardware and humans. The
intended behavior of an application is defined by a specification.
Important for this thesis is the distinction between failure, error and fault:
Definition 1.1. A failure is a deviation from an application’s specification. Crash failures,
for instance, are an unspecified termination. Another important failure is the successful
abuse of an application by an attacker.
Definition 1.2. An error is the deviation of an application’s runtime state from the in-
tended state. This erroneous state can lead to a failure. However, an erroneous application
state does not necessarily imply that the application will fail at some point in time. This
fact is exploited to tolerate errors by repairing the application state before the application
fails.
Definition 1.3. A fault is a defect in an application that can lead to an error. Commonly,
software faults are called bugs. A security vulnerability is a special kind of bug that can
lead to a failure controlled by a malicious attacker. A fault in an application A can be the
result of a propagation of a failure in application B into A.
An application interacts with humans. Automatically hardened applications are inter-
esting for three different groups of people:
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End-User/Administrator Automatic hardening increases the dependability, availability,
and security for the end-user of the application. An administrator who supports
users of an application also counts as end-user when considering automatic harden-
ing. We assume that both, end-user and administrator, have neither the skills nor
the incentive to actively support the automatic hardening process.
Developer as User Applications also provide services to other applications. The devel-
oper of application A using application B risks a failure of A even if A is bug-free
because B can have bugs. These bugs can lead to failures of B that might propagate
to A and, hence, might become failures of A. Even if the developer has the skill to
review B for bugs, the already introduced economic reasons will most likely prevent
that the developer reviews B. To reduce the risk caused by using B the developer
can use automatic hardening. In general, we assume that the developer has not
much more means than the previously introduced end-user and administrator to
support the automatic hardening process.
Application Developer Automatic hardening can also be used as a debugging tool for
the developer of the original application. A generated patch can serve as a template
for the developer to remove a bug [131]. Some automatic debugging tools [123] use
approaches similar to the ones used for error tolerance [94]. Instead of tolerating a
detected failure the failure gets analyzed to pinpoint the underlying bug(s).
Additionally, an application developer can apply automatic hardening to her appli-
cation to reduce the risk for the user. We assume, that in contrast to the end-user,
administrator and developer as user the application developer can support automatic
hardening. For instance, it might be acceptable for the application developer to do
small code changes to enable error tolerance [42, 43, 121, 122, 120]. Nevertheless,
the main focus of automatic hardening is the end-user side.
1.2 Automatic Hardening
Automatic hardening combines error detection with automatic bug removal and error
tolerance. The main application area of automatic hardening is already deployed software.
Therefore it is a preventive maintenance technique [8]. Since automatic hardening is used
at the end-user site it has to be fully automated. End-user or administrator have typically
neither the knowledge nor the resource to assist in the hardening process. Automatic
hardening can be a service provided by the operation system: even if a user does not
apply a patch the automatic hardening protects the user’s system.
Hardening is a best-effort process. That means that there might be always some bugs
that cannot be fixed or found. Nevertheless, the goal is to tolerate or to remove most of
the found bugs.
Automatic bug removal or tolerance is the primary goal. The following secondary goals
are needed to make the approach applicable:
Hardening should not decrease dependability, availability, and security. We have al-
ready discussed that there is also a risk that a patch introduces new bugs. Of
3
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Figure 1.1: Contributions of this thesis associated to automatic hardening.
course, we want that automatic hardening achieves “something good” even if it
introduces new bugs. To rephrase this goal: Hardening should increase the depend-
ability, availability, and security of the protected application.
Furthermore, sometimes a trade-off is possible. For example, for security it might
be acceptable to trade availability for integrity. A detected malicious control flow
manipulation could be mapped to a stop-failure by crashing the application. Thus,
at least the injection and execution of the attacker’s code can be prevented.
Low runtime overhead. Hardening sometimes involves a substantial runtime overhead.
A trade-off between runtime overhead, dependability and security failures exists.
To be acceptable hardening should only lead to small performance overheads.
Especially error tolerance is prone to high performance overheads. Therefore, exist-
ing tolerance approaches [96, 94, 124, 84, 108, 50, 99] are evaluated with light-weight,
but also incomplete error detection. We show in Chapters 2 and 3 that where pub-
lished as [42, 43, 121, 122, 120] how to implement more complete error detection
with low performance overheads by using speculation.
No source code required. Most commercial software producers deliver their software as
compiled binary. Therefore, users have only access to the binary. So, hardening has
only access to the binary. Hardening cannot even expect debugging information in
the binary.
For an application developer it might be acceptable to make changes to the source
code to enable hardening or to increase the chances of success at the end-user site.
1.3 Contributions
Figure 1.1 associates the contributions of this thesis with the two aspects of automatic
hardening: error toleration and automatic bug removal. The contributions to error toler-
ance are:
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a) Preventing code injection by enforcing dynamically updated personalized
system call models. As already introduced security vulnerabilities are a special
kind of software bug that allow a malicious attacker to take control over a system.
We show in Chapter 2 how to prevent a malicious attacker from code injections and
control flow manipulations. The main approach is a novel combination of enforcing
a fine-grained system call model and dynamic taint analysis. SwitchBlade is our
implementation of this approach. SwitchBlade has a low performance overhead, a
low chance of false alarms, and a high probability that an attack is detected.
b) Parallelization of runtime checks. Any error tolerance mechanism needs first to
detect errors before they can be masked. At runtime, errors are detected by runtime
checks. Some of these checks are very light weight, for instance, a crash detector.
Other checks can introduce a substantial performance overhead. We introduce in
Chapter 3 the ParExC approach. ParExC distributes the perceived performance
overhead of runtime checks over the cores of modern multi- and many-core CPUs.
Therefore, ParExC parallelizes the runtime checks. ParExC makes several major
contributions to the state-of-art of parallelizing runtime checks. Chapter 3 explains
these contributions in detail.
Both contributions make use of speculation to reduce the perceived performance overhead
of error detection.
This thesis makes two major contributions to automatic bug removal:
a) Detecting and patching bad error handling. Studies show that error handling
code contains a disproportionate large amount of bugs [29, 126, 132]. In Chapter 4
we discuss how to find error handling bugs and how to generate patches that remove
at-least some error handling bugs.
b) Removal of robustness and security bugs in COTS libraries. Most applica-
tions rely on commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) code. COTS code comes often in the
form of binary libraries. We demonstrate in Chapter 5 how to find robustness and
security bugs in COTS libraries and how to generate patches that remove some of
these bugs.
Both contributions are complementary. The first contribution deals with bugs in an
application calling COTS libraries. Whereas, the second contribution deals with bugs in
COTS libraries called by an application. The underlying approaches of both contributions
are similar but not identical. Both approaches use fault injection to identify bug instances
of known bug patterns. Furthermore, the patch generation is based on templates related
to these bug patterns.
1.4 Theses
This section presents and discusses the theses derived from the introduced motivation for
automatic hardening:
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Thesis 1. Speculation can be used to reduce the perceived performance overhead of error
detection mechanisms.
Error detection is needed for tolerating errors at runtime. The perceived performance
overhead of many error detection mechanisms make them unusable in practice. For ex-
ample, detecting memory errors with a state of the art bounds checker can lead to a
12x performance overhead [98]. Other approaches to detect memory errors like data-flow
integrity (DFI) [22] checking have similar performance overheads, e.g., 2.5x and higher.
These performance overheads increase the latency of the checked application. Because
errors are unlikely, speculating that no error occurs can be a valid strategy to reduce the
perceived performance overhead and to decrease the latency of the checked application.
In Chapters 2 and 3 we show two different approaches to speedup the error detection
using speculation and therewith reducing the latency.
The SwitchBlade approach (published at EuroSys’08 [42] and ACM SIGOPS Oper.
Syst. Rev. [43]) combines a low-overhead checker with possibly false alarms, with a
high-overhead checker with low probability of false alarms. SwitchBlade speculates that
the low-overhead checker has no false alarms by only running the low-overhead checker.
Whenever an alarm is detected, the high-overhead checker evaluates a defined part of the
last execution of the application by replaying this part to check if the alarm was a true
or a false positive.
ParExC uses current multi-core CPUs to decrease checking overhead (published at
(EC)2’09 [121], at SSS’09 [122] and to appear at CGO’10 [120]). It speculatively exe-
cutes an unchecked variant of the application as predictor. The predictor’s execution is
partitioned into epochs. Each epoch is replayed with error checking. The checked re-
play of different epochs is done in parallel to each other and to the predictor. Thereby,
we decrease the runtime of the checked application compared to an execution without
ParExC.
Thesis 2. The system call model of an application depends on the environment.
System call interposition is a common approach to restrict the power of applications
and to detect code injections. It enforces a model that describes what system calls and/or
what sequences thereof are permitted. However, there exist various issues like concurrency
vulnerabilities and incomplete models that restrict the power of system call interposition
approaches. We present in Chapter 2 a new approach that uses randomized and per-
sonalized fine-grained system call models to increase the probability of detecting code
injections. However, using such a fine-grained system call model, one cannot exclude the
possibility that the model is violated during normal program executions. For instance, the
system call model of the Apache web-server depends on the clients (web-browser) using
it. The system call model of the UNIX tool grep depends on the likelihood of failures
in the environment. We show with fault injection experiments that for grep the system
call model changes with the number of injected faults.
Thesis 3. System call model enforcement combined with taint analysis can detect control
flow manipulation with in average low performance overhead, low false positive, and low
false negative rate.
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To cope with false alarms of system call model enforcement, SwitchBlade uses on-
demand taint analysis to update a system call model during runtime.
The approach has the low performance overhead and low false negative rate of system
call model enforcement and the low false positive rate of taint analysis.
Thesis 4. Parallelization of runtime checks can (partly) mitigate the performance costs
of expensive runtime checks.
In Chapter 3 we present and evaluate a novel framework, ParExC, to reduce the runtime
penalties of compiler generated runtime checks. An obvious approach is to use idle cores
of modern multi-core CPUs to parallelize the runtime checks. This could be accomplished
by
(a) parallelizing the application and in this way, implicitly parallelizing the checks, or
(b) by parallelizing the checks only.
Parallelizing an application is rarely easy and frameworks that simplify the paralleliza-
tion, e.g., software transactional memory (STM), can introduce considerable overhead.
ParExC is based on alternative (b). ParExC has – in contrast to similar frameworks –
two noteworthy features that permit a more efficient parallelization of checks: (1) specu-
lative variables, and (2) the ability to add checks by static instrumentation.
Thesis 5. Parallelizing runtime error checks themselves can scale better than parallelizing
an application with runtime checks.
Chapter 3 compares ParExC with an approach using a transactional memory-based
alternative. Our experience is that ParExC is not only more efficient than the STM-
based solution but the manual effort for an application developer to integrate ParExC is
lower.
Thesis 6. Automatic bug removal based on patch patterns can decrease the number of
failures.
A bug pattern is a template for a given kind of bug. We show how to use fault injection
to detect bug instances of two common bug patterns:
1. Error handling bugs in Chapter 4 (published at EDCC’06 [117, 118] and at DSN’07
[116]) and
2. Input validation bugs in Chapter 5 (published at DSN’07 [119]).
Related to the bug patterns are patch patterns that are templates for removing the bug
instances of the related bug patterns. We show two general patch patterns:
1. Error code mapping in Chapter 4, and
2. Input filtering in Chapter 5.
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Thesis 7. Fault injection finds failures even in mature software.
Bad error handling is the cause of many service outages. We will show in Chapter 4 ten
well known GNU coreutils [3] that contain error handling bugs which lead to crashes.
We have found these bugs with fault injection.
Commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) components, like software libraries, can be used to
reduce the development effort. Unfortunately, many COTS components have been devel-
oped without a focus on robustness and security. In Chapter 5 we evaluate the Apache
Portable Runtime (APR) [2], a mature software library used on well-known and well-
tested open source projects like the Apache web-server [1] and Subversion [5]. We found
a failure for more than every second injection into APR.
Thesis 8. Automatic error mapping can mask failures.
Chapter 4 also presents one approach for automatic hardening applications against
error handling bugs: error mapping. Error mapping maps an error from a site in the
application known to have error handling bugs to a site that has no known error handling
bugs. The underlying assumption of error mapping is: that the mapped error will be
handled at the second site without resulting in a failure. Pre-allocation of memory is one
example for error mapping. Error mapping can mask up to 84% of previously detected
failures.
Thesis 9. Automatic filtering can mask a high percentage of failures injected by bit-flip
faults.
In Chapter 5 we introduce a novel approach to harden software libraries to improve their
robustness and security. The approach is automated, general and extensible and consists
of the following stages. First, we use a static analysis to prepare and guide the following
fault injection. Second, in the dynamic analysis stage, fault injection experiments execute
the library functions with both usual and extreme input values.
We automatically harden the library by deriving and verifying one protection hypoth-
esis per function (for instance, function foo fails if argument 1 is a NULL pointer). A
protection wrapper is generated from these hypothesis to reject un-robust input values of
library functions. We evaluate the approach by hardening the APR used by the Apache
web-server. 56% of the bit-flips injected at the interfaces of the library could be prevented
by the automatically generated protection wrapper.
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Many desktop applications and almost all server applications maintain network connec-
tions. Network connections can make applications vulnerable to code injection attacks.
For example, small coding mistakes can introduce buffer overflow vulnerabilities that
might be exploitable by attackers. Users can harden their applications against code injec-
tion attacks by running the applications in a sandbox. The sandbox trades availability for
security, i.e., whenever the sandbox detects a code injection, the application is aborted
before the attack can do any harm. Dynamic taint analysis [115, 28, 81, 55, 95] is a
well-known approach to implement such a sandbox. It detects code injection attacks by
checking if the control flow has been altered maliciously, i.e., tainted, by network or other
user input. Since all control flow instructions need to be checked and taint information
has to be propagated via a dynamic data-flow analysis, taint checking introduces a non-
negligible performance overhead. Newer works, e.g., [80], try to restrict this impact by
tracking less data and by checking less control flow instructions. For example, by restrict-
ing the tracking to detect the exploitation of known vulnerabilities one can restrict the
amount of tracking and instrumentation and, hence, the performance impact.
Restricting the taint analysis to known vulnerabilities improves the performance, but
it decreases the protection from exploits using so far unknown code vulnerabilities. The
underlying hypothesis of our approach is that injected code has some purpose, e.g., getting
access to the system, and to achieve this purpose, the attacker has to execute system calls.
Hence, one can detect or at least restrict the power of code injections by restricting the
system calls that can be performed.
The system calls, an application is permitted to perform, can be restricted along three
dimensions:
1. the set of system calls that an application is permitted to execute,
2. the set of permissible arguments to a system call, and
3. the temporal order of system calls.
Several systems [53, 90, 93] use a combination of (1) and (2). Anomaly-based systems [46,
56, 129, 109, 103, 64, 75] use (3) to detect intrusions based on statistics of the sequence of
system calls: Given a window of the last k system calls, the system decides if the sequence
seems to be normal (no intrusion) or abnormal (intrusion).
Our approach is to enforce a fine-grained system call model that enables us to restrict
system calls along all three dimensions: (1) set of system calls, (2) permissible arguments
and (3) temporal order.
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Both sand-boxing approaches dynamic taint analysis, and system call restrictions have
different trade-offs when applied for automatic hardening.
• Dynamic taint analysis On one hand, dynamic taint analysis has a low chance
of false negatives and false alarms. False negatives are not detected code injection
attacks. Hence, dynamic taint analysis makes it difficult for an attacker to inject
code and at the same time does not reduce the availability by false alarms. However,
the price is a relative high performance overhead.
• Enforcing a fine-grained system call model On the other hand, fine-grained
system call restriction can have a low performance overhead. But, as we will show,
a fine-grained system call model bears the possibility of false alarms. False alarms
are an implication from the observation that the system call model of an application
depends on the environment (Thesis 2).
Furthermore, system call restriction is prone to mimicry attacks, i.e., attacks that imitate
the exact system call behavior and cross system call data flow of the program. An attacker
could slightly change the arguments to system calls such that the program behavior fits
the needs of the attacker without violating the system call model.
In our approach, called SwitchBlade1, we make use of the observation of Thesis 2 to
reduce the chance of false negatives through mimicry attacks. We can make a mimicry
attack arbitrarily difficult by using personalization (see Section 2.3.1) and randomization
(see Section 2.3.2) of the system call model.
SwitchBlade personalizes the system call model by learning a minimal system model
that describes the execution of an application in a given environment. An attacker could
learn the set of accepted system call sequences by analyzing the source or binary code of an
application. We try to use the smallest model that describes the sequence of system calls
of an application in a given environment. Thereby we want to prevent that an attacker is
able to mimic program features that are disabled in a given environment. For example,
an editor might be compiled without the feature to spawn shell scripts. Personalization
will remove the system call subsequences associated with such features that are statically
or dynamically (via a configuration file) disabled. We show in Section 2.4.1 that models
depend on various factors such as the client applications accessing a protected server
application and errors experienced in a given environment (Thesis 2). Thus, an attacker
cannot be sure that all sequences permitted by the code are indeed permitted by a system
call model for that specific system he is attacking.
SwitchBlade randomizes the model by inserting system calls in the application (and
hence, in the model) that are not in the original program. We can increase the difficulty
of mounting a successful attack by inserting dummy system calls using, for example,
library wrappers or source code transformation tools. An attacker would need to be
very careful to call (library) functions in the right sequence, with the right inter-system-
call data-flow and with the correct backtrace. Moreover, an attacker needs to write the
right return addresses in the backtrace, which are already randomized by virtual memory
randomization feature of modern OSs.
1This chapter is based partly on [42, 43].
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Using personalized and randomized system call models means that one has to learn
the model dynamically for each installation of an application. We address this problem
by combining a taint analysis tool with a model learner. One learns some initial model
using the learner and the taint analysis makes sure that one does not learn system calls
from injected code during the training period. Our current implementation enforces the
(initial) model speculatively by intercepting system calls with the help of a kernel module.
The initial system call model very likely is not complete and will therefore result in false
alarms, i.e., we miss-speculate: some system calls performed by the application are not yet
part of the model and will hence result in a model violation. Whenever this happens, we
switch to a combined taint and learn mode. The last requests before the model violation
are replayed in taint/learn mode. If the taint mode does not detect an intrusion, we
update the system call model. Like other approaches that use a replay mechanism (e.g.,
the RX approach [94], Sweeper [124] or recovery-oriented computing [89]), we need an
application-specific proxy to perform this replay.
While for stateless (server) applications a proxy is sufficient, for stateful applications
we need periodic application-level check-points. Since we do not continuously track taint
information in SwitchBlade, we cannot assume that a check-point is not already corrupted,
i.e., there is the potential for false negatives – unless we mark the complete check-point
as tainted. However, marking everything as tainted leads with a very high likelihood to
a false alarm. Application-level check-pointing does not write the complete process state.
Only the data that is essential for recovery is stored. Marking the complete application-
level check-point as tainted avoids false negatives and in our experiments also false alarms.
Note that many modern desktop and server applications support application-level check-
pointing. For example, IMAP servers support a CHECK command to write the contents
of mailboxes to disk. One can roll back to such an application check-point using a process
in an uncorrupted initial state. This permits us to roll back to a point where the taint
analysis was switched off and, thus, no taint information is available.
The SwitchBlade approach combines the enforcement of a fine-grained system call model
with dynamic taint analysis using speculation. The system call model is enforced specula-
tively. Whenever an system call model violation is detected, SwitchBlade tries to confirm
the speculative alarm by dynamic taint analysis. With SwitchBlade we demonstrate The-
sis 1 (“Speculation can be used to reduce the perceived performance overhead of error
detection mechanisms.”). One can use speculation to get:
1. the low chance of false negatives of a personalized and randomized fine-grained
system call model,
2. the low chance of false alarms of dynamic taint analysis, and
3. the low performance overhead of system call interception.
SwitchBlade has several restrictions. First, it is currently only applicable to stateless
applications and stateful applications for which an application-level check-pointing mech-
anism exists. Second, we require the support for replaying application-level requests with
the help of a proxy. Replay mechanisms are technically difficult but can be reused to
achieve other objectives like locating bugs [123], tolerating software bugs [89, 94, 124],
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tolerating server crashes and facilitating load-balancing across machines. Third, our cur-
rent implementation has several shortcomings, in particular, supporting multithreaded
applications and kernel support for deterministic replay of system calls. Fourth, we can
only detect code injections that modify the system call behavior. However, using random-
ization we can make it increasingly difficult for injected code not to modify the system
call behavior.
In Section 2.1, we review the related work before we present the SwitchBlade architec-
ture in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we introduce our system call model. We demonstrate
the need for dynamic model updates and we describe our novel data-flow-based learner
in Section 2.4. We describe the taint analysis in Section 2.5 and the model enforcement
in Section 2.6. The performance and effectiveness of SwitchBlade is investigated in Sec-
tion 2.7. Our evaluation shows that SwitchBlade can provide effective and efficient means
for detecting and containing code injection attacks.
2.1 Related Work
There exist a variety of runtime tools that address certain classes of vulnerabilities, e.g.,
PointGuard [26], FormatGuard [25], StackGuard [24], Stack Shield, LibSafe [9], ProPo-
lice [38], and LibSafePlus [7] to name a few. Some of these tools require the recompi-
lation of the source code and might therefore not be applicable to protect third-party
software. More generic tools exists that cover a larger class of vulnerabilities, e.g., pro-
gram shepherding [61], XFI [37], and dynamic taint-based tools like the ones described
in [28, 55, 81, 115]. For several runtime tools, researchers found ways to circumvent their
detection mechanisms (e.g., [66, 106]).
There exists a significant body of related work in the domain of system call interception
and intrusion detection. System call interception to confine the intrusion into applications
has been used for many years [53, 90, 93]. Intercepting security related operations is even
supported by default in the Linux kernel [135] and is used by security tools such as
AppArmor [11, 27].
System call based intrusion detection systems can broadly be classified into misuse-based
and anomaly-based systems. Misuse-based systems detect deviations from a usage model
while anomaly-based ones detect statistical deviation from safe system call behaviors.
There is a rich set of articles about anomaly-based intrusion detection, e.g., [46, 56, 129,
109, 103, 64, 75]. The basic underlying idea is to look at a window of system calls to detect
deviations to known good windows of system calls. Newer approaches also use system call
arguments [64] and the data-flow between the system calls [14] for the detection. System
call based intrusion detection systems are susceptible to mimicry attacks that imitate the
statistical system call behavior of the application [127].
Misuse-based detection schemes provide a set of rules that describe which system calls
are permitted and which are not [53, 93]. SwitchBlade uses a misuse-based detection
scheme and applies several mechanisms to prevent exploits from evading detection (see
Section 2.3). Creating a good policy with a low false alarm and false negative rate is in
general difficult. [93] points out the difficulties of generating a good policy for system
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call interception: (1) during the learning phase one needs to cover all possible code paths
to reduce the number of false alarms at deploy time, and (2) one needs to make sure
to avoid anomalies (like exploits) during the training phase to reduce the number of
false negatives. We address these two main issues in SwitchBlade by combining a novel
data-flow-oriented model learner and a dynamic taint analysis tool. The authors of [93]
also point out that most of the policy violations they experienced were by a web server
caused by the attempted execution of user-created CGI scripts. Therefore, we applied
SwitchBlade to two web servers.
The policy used by SwitchBlade is quite different from those used by tools such as
SysTrace [93] or AppArmor. SwitchBlade focuses on checking of the sequencing of system
calls. We derived the system call model from the model carrying code approach [104] in
which the model is used to confine mobile code. We added explicit garbage collection for
model variables and we can tag arguments as being constant (see Section 2.3). Also, we
learn the system call model via data flow analysis to ensure the accuracy of the data-flow
constraints of the models.
Korset [13] also enforces a system call model. In contrast to SwitchBlade and [104]
Korset extracts the system call model at compile time with static analysis. Thus, Korest
does not support personalisation as every site enforces the same system call model ex-
tracted from the application’s source code. Furthermore, we believe that it is difficult to
extract a system call model statically for applications that make heavy use of dynamically
loaded plug-ins (such as Apache).
Checking the arguments of system calls can introduce races that might permit to cir-
cumvent this security mechanism. The Time Of Check To Time Of Use (TOCTTOU)
problem is well studied in the literature [51]. Watson [130] shows that several system
call interposition frameworks (Systrace [93], GWSTK [48], CerbNG [32]) are susceptible
to races that are particularly easy to exploit on modern multicore systems. The main
issue is that arguments that are passed to the kernel via pointers can be modified by
a concurrent thread between the time of check and the time of use. Our approach to
counter TOCTTOU attacks is to rely on information that is vulnerable to TOCTTOU
attacks, such as the system call number and system call arguments (but no buffers in
user-space). System call number and system call arguments are passed in registers into
the kernel. Therefore, a concurrent thread has no access to the system call number and
arguments. In this work we focus on the temporal order of system calls and some limited
data-flow checking of the syscall arguments [14] and it could easily be extended to do
more argument and data-flow checking.
Waston’s approach [130] is to set up arguments and spawn threads in such a way that
page faults increase the chances that a race can be successfully exploited. Setting up these
arguments and threads involves the execution of system calls. These system calls are not
executed in the original program and, hence, most likely these system calls would be
flagged as violating the normal sequence of system calls. Anomaly-based approaches use
statistics on the sequencing of system calls to detect code injections. However, a smart
attacker can execute additional system calls to make the sequence of executed system
calls look normal [127]. In SwitchBlade, we do not use a statistical model but instead a
model that describes for a given application the temporal order of system calls and the
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data-flow between the system calls (see Sec. 2.3). Currently, we only check arguments
passed in registers, i.e., we are not susceptible to TOCTTOU attacks.
Dynamic taint analysis [115, 28, 81, 55, 95] keeps track of untrusted input data, and
detects attempts to misuse such tainted data, e.g., as a jump target. Several approaches to
implement taint analysis exist based on emulation using emulators like QEMU [12], based
on dynamic binary rewriting tools like Valgrind [78], or using hardware support. Using
MMU support, [55] can dynamically switch between executing in QEMU while needing
to track tainted data and executing natively when no tainted data is accessed. Recall
that SwitchBlade only switches to taint mode after we detected a system call model
violation. After a system call model became sufficiently complete, this should mainly
happen because of the activation of an exploit. SwitchBlade provides in this case a way
to reproduce the exploit and, hence, a way to help locating and fixing the vulnerability.
One possible application domain of SwitchBlade is to protect applications from worms.
A reactive worm defense [23, 19, 92, 124, 18] consists of a set of monitoring sites that
detect exploits and generated exploit-specific signatures. Signatures are used to filter out
worm code from network traffic. These signatures might however not protect against
polymorphic worms. One could address polymorphic worms by shipping vulnerability-
specific execution filters like [80, 124]: the taint analysis is restricted to known exploits
and in this way the overhead of the taint analysis can be reduced. However, all reactive
worm defense systems have a vulnerability window that stretches from the time the worm
starts spreading until the time a signature or execution filter is received and installed by
a node. Sweeper [124] provides additionally a repair mechanism for detected infections
by rolling back to an uninfected check-point.
SwitchBlade instead permits preventive worm defense. Worms need to communicate
with the external world and, hence, are forced to perform system calls. This makes
them detectable by system call interception and in this way they can be prevented from
spreading.
2.2 SwitchBlade Architecture
The objective of SwitchBlade is to detect exploits with a very high likelihood while en-
suring a low false alarm rate and a low performance overhead. SwitchBlade’s general
architecture is depicted in Figure 2.1. SwitchBlade’s primary method for detecting ex-
ploits is a process-specific, fine-granular system call model (see Section 2.3). The system
call model describes the set of permissible sequences of system calls, provides constraints
on the data-flow of arguments of the system calls and the locations they can be called
from. In our current implementation the system call model is speculatively enforced with
the help of a Linux kernel module.
Assumption 2.1. An attacker has to execute system calls in the context of the attacked
application achieve her goal.
As already outlined, our approach is based on the assumption that an attacker will make
the application perform system calls, for instance, to start a shell or to open a network
14
2.2 SwitchBlade Architecture
AApplication
confinement
system call 
interface
Syscall Model
Enforcement
Proxy
TCP
TCP
clients
normal 
mode
Application taint analysis
taint 
mode
 requests/replies/
checkpoint
update
model
signal
violationsystem call 
interface
kernel module
replay
requests application-level
checkpoint
marked
tainted
Figure 2.1: SwitchBlade architecture: in normal mode, all system calls are checked against
a system call model. Violations result in a switch to taint mode, in which the
last requests are replayed using a fine-granular data flow and control flow
analysis. To facilitate replays, all network traffic is routed through a proxy.
connection to another server. These system calls are very likely not part of our process-
specific, fine-granular system call model. Hence, we need to detect when an applications
deviates from its system call model to detect an attack.
SwitchBlade requires that we can roll back an application to a previous state in case
of a violation of the system call model. We then replay the outstanding requests in taint
mode to decide if the model violation was caused by mis-speculation, i.e., an incomplete
model or by an intrusion. In a stateless server, the outstanding requests are all requests
that have not yet been replied to. In a stateful server these are all requests that need to
be processed after the most recent check-point was taken.
Because of non-determinism in the execution, a model violation in normal mode might
not reoccur during replay. This could result in a performance penalty because we might
have to switch multiple times to taint mode and then switch back to normal before,
eventually, we might succeed to extend the system call model. In our experience this
is not an issue and models grow nicely with the number of model violations (see also
Section 2.7).
Roll back of speculative processing (in enforcement mode) can in general be supported
via check-pointing of application state and logging of input and output. For logging, we
use the standard approach of sending all client interactions through a proxy. The proxy
is application-specific and maintains the set of requests since the last application check-
point. Checkpoints contain sufficient state to permit an application to roll back and then
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Figure 2.2: Execution of an application under SwitchBlade. Violations of the model result
in the re-execution of the affected request in taint mode. If the violation was
caused by a false alarm, the model is updated appropriately.
replay/continue the execution. In SwitchBlade, we cannot use check-points that simply
save the content of the entire address space. When restarting the application in taint
mode, we would not know which parts of the address space are tainted and which are not.
Tainting the entire address space would result in a high false alarm rate. Our approach
is to use an application-level check-pointing mechanism. Most applications can save the
state that is essential for them to recover from a crash and taint-based approaches can
deal with such application-level check-points. For example, text editors (such as Vim)
safe the state of the currently edited buffer periodically to disk. For stateless servers we
do not need an application-level check-pointing mechanism. For switching to taint mode
the server is always restarted from its initial state. The proxy then resends all outstanding
requests that have not been replied before the model violation.
A more detailed view of SwitchBlade is given in Figure 2.2. A server process initially
starts in taint mode, forks a child process that switches on system call enforcement for
itself before it goes to normal mode to process the first request. Starting a server in taint-
mode ensures confidentially in its initial state. Requests are processed until a violation
is detected. The parent is notified via a signal of the violation and spawns a new child
process that processes the outstanding requests in taint mode before switching back to
normal mode. If during taint mode a security violation is detected (e.g., using a tainted
address as a jump target), all outstanding requests are dropped and the child terminates.
The parent can continue by spanning a new child that processes the next out-standing
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Figure 2.3: Syscall Model of Arithmetic Unixbench Benchmark.
request. Thus, the attack is detected and tolerated (by dropping the attacking request).
If no vulnerability is found in taint mode, but a deviation from the current system call
model is detected, the system call model is extended to cover the replayed execution. The
proxy ensures that the replay is not visible to the client (except for some slight delay).
The model is updated in the kernel and system call model enforcement is switched on
before the process leaves taint mode.
2.3 System Call Model
To give an intuition for how a system call model looks like Figure 2.3 shows the system
call model of the Arithmetic Unixbench benchmark. State l0 is the backtrace of the first
getrusage system call. The backtrace of a system call is the sequence of all return
addresses on the stack at the time when the system call is issued. The next allowed
system call is the second getrusage at node l1 and so on. State l6 is the end state
and is not associated with a backtrace. When reaching the end state no system calls
must be issued anymore. The data-flow between the system calls is constrained: the first
argument of the write and the close call have to be the return value of the open call.
The variable v1 denotes the data-flow from open, via write to close. The digit 4
identifies the register that carries the first system call argument. Thus, 4 = v1 means
that the first argument must have the same value that open returned at l4. The suffix
:free denotes that v1 can be garbage collected at l3.
Definition 2.1. A stack backtrace is the sequence of return addresses on the stack.
Definition 2.2. A system call model is a graph in which each node represents a unique
stack backtrace and edges represent system calls with optional argument constraints.
One can compute the backtrace at runtime (with techniques also used by debuggers)
for instance with the help of frame pointers. No source code is needed for computing the
backtrace. An edge from a node nsrc to node ndest that is labeled sys N means that the
system call with system call number N is called with the backtrace that is represented
by ns. Because an edge defines the transition from one node to its successor, we use the
terms edge and transition synonymously. For any system call number N and any two
nodes, there exists at most one edge that is labeled with sys N. For better readability we
often replace sys N by the name of the system call, e.g., open or write. Typically, all
edges starting from a node refer to the same system call number. However, some library
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l17
v16 = mmap2(12 == 0x0, 8 == 0x3, 24 == 0x22, 28 == 0xffffffff)
l18
write(12 == v14, 4 == v16)
l21
getppid()
l19
getppid()
l22
write(4 == v20)
l23write(4 == v20:free)
write(12 == v14, 4 == v16) l0
exit_group(12 == 0x0)l20fstat64()
v20 = mmap2(12 == 0x0, 8 == 0x3, 24 == 0x22, 28 == 0xffffffff)
...
Figure 2.4: Programs might not always close handles. The system call model can some-
times remove values from variable sets even if they are not freed by the pro-
gram. In this case, the file descriptor is removed from set v20 on the last write
call.
functions do not properly update the frame pointer and, thus, some return addresses on
the stack are not part of the computed backtrace. This can result in (rare) cases in models
in which different system calls are issued with the same incomplete backtrace. This also
implies that there can be multiple edges between two nodes.
The outgoing edges of a node nsrc determine the set of system calls that are permitted
to be executed with the backtrace associated with nsrc. If there are k outgoing edges from
a node nsrc, then a system call executed with the backtrace represented by nsrc has to
match at least one of the k edges. Matching means that the system call number N of the
edge and the number of the executed system call are identical and all argument constraints
are satisfied (see below). The edges that match determine the set of backtraces of the
next system call. As soon as the backtrace of the next system call is known, only one
edge is permitted to match. Say that the backtrace of the next system call is represented
by node ndest, then there must be exactly one edge between nsrc and ndest that matches
the system call with backtrace nsrc.
The system call model not only determines the permissible sequence of system calls,
but it also restricts the data-flow between system calls. Edges may therefore constrain
the arguments of the system calls. We achieve this by introducing variables and constants
in the system call model. Each model variable represents a set of values. A model can
contain argument constraints of the form a = v on edges. This means that the value of
argument a must be in set v. Most of these arguments contain handles like file descriptors
or sockets. Currently, we only support arguments that are passed in registers. Note, in
the automatically generated model graphs (e.g., see Figure 2.3) arguments are described
by their offset in the architectural depending CPU-state. For instance, 4 is the offset
of the register ebx on x86. Register ebx carries the first argument of a system call on
x86-Linux. Thus, 4 = v means that the value of the first system call argument has to be
in the set of variable v.
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Some arguments are always constant, e.g., one might pass always the same file name
that is stored at a fix address and with a constant set of permission flags. We support
constraints that say that an arguments is constant. These are of the form a = c where c
is a constant value, e.g., a = 0x3. One could support a set of constants (as we support
variables that contain a set of values; see below). However, for efficiency, our model
and implementation is currently restricted to one value. Figure 2.4 depicts a model that
contains several constant arguments. Note that, if a constant pointer points to a code
page or a read-only page, an attacker will not be able to control this argument because
this would require to make the page writeable. This would in turn require a system call
and this system call would with a high likelihood not be covered by the system call model.
We omitted the constant arguments in all following system call models for readability.
During runtime one can add and remove values from the model variables. The model
permits to define one model variable per edge. The return value of the system call executed
at this edge is stored in the set represented by this variable. In the graph we denote this
by edge labels of the form vi = sys N. For example, an open call returns a file descriptor,
which might be added to a model variable v and a later write call might contain an
argument constraint that says the first argument has to be in v. If a variable is never used
as an input argument, we drop it from the model. This means that we do not need to
maintain a model variable for each system call during runtime but only for those system
calls whose return value may be used as an argument in some later system call.
We have to be able to remove values from the variable sets at runtime. To do so, we
can add a free attribute to the edge at which a variable value is used the last time. For
example, in Figure 2.3 we remove the value from variable v that is passed as argument to
close. We represent the removal with the suffix :free. However, handles might not
always be closed as depicted in Figure 2.4, where, no call to close is issued for v20. We
can nevertheless remove the values from the variable set because from a model perspective
we are only interested in keeping values that might still be used in an argument constraint.
For example, see the edge from node l21 to node l23 in Figure 2.4. There we remove the
value of the file descriptor argument passed to write from the variable v20.
Our system call model is similar to the one used in [104] to predict what system calls
an application will perform. The main differences are with respect to the constraints of
arguments in which we restrict ourselves to simple checks on system call arguments passed
in registers. Moreover, our model explicitly states when certain model variables can be
garbage collected and which arguments are constant. More importantly, we personalize
and randomize the model since our use of the model is different from that of [104].
2.3.1 Personalization
Most injected code will have to perform system calls to achieve its purpose. For example,
a worm will try to connect to other hosts, or an injected keyboard logger would need to
write the keystrokes somewhere. To stay undetected by SwitchBlade, an exploit would
need to:
1. perform system calls in an order that is consistent with the system call model,
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2. for each system call, the backtrace needs to match the sequence in the model, and
3. the arguments of a system call need to satisfy all argument constraints active for
the call.
To maximize the chances that an exploit violates the system call model – and unlike
other system call interception approaches – we want to personalize the system call model.
Our goal is to use a minimal system call model that describes the permissible sequences
of system calls of an application within a given environment. We show in Section 2.4
that system call models are dependent on many factors like the clients of a protected
server application and the error rate of the underlying system. Hence, by only permitting
the system call sequences SwitchBlade observed in a given environment, we restrict the
possibilities of an attacker.
An attacker cannot just study the source code or program traces of another installation
to know for sure which sequences are permitted and which are not. For example, in a
given environment certain program features might be disabled by a configuration file. Our
system call model should therefore prohibit system call behaviors specific to the disabled
features. Of course, an attacker could always try to restrict herself to a minimal system
call model. We show in the next section how to minimize the chance of a successful attack
by using randomization.
The potential disadvantages of personalizing the system call model are:
• one needs to learn the system call model in each environment, and
• the probability of false alarms will most likely increase because one cannot invest
as much time in training in each environment as if all training would happen once
centrally for all environments.
We address these two issues by automatic learning and updating the system call model
at runtime (see Section 2.4). This facilitates the use of personalized system call models
without increasing the risk of false alarms and with a low training overhead.
2.3.2 Randomization
Our goal is to detect code injections with a high likelihood even if these do not change
the original system call behavior. Personalization makes it already more difficult to find
permissible system call sequences. However, an attacker might still find system call se-
quences that are permitted in most environments. To minimize the chance that an exploit
succeeds in imitating the system call behavior even further, we randomize the model in
two ways. By default, Linux randomizes the location at which dynamic link libraries are
loaded. This automatically randomizes the return addresses in backtraces. Our approach
supports this randomization by updating the expected addresses in the system call model
accordingly. An attacker would have to figure out the expected return addresses on the
stack for each system call that she wants to perform (without performing any other system
calls).
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Figure 2.5: Extract from system call model for Apache worker processes.
We do not solely r ly on address space randomization. We also randomize the system
call model by injecting random system calls. We implemented a wrapper generator that
can wrap library functions used by an application and/or functions within an application.
These function wrappers call system calls with a random and invalid system call number
(32bit size) before and/or after calling the original function. Figure 2.5.b shows a random-
ized version of the partial Apache model depicted in Figure 2.5.a. The generated random
wrapper inserts a new system call sys 2533835 between open and socketcall. The
execution of an invalid system call is particularly fast because the kernel performs a simple
check if the system call number is valid, If it is not, the call just returns with an error
code that is ignored by the wrapper.
Our wrapper generator uses randomization to generate new wrappers. Different instal-
lations of an application can have different random wrappers and, hence, have different
system call models. Because of our dynamic model learner it is possible to have different
wrappers for different executions of the same installation of an application. Each time
the application is started a new random wrapper is generated. Because of the randomiza-
tion the attacker cannot reason about a specific wrapper, even if she knows the wrapper
generator.
An attacker would have to inject code that can guess or somehow figures out at runtime
the permitted sequence of system calls together with the correct backtrace for each system
call. One possible way to achieve this would be to emulate the original code using an
emulation framework. However, the emulation framework would have to stay undetected.
Therefore, it would have to work without library/application functions and system calls.
The original code would be used as an oracle for the right calling sequence of system calls
for the attacking code. To prevent this attack, we need to hide the wrapper code from
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the attacker. We want to set all pages containing wrapper code as execution only, i.e., we
would prohibit any read accesses of the wrapper code. This would prevent the emulation
of the wrappers. Changing the protection of wrapper pages would require a system call
that would, by definition, violate the system call model. Supporting execute only pages
on IA32 is possible but non-trivial and would require changes to the Linux kernel. So far,
we have however not implemented these changes.
Preventing read access to the wrapper code, will prevent the emulation of code that
might contain system calls. Since an attacker would not know which functions contain
system calls and which not, injected code would have to call all functions in the original
order to stay undetected. Moreover, changing the arguments to these functions might
result in:
• a sequence of system calls that was not experienced during learning or
• a data-flow between system calls that might not be covered by the model.
In other words, by inserting more random invalid system calls in the program code, we can
make it more and more difficult for an attacker to come up with a permissible sequence
of system calls.
Our wrapper generator combines personalization with randomization, by generating
one random wrapper per application installation. Furthermore, it is possible to start the
same application with different random wrappers. We can increase the randomization
even further by adding random data-flow and random but constant arguments.
2.4 Model Learner
SwitchBlade can learn and update the system call model at runtime. The need for dynamic
model updates not only stems from our approach to use personalized and randomized
system call models but is a general problem of system call interposition frameworks. To
motivate this, we first show several measurements indicating the problem of coming up
with a good system call model, i.e., one that has a low false alarm rate.
2.4.1 Problem: False Positives
As stated in Thesis 2 the system call model of an application depends on the applica-
tion’s environment. This dependency can lead to an unacceptably high false alarm rate
for model-based system call monitoring. The model is typically learned by the use of
traces (e.g., see [104]). One can easily see that tracing can lead to incomplete models in
which nodes (i.e., backtraces) and transitions (system calls with argument constraints)
are missing. For example, it is unlikely that all error handling code is executed during
tracing. Typically, error handlers will issue additional system calls, e.g., for logging error
messages. Figure 2.6 shows the growth of the system call model for grep when injecting
errors into malloc: in each run another malloc call returned NULL. During high system
load one needs to expect a higher likelihood of executing error handling code because of
resource depletion problems. An incomplete system call model, i.e., that does not cover
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Figure 2.6: Model size of grep grows when we inject errors in the form of returning error
codes for random system calls during tracing. The number of states grows
from 36 to 79 and the number of transitions from 46 to 129.
all error handling, might result in false alarms. In other words, without dynamic updates
the model enforcer will abort the application because of model violations at times when
the system is used (needed) most.
As already mentioned before, changes in a program’s configuration files might also result
in a different system call behavior, e.g., by switching from a centralized logging demon to
local logging.
Different client programs can also trigger different code sequences in a server program.
Since the impact of different client applications might be less clear, we measured its impact
for Apache. Figure 2.7 shows the size of models generated for Apache depending on the
client program used. The unified model was generated using five different client programs:
we used four different browser versions and wget to retrieve the same sequence of web
pages from an Apache web server. Figure 2.7 already shows that it is not enough focus on
one client in the learning phase. Especially, using the easily scriptable wget only leads
to an incomplete system call model.
Figure 2.8 shows the overlap of the different Apache models. While the overlap in nodes
(i.e., backtraces) is relatively high, the overlap in edges is much less pronounced. To give
an impression of how the models differ from each other, we depict the three nodes and
some of the edges that are missing from the wget-generated Apache model in comparison
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Figure 2.7: Model sizes for Apache when learned with different client programs.
to the unified model (Figure 2.9). Three of the reasons for divergent models are:
• Slightly different requests from the clients, e.g., User-Agent field.
• Web-browsers in contrast to wget automatically try to fetch a file containing a
web-site icon (favicon.ico).
• Connections can be used to transmit more than one request/reply pair. How many
request/reply pairs are transfered per connection and who closes the connection
depends on both the server and the client application.
A major problem of the enforcement of an incomplete system call model is that it might
be used for denial of service attacks. For Apache it might be sufficient for an attacker
to browse with an uncommon browser to cause the abort of an Apache worker process.
While Apache will spawn a new worker process, this might nevertheless lead to a major
reduction in throughput for all clients when a new browser version becomes available.
For example, even minor changes from one browser version to another (like from Firefox
1.5 to Firefox 1.5.10; see Figure 2.7) can modify the system call model. This can lead to
model violations which in turn can result in an increased service unavailability.
One might guess that the issue of incomplete models is mainly caused by the kind of
model we are using. For example, some system calls associated with the missing transition
of the wget-generated Apache model depicted in Figure 2.9 are actually already known
from other transitions. More specifically, the open going to l19 is the same as going to
l20. The same is true for the sendfile64, socketcall between l28, l30, and l27
as well as, between l28, l29, and l16, respectively. Hence, omitting the backtrace of a
system call would merge l19 and l20 (and so on) and, thereby, minimize false alarms.
But it might potentially increase false negatives which we want to avoid. To investigate
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the issue of incomplete models, we also looked at alternative security mechanisms such
as AppArmor. In our experiments we used an early (but at that time the only available)
AppArmor profile for Firefox and displayed more than 10,000 pages. This resulted in a
variety of policy violations. We adapted the profile to get Firefox 1.5 to run with the set
of pages we experimented with. To do so, we needed to add 124 lines, remove 5 lines and
modify 22 lines to the profile. Of course, we were not always sure if there was a policy
violation or a real exploit of Firefox because some of the 10,000 pages contained exploits
that worked for earlier versions of Firefox. Hence, using taint analysis during learning
of the model is an important feature of SwitchBlade to make sure that we do not learn
model transitions caused by malicious code.
2.4.2 Data-flow-Based Learner
Sekar et al. [104] describe a trace-based learner that tries to match values returned by
some system call with arguments passed into subsequent system calls. For example, if
there are two calls to open and the first returns value 1 and the second value 2 and a
later call to write uses value 2 for the file descriptor, then the system learns that the 2nd
open call and the write call are linked. The trace-based learner needs a specification
of potential data-flow. The specification relates return values and arguments of different
system calls (e.g., the return value of open can be used as argument for read, write and
close). Without the specification a learner would interpret values that are accidentally
equal as data-flow, e.g., open returns the same file descriptor value that is used as flag
argument prot for a call to mmap. Learning in this way can result in wrong connections
between system calls because values can be identical for other reasons. Also, some system
calls S1, ... , Sk in a trace might return the same value x and x is later passed as an
argument to another system call Ss and it is not always clear which (if any) system call Sp
(p ∈ {1, .., k}) did indeed produce value x. In other words, it is not always certain which
system calls should be connected via argument constraints in the system call model. To
distinguish between the different options, one would have to try to produce additional
traces in which the system calls return different values that permit the learner to decide
which system call produced a certain argument.
SwitchBlade tracks the data-flow of an application to learn the system call model of an
application. In the above example, the data-flow analysis permits us to determine exactly
which (if any) of the system calls produced the value x. Also, the data-flow analysis
permits us to determine if some of the arguments might be constants.
To track the data-flow between system calls, SwitchBlade dynamically instruments the
binary code using Valgrind [78], a binary instrumentation and analysis framework. The
learning of the model is always performed in taint mode, i.e., in a mode in which we
anyhow track the data-flow of an application. Hence, we use a combined Valgrind tool
for taint analysis (see Section 2.5) and learning.
Our instrumentation assigns to each executed system call a unique ID (SCID) and
records the backtrace of each call. Each return value of a system call is tagged with the
SCID. Whenever this value is copied to another memory location or register, the new
location/register is also tagged with the SCID. If a location is cleared or modified in some
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other way, we remove the SCID from this location. We use the standard approach of
keeping a shadow memory as described in [77] to track the SCID: we maintain 32-bit of
shadow information for each register and potentially each word in memory. The shadow
information does not only contain the SCID but also whether the content of the location
contains a constant and whether it is tainted, i.e., untrusted data (see Section 2.5).
To track if a word contains a constant, we initially mark all code segments as containing
constants. Whenever a word is read from a code page, the destination is also marked as
constant. However, even if two constants are used as an input of an operation, we do not
mark the result as a constant. Note that even if a memory location holding a program
variable v is marked as constant, this does not necessarily mean that v indeed is a constant:
the value of v could of course depend on the control flow of the executed program. We use
this marking to determine if an argument of a system call could be marked as constant in
the system call model. This reduces the overhead of the learner because we only attempt
to learn if an argument is a constant if it is marked as such by the data-flow analysis.
The learner records for each system call Si the system call number SN , the backtrace
b, the SCIDs of the arguments (if any), and if arguments are marked as being constant. If
the backtrace b is not yet part of the current model, we add a new node Nb that denotes
the new backtrace. When executing the next system call Si+1 with a backtrace b
′, we
check if there is already an edge between Nb and N
′
b that is marked with SN . If this edge
does not yet exist, we add it and mark it with SN and the argument constraints. For
each argument a that contains a SCID, we add an argument constraint a = v, where, v is
the model variable associated with the SCID. If such a model variable does not yet exist,
we add it to the model. For example, if the SCID refers to a system call sys n with a
backtrace x, we add to all outgoing edges from node Nx the prefix “vx = sys n”.
If an argument a is marked as a constant, we add a constraint a = c, where, c is the
value that was passed as argument.
If the edge already exists, we check if it is consistent with our current observation.
It is of course possible that the argument constraints of an edge might change between
different calls. For example, the first time the edge is executed, argument a may contain
a value of some variable v while in the second call a may contain the value of a different
model variable v′. To address this issue, we could permit disjunctions in constraints, i.e.,
a = v∨v′. For now, we decided to keep the model simple and instead remove a constraint
if we observe conflicting constraints.
Our learner does not only learn data flow that can be derived from the system call
specification (e.g.: the file descriptor argument of read was returned by some open).
Other data flow like using the returned memory address from a mmap call as buffer for a
recv is also learned.
Sekar’s et al. [104] trace based learner uses interface specifications for adding data-flow
to its models. These interface specifications explicitly name constructors and destructors
for every potential data-flow. For instance open and close are the constructor and
destructor for the file descriptor interface, respectively. For our data-flow-based learner
any system call is a potential constructor. Destructors are more difficult, but neverthe-
less, important to extract. At runtime, destructors garbage-collect no longer used model
variables. Without the garbage-collection the set of variables might grow infinitely at
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Memory to check New
tainted return address
tainted jump addresses calculated at runtime
tainted format strings
tainted code at jump targets x
tainted heap meta data before free x
Table 2.1: Checks done by TaintCheck to detect and block exploits.
runtime. Therefore, our model learner marks any last usage of a variable with a :free.
At runtime, the variable referred an argument marked with :free is garbage-collected.
For example, in Figure 2.3 (page 17) the file descriptor value passed to close is removed
from model variable v1. The last usages of a variable v are all edges e where v is a system
call argument and where from e no other edge e′ is reachable where v is a system call
argument.
2.5 Taint Analysis
Taint analysis is a well-known approach to detect and block code exploits. It can be
implemented using a dynamic binary instrumentation framework like Valgrind [78]. One
of the main advantages of this approach is that it works for arbitrary binaries without the
need for recompilation. We have reimplemented the taint analysis tool TaintCheck [81]
using our own data-flow engine. We added the support to generate traces to learn system
call models (see Section 2.4). We also modified Valgrind to be able to switch to a native
execution. This allows us to remove the overhead of Valgrind while running with system
call enforcement switched on.
2.5.1 TaintCheck
Valgrind runs an application on a simulated CPU under the control of our TaintCheck tool.
In this way, TaintCheck marks data from suspicious sources as tainted, traces tainted data
flow, and blocks the usage of tainted data at vulnerable points. TaintCheck has a very low
false alarm and false negative rate. One reason why tools like the original TaintCheck are
not more widely used to protect vulnerable applications is Valgrind’s enormous slowdown
(see Section 2.7).
TaintCheck maintains for each byte of memory and all CPU registers a shadow bit.
This shadow bit is set to 1 if the corresponding byte of memory or register is tainted.
Initially, all shadow bits are set to 0. In our current configuration all data that is read form
the network is marked as tainted. Optionally, data from the file system can be marked
as tainted too. Additionally, the software itself can mark data as tainted. Whenever
memory words or registers are copied, their corresponding shadow bits are copied too. In
that way we trace the propagation of tainted data throughout the address space of the
application.
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Table 2.1 lists all checks executed by our extended TaintCheck to detect and block
exploits. All data is checked before it is used as a jump target, as format strings or to
concatenate heap blocks after freeing them. Whenever a taint check evaluates to true,
the corresponding operation is not executed. Instead, the current process is aborted with
a detailed error message. The last two checks in Table 2.1 are not part of the original
TaintCheck. We added them for completeness and better debugging. The first check
is necessary if an attacker is able to overwrite code without changing the control flow.
The second check is redundant because it should not detect anything that would not be
detected by the other checks. However, it directly points to the vulnerable heap block
and, thus, eases debugging.
2.5.2 Escaping Valgrind
Initially, we start the application under the control of TaintCheck. For stateless server
applications, we take one process-level check-point (which is currently implemented by a
simple fork) to be able to restart quickly in taint mode in case the model enforcer detects
a model violation. After taking the check-point, we switch on the model enforcement
and then switch from the simulated CPU under the control of Valgrind and TaintCheck
to the real CPU. Therefore, we implemented an Escape feature for Valgrind. When an
application wants to escape Valgrind, the state of the virtual CPU is copied to the real one
and the application’s execution then proceeds on the real CPU. This is possible because
Valgrind does not modify the memory layout of the application running on the simulated
CPU.
TaintCheck stops after the escape. Thereafter, no data is marked tainted and no data
flow is traced. While this might permit an attacker to change the control flow without
being detected and to contaminate the application’s state, the model enforcer confines
the effects of such an attack and will detect it as soon as the system call behavior deviates
from the model. Our current implementation does not permit to switch back to Valgrind
after an escape. This would be difficult to do correctly: If a vulnerability is detected by
the model enforcer, the attacker might already have contaminated the application’s state
and the control flow. Even if one could roll back to, say, some earlier process-level check-
point, we would neither have taint information (unless we roll back to a point before we
escaped from Valgrind) nor would we know if the state might be corrupted already. We
address this issue by using application-level check-points to which we roll back for replay.
2.5.3 Replay of Requests
After the model enforcer detects an attack, it stops the application. To test if the detected
attack is a false alarm because of an incomplete model, the outstanding requests are re-
executed (see Figure 2.2 on page 16). Because the current state of the application might
be contaminated by an attacker, we roll back to a known clean state that was still under
the control of TaintCheck.
If the application is stateful, we load the most recent application-level check-point from
disk. As this check-point could be already contaminated by an attacker the complete
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check-point is marked as tainted, i.e., we do not trust the information that is in the
check-point. From here on we replay all outstanding requests by asking the proxy to
transmit them again.
During replay the execution does not escape from TaintCheck. Thus, TaintCheck veri-
fies during the re-execution of the outstanding requests that no attack is taking place. The
model learner checks if the model needs to be updated. In taint mode the enforcement
of the system call model is switched off. If no exploit is detected during the re-execution,
the learner will update the model.
The proxy ensures that a client does not see that its requests are replayed, i.e., duplicate
replies are filtered by the proxy. SwitchBlade is transparent for client applications as long
as they do not try to inject code into the server application.
For simple stateless server applications we created a generic wrapper library that pro-
vides transparent support for running stateless applications under SwitchBlade. In par-
ticular, we do not require any changes of the source code for stateless server applications
that serve a single connection per execution (e.g., servers spawned via inetd). The
generic wrapper library takes the initial process-level check-point (e.g., using fork) and
switches from TaintCheck mode to model enforcing. We have used this approach for the
micro benchmarks in Section 2.7.4. Servers serving multiple connections need some mod-
ifications of the application because some code for the initial check-pointing needs to be
added to the application.
Although, it is in principle possible to substitute the proxy with system call recording
and replay as used in [110, 94] and Chapter 3, it is technically difficult. The reason is
that Valgrind changes the application’s behavior on system call level. For performance
reasons, the enforcement mode runs without Valgrind. In the learning mode we need
to enable Valgrind for the taint analysis and the data flow learner. Valgrind adds new
system calls, e.g., to manage the memory for its own book-keeping. Some system calls
(like sigaction) are completely implemented in Valgrind, they are not passed through
to the kernel2. Therefore, the sequence of system calls recorded in enforcement mode
would not match the sequence of system calls issued in learner mode. Hence, it is not
enough to record the system calls in enforcement mode and play them back in learner
mode. With the proxy, we abstract from the system call level. The proxy replays network
connections and indirectly the required system calls. But other system calls, for instance
for memory management, are newly executed and not replayed.
2.6 Model Enforcement
The model enforcement ensures that an application escaped from the control of Taint-
Check follows the application’s system call model. Therefore, model enforcement must
intercept all system calls the application performs, compute the backtraces of all seen
system call and compare these backtraces to the possible next states of the system call
2Valgrind registers its own signal handlers. When the protected application calls sigaction the pointer
to the application’s signal handler is just stored in an internal variable. When signaled, Valgrind’s
signal handler calls the application’s signal handler referenced by that variable.
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model.
We implemented our model enforcement tool as kernel module for Linux 2.6.20. Using
the Linux Security Module (LSM), which is an interface to intercept security-related oper-
ations [135], would have been one option. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems like
AppArmor and SELinux [71] are implemented on top of LSM. But our system call models
are more fine-grained than the security policies of AppArmor and SELinux. We believe
that SwitchBlade might therefore detect attacks earlier because an attacker might have to
perform some system calls to setup the system call that is detected by the MAC system.
We did not use LSM to intercept the systems calls because LSM does not intercept all
system calls. Instead we use the utrace framework [72]. The utrace framework allows
us to intercept and analyse all system calls an application does (similar to ptrace but
in kernel space).
In this section we use the term enforced application and enforced process to denote
an application and process running under the control of the model enforcer. The model
enforcer checks that the application/process follows its given system call model.
2.6.1 Loading the System Call Model
When a process switches from TaintCheck to model enforcement, TaintCheck informs the
model enforcer that the system call model for the current process needs to be enforced.
Directly after this, the control is switched from the simulated CPU to the real CPU using
TaintCheck’s escaping feature (see Section 2.5.2). This switch does not need a system
call and, therefore, it does not appear in the system call model. The next system call
performed by the application has to be from one of the starting states of the system call
model.
When a process wants the system call model to be enforced, the model enforcer allocates
space for the model and the model variables and sets the starting state of the enforced
model. The model enforcer intercepts all system calls from all processes. When a system
call is performed by an enforced process, the associated model is checked before performing
the system call. For processes that do not require model enforcement (e.g., in learning
model), the call is forwarded without further checking. The loading of the model and the
request for enforcement are communicated via system calls. Any further attempts by an
already enforced process to communicate with the model enforcer are rejected. Hence,
there is no possibility for an enforced process to communicate to the model enforcer. This
ensures that an enforced process cannot break out of the model enforcer’s control.
2.6.2 Checking System Calls
Before the current system call of an enforced process can be checked, the backtrace of the
system call is extracted from the processes stack. This backtrace is compared with the
list of possible next states. If no state matches the backtrace, the model enforcer stops
the enforced process. If a state matches the system call and its arguments are checked
according to the system call model. If this check succeeds, the system call is performed
and the model state is updated. All possible next states are computed. If necessary, the
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Attacks Without SwitchBlade With SwitchBlade
succeeded 6 0
failed 8 8
detected & aborted 0 6
crashed 4 4
Table 2.2: Result of Wilander’s testbed [133] running natively and under SwitchBlade.
system call’s return value is recorded in the correct model variable. Also, if requested by
the model, values are removed from model variables.
If the check does not succeed, i.e., if a process violates the current model, the system
call is not performed. Instead, the process is stopped but not immediately killed. The
parent process stays in taint mode and waits for the child process to terminate or being
stopped. The parent process is informed when the child is stopped. Now it kills the child
and forks a new child. But this child will stay in taint mode to replay the last requests
for verifying that the detected model violation is no false alarm.
The model enforcer can deal with address space randomization. When a process wants
to be enforced, the model enforcer extracts the mapping of the dynamic linked libraries to
address ranges. This facilitates the comparison of the backtraces of the model (in which
an address is represented as an offset and an unique ID of a dynamic linked library) and
the backtraces extracted from the stack (in which addresses are converted to offsets and
unique ids of dynamic linked libraries).
2.7 Evaluation
Our evaluation of SwitchBlade tests how far we have achieved our three goals: low false
alarm rate, low false negative rate and, good performance. Therefore, we ran a series of
micro benchmarks and applied our approach to the Apache web server. As expected, we
experienced a number of false alarms during system model enforcement. However, we did
not observe any false alarms during replay in taint mode in any of our runs.
All experiments were performed in a virtual machine with 512 MB memory running on
an Intel Core 2 Duo with 2 GBytes RAM. We used Ubuntu 7.04 as operating system.
2.7.1 Synthetic Exploits
The Wilander Testbed [133] is a set of 18 vulnerabilities and exploits. In our environment
and without SwitchBlade of the 18 exploits only six were successful, four resulted in
crashes and 8 had no effect. SwitchBlade detects and confines all six of the otherwise
successful exploits.
We used the Wilanders testbed with our generic check pointing wrapper (see Sec-
tion 2.5.3). We generated an initial system call model for the run of the testbed by
printing the help messages of the testbed – the only mode in which no attack is at-
tempted. The resulting model consists of 27 states and 26 transitions. All 26 transitions
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Figure 2.10: Overhead of SwitchBlade’s normal mode (i.e., system call enforcement) and
executing the same requests in SwitchBlade’s taint mode compared to a
native execution without SwitchBlade. We measured the average connection
time as seen by a client connecting to the proxy for different kinds of content.
were write system calls which resulted from calling the LibC function fprintf. The
27th state is the end state. Each run that performed an attack violated the system call
model and was replayed in taint mode. Table 2.2 shows the result of our experiments.
It demonstrates that SwitchBlade was able to detect and abort all of the six previously
successful attacks. Note that the behavior of all other executions was not affected by
SwitchBlade.
2.7.2 Apache
We applied SwitchBlade to the Apache Webserver. First, we inserted the code for
check-pointing and for replaying outstanding requests. Therefore, we added 181 lines
to server/mpm/prefork/prefork.c. Originally, this file contained 1478 lines. The
changes within the file were very localized. The effort of adding custom check-pointing
and replay support to Apache therefore was very small. We expect a similar effort for
other server applications (see Section 2.7.3 for GazTek HTTP Daemon). Apache sup-
ports loading plug-ins (called Apache modules) at runtime. SwitchBlade does not require
any modification or recompilation of the Apache modules. Apache uses several worker
processes to serve concurrent requests. SwitchBlade protects each worker separately.
Figure 2.10 shows the overhead of the average connection time for different kinds of
content:
• small static A HTML file of 174 bytes (index.html).
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Figure 2.11: Evolution of the Apache system call model for a sequence of 200 requests.
• doc. root The root document accessed implicitly via /. In contrast to small static
Apache must additionally map the URI / to index.html.
• error page Request of an not existing file resulting in the 404 HTTP error page.
• large static A JPEG picture of 100,162 bytes.
• dynamic A hello world PHP script.
In all three configurations we used a proxy between the client and the Apache server.
The overhead of SwitchBlade in normal mode (i.e., with system call model enforcement)
varied between 3.8% for a static 400 byte file and 25.5% for retrieving a static 100 K
byte file. If we keep the server process in taint mode instead (and without system call
enforcement and without TaintCheck), the overhead varies between 50.0% and 288.5%.
The overhead of taint mode is 2 times (100k static file) to 76 times (400 byte static file)
larger than the overhead of SwitchBlade in its normal mode of system call enforcement.
We measured how the Apache system call model evolves with an increasing number
of requests (see Figure 2.11). For each requests that requires a new state or transition,
the existing model needs to be updated. Initially, the model is updated frequently and
growing fast but after about a hundred requests the model starts to stabilize. In other
words, even without an explicit learning phase, one can expect that the number of model
changes and, hence, switches to taint mode, will typically happen less and less often.
However, as we pointed out several times, we cannot ever be sure that we reached the
maximum model of a certain installation.
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Figure 2.12: System call model of ghttpd including model of the exploit (bold).
Application Vulnerability Exploit
Apache + PHP 4.4.4 double free in garbage collector inject code
Apache + PHP 4.4.4 double free in garbage collector control flow manipulation
GazTek HTTP v1.4-3 stack overflow in function Log control flow manipulation
Table 2.3: Results of testing SwitchBlade against real world exploits.
2.7.3 Exploits
We have tested SwitchBlade against three real life exploits: two for the PHP module
for Apache [114, 113], and one for the GazTek HTTP Daemon v1.4-3 (ghttpd) [4]. All
three exploits were detected and aborted by SwitchBlade. Table 2.3 summarizes our
experiments. We tested two different exploits for the same vulnerability in the PHP
engine. One exploit injected code [114] without touching the control flow and the other
one changed the control flow [113]. All three exploits violated the system call model and
forced the server to replay the attacking request in taint mode. The taint analysis was
able to detect and block all three exploits.
For ghttpd, we had to add some code for check-pointing and replay. We added 133
lines to main.c which originally contained 235 lines.
To illustrate how the exploit violates the system call model, we combined ghttpd’s
system call model with the model of the exploit. Figure 2.12 shows the combined model.
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Increase in model size for larger input files
12
1
0
1
0
14
3
0
2
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
diff grep gzip ruby wc
Programs
#
new nodes new edges
Figure 2.13: Change of the size of the models when changing from a small input file to a
larger input file.
The model without exploit is show with the dotted edges. The bold edges show how
the request with the exploit is processed by the application. First, the request follows
the system call model from l1 to l0 (with a loop). But second, the request processing
deviates from the system call model after l0 with a system call execve executed from
backtrace X. This deviation is a system call model violation. This violation is detected
and ghttpd aborted. Thus, execve leads to the end node. After aborting our generic
wrapper library forces the last request of ghttpd to be replayed in taint mode. The
exploit was also discovered in taint mode. Hence, the system call model was not updated.
A detection of an exploit in taint mode results in the abort of the child process and the
dropping of the corresponding connection via the proxy. The parent process will then
spawn a new child that will execute in enforcement mode again.
2.7.4 Micro Benchmarks
We implemented several micro benchmarks to compare the performance overhead of the
system call model enforcement and the taint analysis for common command line tools.
We used our generic wrapper library (see Section 2.5.3). Hence, the command line tools
did not need to be changed.
As expected, the system call models were different for different input files. We first
used small input files (40 KBytes) to generate models for the five utilities and second, we
used much larger input files (5.7 MBytes). We observed that the system call models of
grep, diff and ruby (which runs the same script independent of the input file) differ
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Figure 2.14: Performance overhead of system call model enforcement compared to taint
analysis. We expect that the applications run most of the time in model
enforcement mode.
for the small and the large input files (see Figure 2.13). This is another indication that
generating a general system call model for an application can be difficult.
Figure 2.14 compares the overhead of system call model enforcement to the overhead
of taint analysis for four of the tools. We exclude the runtime measurements for grep
because its execution time – even for large input files – was too brief to get a reproducible
measurement error. All applications were initially started in taint mode and switched to
model enforcement after taking the first check-point. For measuring the performance of
the taint analysis we did not switch to model enforcement mode. The model enforcement
overhead varied between 18% for gzip and 81% for diff. The overhead is larger than
that reported for other system call interception tools (e.g., SysTrace [93], AppArmor and
SELinux). This has two reasons:
• Our system call model is much more fine-grained. All system calls must be inter-
cepted to minimize the possibilities for the attacker to make an attack conform to
the model and to reduce the detection delay. Whereas other system call interception
tools are only interested in the security related subset of the system calls.
However, our goal is to detect an attack as soon as possible, even if the system call
performed by the attack is not security relevant.
• For each system call, the backtrace must be computed.
In contrast to Apache (our primary focus) the enforcement overhead for the four measured
utilities is more pronounced. Apache spends more time doing IO than the four command
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Figure 2.15: Size of Apache model depending on the length of the backtrace.
line utilities. The enormous overhead of the taint analysis has two sources:
• We have not yet optimize our taint-analysis for performance as we use it only as
fall-back.
• Additionally, taint analysis does also track the data flow of system call return values
and constants.
However, we expect that the applications run most of the time under the model enforce-
ment mode with much less overhead.
2.7.5 Model Size
The model generated in [104] used the first return address on the stack that points within
the application to identify a system call. Our backtrace uses all return addresses on
the stack to identify a node. In that way, our model becomes more fine grained. For
example, the model contains parts associated to individual calls to dynamically linked
libraries that issue system calls. For instance, our model of a call to the library function
gethostbyname contains 26 distinct states with 28 transitions. Whereas, a model
that only uses the return addresses within the application has only one state where
all transitions are attached to. An attacker gaining access to the library implement-
ing gethostbyname can issue all system calls of the 28 transitions in an arbitrary order
without violating the model. This is not possible with our system call model because
we use all return addresses. Therefore all 28 system calls get individual nodes and an
attacked cannot freely call them any more.
To quantify the impact of the number of return addresses used to identify a node in
the model, we generated different models for the Apache worker process by restricting
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Figure 2.16: Growing size of the system call model of Vim. Each step contains an action
like saving the file, calling external applications, and using the online help.
the backtrace length. Figure 2.15 shows the number of states and transitions and the
maximum and average out-degree of the nodes of the generated models. The longer the
backtrace, the larger the number of states and transitions. The out-degree of the states
shrinks with a growing length of the backtrace. This indicates that models based on longer
or unrestricted backtraces will be more restrictive. A more restrictive model will make
it more difficult for an attacker to perform system calls without violating the system call
model. In practice, our tool determines the length of the backtrace during initial tracing
so that the number of states in the model is maximized.
2.7.6 Stateful Application
We have tested SwitchBlade with the text editor Vim. The state of Vim is the content
of the currently edited file. Vim performs periodic application-level check-points. Using
the initial system call model results in model violation for various actions such as saving,
calling external applications, and using the online help. Our wrapper detects this and
restarts Vim under TaintCheck. Vim restores its check-point, we can repeat the last
action, the learner updates the model and Vim is restarted under model enforcement.
The model was extended with each action that triggered a model violation according to
TaintCheck’s trace. Figure 2.16 shows the growth of Vim’s system call model. In each
step we one or more actions such as the ones given above. The growing of the average
out-degree from 1.5 to 1.9 (right Y axis) shows that there were more new control flow
operations than new system calls.
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2.8 Conclusion
SwitchBlade automatically hardens an application by putting it into a sandbox. The
sandbox enforces that the application follows a system call model. It trades security
for availability: a detected code injection is converted into an abort. A user can use
SwitchBlade without any changes to the application. However, with minor changes an
application developer can support SwitchBlade with a check-pointing mechanism. Our
changes to Apache allow us to tolerate a code injection by spawning a new worker process
for the affected worker process. The request with the exploit is dropped. For other
applications SwitchBlade can be combined with toleration approaches like Rx [94] or
ASSURE [108]. These toleration approaches are evaluated with simple crash detection
and in contrast to SwitchBlade, successful code injection attacks cannot be detected by
these approaches.
The SwitchBlade system demonstrates that speculation can be used to combine system
call interception (in normal mode) and dynamic taint analysis (when checking violation
of the system call model). The result of this combination is a system that has the low
performance overhead of system call interception but also the low false negative and false
alarm rate of taint analysis. Hence, SwitchBlade demonstrates Thesis 1: “Speculation can
be used to reduce the perceived performance overhead of error detection mechanisms.”.
Another insight of SwitchBlade is that a system call model depends on its application’s
environment (Thesis 2). The implication of Thesis 2 are:
• System call models that are build dynamically are most likely incomplete. A dy-
namic update mechanism like SwitchBlade is needed to avoid false alarms.
• We also have evidence that much more coarse-grained system call models like for Ap-
pArmor suffer from the same incompleteness (see Section 2.4.1) as our fine-grained
system call models. These coarse-grained system call models are written by ex-
perts that need to know the target application. Not only these can experts make
mistakes, but the system call model also depends on the system libraries (like the
libc) and dynamically loaded extensions. System libraries and extensions depend
on individual configurations, that might not be as well known to the experts as
needed to create a complete and secure system call model. Hence, even enforcement
tools of coarse-grained system call models need a dynamic update mechanism like
SwitchBlade.
Our evaluation demonstrates Thesis 3: “System call model enforcement combined with
taint analysis can detect control flow manipulation with in average low performance over-
head, low false positive, and low false negative rate.”. Of course, there is a performance
trade-off. As long as the system call model needs to be updated the performance overhead
is dominated by the learner and the taint-analysis. Our measurements indicate that after
an initial learning phase, on-demand learning is less often needed (see Figure 2.11 and Fig-
ure 2.16). If learning is needed rarly, then the performance overhead is dominated by the
system call model enforcement, which has a negligible performance overhead compared
to the overhead of the learning mode.
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SwitchBlade constraints itself to automatically hardening against security vulnerabili-
ties. It uses speculation without parallelization. The ParExC approach (presented in the
next chapter) is more general because it does not focus on security vulnerabilities only.
The core idea of ParExC is to speculatively parallelize runtime checkers.
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Checks
Error toleration approaches implemented by frameworks like Rx [94] and ASSURE [108]
rely on error detection mechanism that are implemented as sensors. While both ap-
proaches can work with any kind of sensor, they are only evaluated with very lightweight
crash sensors in current research papers [94, 108]. A crash sensor is practically already
provided by the OS and costs no additional runtime overhead. When a sensored applica-
tion crashes, a signel is sent to recovery framework. This signal just needs to be handled
to mask the error.
However, crash sensors cover only a small subset of possible errors. State corruption
(errors) can lead to failures – such as corrupted output – that are not detected by a
crash sensor. Unsafe languages like C/C++ are particularly prone to state corrupting
bugs, for instance buffer overflows. Buffer overflows cannot only corrupt state but they
additionally facilitate malicious attacks. State of the art precise out-of-bounds checkers
can detect buffer overflows, but they introduce slowdown up to 12x [98]. A less expensive
alternative is, for example, data-flow integrity checking [22] that does not prevent buffer
overflows but instead detects invalid data-flows. Since buffer overflows generate invalid
data flow, data flow integrity checking effectively prevents state corruption and malicious
attacks due to buffer overflows. Nevertheless, data-flow integrity checking still introduces
a slowdown of 2.5x or higher.
Given the potentially very large slowdowns introduced by runtime checks, our goal is
to make runtime checking more palatable by reducing its impact on the runtime of appli-
cations. Given the prevalence of multi-core CPUs and the difficulty of many applications
to harness the full power of multi-core CPUs, it makes sense to use additional cores to
try to mask the overhead of runtime checks. This could be accomplished by:
(a) parallelizing the application and in this way, implicitly parallelizing the checks, or
(b) by parallelizing the checks only.
The problem with alternative (a) is that parallelizing existing applications and even
writing new parallel applications is very difficult and introduces new sources of software
bugs resulting in, e.g., data races and deadlocks. To simplify the parallelization of ap-
plications one could use software transactional memory (STM). STM alleviates several
drawbacks of lock-based and also lock-free synchronization mechanisms. However, it still
requires the developer to parallelize the application itself which is a non-trivial error-prone
manual process.
Alternative (b), i.e., the parallelization of runtime checks has recently been investi-
gated [138, 97, 128, 83, 59]. While approaches like Speck [83] scale very well with the
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number of cores, the performance measurements of Speck show no performance gain when
compared to sequential checking. The parallel taint analysis of Speck has a slowdown of
18.4x on an 8-core CPU [83]. This is in the same order of magnitude as checking without
parallelization on one core [81]. Newer sequential taint checking approaches using static
instrumentation perform even better: slowdowns are between 1.58x and 2.06x [136].
Given the current state of the art, it is not clear if one should choose alternative (a)
or (b), or maybe even just use sequential checks using static instrumentation? The main
question is on how much we can reduce the overheads of the competing alternatives.
In our analysis of alternative (b) we have identified two sources for high overheads
generated by existing checkers:
1. If parallelized runtime checks hold book-keeping state, state accesses are serialized.
Parallel Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) [97] uses a non-trivial hard-
ware extension to stream meta data to another core. Speck [83] streams taint data
to a single core thereby serializing data access. Both approaches limit scalability
and performance.
2. In most previous work on parallelized runtime checking checks are added by dy-
namic binary instrumentation (DBI). DBI introduces a high overhead that must
be compensated by additional cores. Our goal is to be faster than the sequential
execution of statically instrumented code. Results of current DBI-based approaches
indicate that DBI is not suitable therefore. Furthermore, some checkers cannot be
implemented by DBI. For instance, bounds for objects on the stack are not avail-
able in binaries without debug information. Therefore, it is not possible to build a
precise out-of-bounds checker for stack objects using DBI.
Beside the performance issues, we found two functional problems in the state of the art
approaches:
1. All DBI based approaches can only add checks. For instance, with DBI it is not
possible to parallelize checks that are already part of an application, such as asser-
tions and sanity checks. The only approach that is (in principle1) able to parallelize
assertions and sanity checks is FastTrack [59]. However, FastTrack imposes some
restrictions. Most importantly, FastTrack can only be applied to code blocks that
do not contain system calls. It is not possible make the whole application one
FastTrack block. Therefore the FastTrack approach limits scalability.
2. All parallelization approaches for runtime checks use speculation. Most approaches
do not support speculation for system calls and therewith limit the possibilites for
speculation and parallelization. Only Speck [83] supports speculation for system
calls based on Speculator [82]. But Speculator does not isolate speculatively issued
system calls. Their effects propagate through the whole system. If the speculation
fails, not only the checked application needs to be rolled back, but also all applica-
tions influenced by this speculatively executed application. Futhermore, the missing
1FastTrack was only evaluated with a checker that adds checks [59].
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isolation makes it difficult to have more then one application issuing speculative sys-
tem calls at the same time. The difficulties are, for instance, that specultive actions
of two different applications can interweave or even conflict. Interweaving makes
roll back difficult too.
Based on the above four observations, we developed a new framework, ParExC2, for
writing parallelized runtime checkers. It parallelizes the runtime checks only, i.e., it does
not require the application itself to be parallelized. To demonstrate the effectiveness and
versatility of our approach, we implemented different checkers to detect state corruptions
(see Section 3.6):
• A precise out-of-bounds checker to detect buffer overflows.
• A data-flow integrity checker to detect illegal data-flows.
• A checker relying on programmer given assertions.
Furthermore, we compare ParExC with an STM-implementation using two parallelized
STM-benchmarks, i.e., benchmarks for which STM implementations have been optimized.
We describe how to add checks to parallelized applications using software transactional
memory in Section 3.6.4 and compare the performance of an STM-based checker and the
same checker based on ParExC in Section 3.7.2.
A checker instruments applications with runtime checks. When a check fails at runtime,
the application is aborted. The basic approach is very similar to Speck [83]. We execute
the original application as predictor without any runtime checks on one core. The pre-
dictor’s execution is partitioned into epochs. Each epoch is replayed with runtime checks
enabled by an executor. Because of the runtime checks, the executor is typically an order
of magnitude slower than the predictor for the same epoch. We achieve a speedup by
running the executors in parallel to each other and to the predictor. Our approach for
parallelizing runtime checks is introduced in more detail in Section 3.1.
With ParExC we make the following novel contributions to the state of the art:
1. Parallelize runtime checks that are already part of the application. Unlike
the DBI approaches, we transform the application statically. This enables us to also
optimize the predictor. Unlike FastTrack (which also uses static instrumentation)
we restrict our parallelization not only to some regions. We support application wide
parallelization, by our novel StackLifter (see Section 3.4). The StackLifter facilitates
switching from the code base without runtime checks (run by the predictor) to the
code base with runtime checks (run by the executors).
By using static instrumentation we also avoid the overheads introduced by DBI.
2. Generic speculation support for checker state. At runtime checks need to
maintain book-keeping state. Because, the checks are performed by the executors
checks can be executed in parallel to each other. Thus, checks need means to
synchronize their state. Our approach is to use speculation to sync the book-keeping
state. Therefore, we propose our novel speculative variables (Section 3.5).
2This chapter is based partly on [121, 122, 120]. ParExC is called Prospect in [120].
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Figure 3.1: Our parallelization approach executes a fast variant on one core. The execu-
tion of the fast variant is partitioned into epochs. Each epoch is re-executed
with a slow variant with more functionality. The re-execution happens in
parallel to the fast variant on multiple cores.
3. Isolated system call speculation. The predictor’s execution is speculative until
it is checked by the executors. Thus, if the predictor write to a file, the write
itself is speculative until the computation is confirmed by the runtime checks in the
executors. Our goal is that users see no speculative output. Usually applications
perform output by system calls. Most approach either ignore or forbid system
calls [138, 97, 128, 59]. Only Speck [83] supports speculative system calls. However,
as outlined before Speck does not isolate the speculation from the rest of the system.
Our system call speculation (see Section 3.3) isolates applications from each other.
Thus, and in contrast to Speck, on miss-speculation only the affected application
has to be rolled back. Furthermore, we support multiple parallelized applications
running in parallel.
In our evaluation in Section 3.7 we show that parallelization of runtime checks can
reduce the perceived performance overhead of expensive error detection (see Thesis 4).
Additionally, we demonstrate that parallelizing runtime checks can be faster than paral-
lelizing an application itself with the help of STM (see Thesis 5). Because the ParExC
approach is heavily based on speculation, we also show Thesis 1 that speculation helps to
improve the performance of runtime checking.
3.1 Approach
ParExC uses the predictor/executor approach of [138, 83, 59] to parallelize an application.
Figure 3.1 (i) shows a fast variant and a slow variant derived from the same code base.
For example, the fast variant can be the original application and the slow variant can
be the original application including additional runtime checks. Our goal is to provide
the functionality of the slow variant while not exceeding the fast variant’s runtime. To
achieve this, the ParExC framework parallelizes the execution of the slow variant (see
Figure 3.1 (ii)). At runtime, ParExC executes the fast variant in a predictor process that
is used to compute future states of the slow variant. The execution of the predictor is
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partitioned into epochs. The state of the predictor at the start of an epoch is used to
spawn an executor process. The executer re-executes its epoch using the slow variant and
the predictor state from which it started. We can parallelize the checked application by
running the individual executors and the predictor in parallel. The maximum possible
speedup is the execution time of the slow variant divided by the execution time of the
fast variant.
At each epoch boundary, ParExC takes a snapshot of the fast variant. The snapshot is
similar to a UNIX fork. The fast variant continues its execution. The forked executor
switches from the fast variant to the slow variant and starts executing the epoch in the
slow variant. At the end of an epoch, the slow variant terminates, whereas, the fast
variant forks the next epoch.
ParExC is not completely transparent for the application developer. The applica-
tion developer has to ensure that the application calls parexc chkpnt periodically and
preferably, with a constant frequency. This function starts a new epoch and is provided
by the ParExC runtime.
ParExC has two major components:
1. the ParExC compiler that generates the fast and/or slow variant of the given appli-
cation, and
2. the ParExC runtime that provides deterministic replay for re-executing the slow
variant in the executors and speculative execution for the fast variant in the predic-
tor. The speculative variables used to sync the book-keeping state of the checker
between the, in parallel running, executors is also part of the ParExC runtime.
3.1.1 Compiler Infrastructure
The slow and fast variant are generated by the ParExC compiler from the original appli-
cation. We consider three cases of variant generation.
1. The original application is the fast variant. The slow variant is generated by adding
additional code (like runtime security checks) to the original application [83].
2. The original application is the slow variant. The fast variant is generated by remov-
ing code from the original application. For instance, aggressive but potential unsafe
optimizations can remove code [59].
3. The first and the second approach can by combined, i.e., both variants are generated
from the original application.
Figure 3.2 shows the work-flow of the ParExC compiler. Our novel StackLifter (Sec-
tion 3.4) takes the original application’s code and generates the initial versions of the fast
and the slow variant. In particular, it prepares both variants in a way that it is possible
to switch from the fast variant to the slow variant at epoch boundaries.
Both variants can then be instrumented, e.g., to remove existing functionality such
as sanity checks or add error detecting functionality (see Section 3.6). We cannot allow
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Figure 3.2: The ParExC work-flow: The StackLifter generates the two initial code bases
for the fast and the slow variant. Both variants can be instrumented to remove
or add functionality, respectively. Both variants are linked together with a
generated framework code that manages the switch from the fast variant to
slow variant at epoch boundaries.
arbitrary instrumentation of the fast and the slow variant. The instrumentation must
preserve the state equivalence property:
Definition 3.1. The application state of the fast variant at the end of epoch e must be
equivalent to the application state of the slow variant at the end of epoch e.
This property ensures that from an external point of view, the parallel execution of the
slow variant is equivalent to the sequential execution of the fast variant. We currently
do not enforce the state equivalence property. We show in Section 3.5 how to partly
circumvent this restriction by using speculation.
The fast variant generator and the slow variant generator are provided by the checker
developer. In our experience, the instrumentation process does not need to be aware
of the parallelization. For instance, we can use the same instrumentation for checking
for out-of-bounds errors for parallelizing with ParExC, and STM as well as without any
parallelization at all. But, we need different implementations for managing the book-
keeping state of the checker, e.g., the bounds of the allocated buffers.
ParExC’s framework generator generates framework code that connects the code bases
of both variants. The framework code primarily consists of a new main function. This
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Figure 3.3: Overview of ParExC’s architecture at runtime. Deterministic replay and
speculative system call execution is provided as part of the OS kernel. The
checker runtime has access to speculative variables to manage the checker’s
book-keeping state. Both, the fast variant and the slow variant (through the
checker) have access to the epoch management.
main function sets up the ParExC runtime, any additional runtime that was added for
the slow variant, and starts the first epoch in predictor and executor.
We have implemented ParExC using the LLVM compiler framework [65]. StackLifter
and the variant generators are LLVM compiler passes. In general, the approach itself is
not restricted to LLVM. ParExC can be ported to other compiler frameworks.
3.1.2 Runtime Support
Figure 3.3 gives an overview over ParExC’s architecture at runtime. The fast variant has
access to ParExC’s epoch management via parexc chkpnt. The executor (and there-
with the slow variant) additionally needs to approve its epoch after completely checking
it.
ParExC performs external actions of the fast variant speculatively [83]. For instance,
write system calls are held back until they are re-executed and approved by the slow
variant. Hence, we ensure that external actions only become visible after the slow variant
has verified them.
To support the state equivalence property we use deterministic replay [110] for re-
executing the slow variant. ParExC records all non-deterministic external events that hap-
pen in the fast variant of epoch e. When the slow variant of epoch e is re-executed, ParExC
replays the recorded events. For example, the time value returned by the gettimeofday
system call in the fast variant is also returned in the slow variant for the respective call
to gettimeofday.
We have implemented the speculative execution and deterministic replay for Linux as a
kernel module (see Section 3.3). In contrast to ParExC, Speck [83] provides system wide
speculation, i.e., external actions of the fast variant are speculative propagated to other
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processes. In case of an abort all processes containing speculative state are rolled back. In
contrast to Speck, our kernel module isolates multiple applications running under ParExC
at the same time from each other.
Our runtime support also contains speculative variables to circumvent the state equiv-
alence property for checkers. Some checkers hold additional book-keeping state required
for the checking. The state is managed by the checker-runtime given by the checker
developer. This book-keeping state is only needed in the slow variant. But the state
equivalence property requires that the book-keeping state has to be in the fast variant
too. For instance, the checker runtime of an out-of-bounds checker needs to keep track
of the size of the allocated buffers. The straight forward solution would be to track al-
locations in both variants (such as in FastTrack [59]). However, we want to avoid any
additional overhead in the fast variant. Therefore, checker developers can use speculative
variables to maintain book-keeping state in their checker runtime (see Section 3.5).
3.2 Related Work
The predictor/executor approach was first introduced by the hardware community [138].
A distilled program (i.e., a fast variant) is generated at compile time. The execution is
similar to our approach. The main difference is on how the switch from the fast variant
to the slow variant at epoch boundaries is performed. Zilles et al.[138] use a hash-map to
translate program counters. States are communicated via a check-pointing unit located
in the memory subsystem. However, it is not clear how this approach handles different
stack layouts between fast and slow variant.
FastTrack [59] is the system most similar to ParExC. In contrast to ParExC, FastTrack
is not designed to apply the parallelization to the whole application. It only supports fast-
track regions that must not contain system calls. Fast-track regions raise composability
questions. Is it possible to nest fast-track regions? On one hand, FastTrack does not need
to switch between fast and slow variants code base at arbitrary locations nor does it need
speculative system calls. But on the other hand, FastTrack’s approach of the fast-track
regions makes it impossible to apply the parallelization to the whole application, which is
our goal. To do so, it is necessary to have an approach, such as our StackLifter, to switch
from the fast variant to the slow variant at arbitrary points. By applying the approach
to the whole application we avoid the composability issues of FastTrack. Additionally,
FastTrack makes no use of speculation for state added to the slow variant. Instead,
FastTrack tracks all necessary checker state in the fast variant and therewith slows down
the whole parallelization approach.
In the last few years the predictor/executor approach got some attention from the
runtime checking community [128, 83, 97]. All these projects make use of dynamic binary
instrumentation with the help of the Pin tool [67]. Whereas Pin allows adding code like
runtime checks, it is not suitable for efficiently removing code like user-defined assertions.
A StackLifter is not needed because the state of the runtime checks is completely separated
from the application state. SuperPin [128] does not support speculation for system calls.
Hence, speculative state might become visible as value failure, e.g., due to failing runtime
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checks or unsafe optimizations. Speck’s [83] support for system call speculation and
deterministic replay is closest to ours. It is derived from Speculator [82]. Speculator is an
operating system extension and it supports the speculative execution of one process. The
speculation is propagated throughout the system, whereas, ParExC provides isolation.
ParExC’s isolates the speculatively issued system calls of an application form the rest
of the system until these system calls have been committed. Thus, it is possible to run
several applications under ParExC at the same time. Speck’s and our replay support
is very similar to Flashback [110]. DIFT [97] uses a non-trivial hardware extension to
stream data from the core running the fast version to slave cores. Slave cores use this
data to perform runtime checks.
The problems solved by the StackLifter are similar to the dynamic software update
problem. The current version of an application shall be replaced by a new version without
terminating or restarting the application [76, 68]. Previous work, for instance Ginseng [76],
avoids stack rewriting by only upgrading a function that has currently no frames on the
stack. Data is accessed solely indirectly to allow online updates. The recently published
UpStare [68] uses an approach similar to StackLifter. However, UpStare works on C
source code and seems to need manual intervention for mapping an old version’s stack
frame to a new version’s stack frame, e.g., when pointers are involved. We avoid this issue
by using the alloca stack (see Section 3.4.4) and with the help of the state equivalence
property. The state equivalence property requires that there are no state changes that
require manual mapping of stack frames.
ParExC uses speculation in two ways:
1. It speculates on the error free execution of the predictor, and
2. uses speculative variables to decouple executors.
Both ways of speculation have been used before in thread-level speculation [87, 111, 112],
by transactional memory [21, 40, 54] and to implement speculation on synchronous IO [82].
Thread-level speculation tries to exploit parallelism in sequentially programmed applica-
tions. Therefore, applications are divided into parts similar to our epochs. This requires
either code analysis or hints by the programmer [87]. The obtained epochs are char-
acterized by no or minimal data dependencies and are executed in parallel [111, 112].
Our speculative variables are similar to value speculation used in thread-level specu-
lation [111, 112, 91]. Transactional memory (TM) [21, 40, 54] provides atomicity for
critical regions. Optimistic TM implementations speculate on low contention between
concurrently executed critical regions. If a conflict between two concurrently performed
critical regions is detected, at least one of the critical regions is rolled back and its changes
are undone. ParExC speculates on a failure free execution. Thus, we abort the appli-
cation as soon as we detect a failed speculation. Nightingale et al. [82] use speculation
to turn synchronous file system write accesses into asynchronous write accesses. That
basic idea is to speculate on a successful execution of the asynchronous write access. The
application continues speculatively until the acknowledgment from the file server arrives.
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3.3 Deterministic Replay and Speculation
To prevent the fast variant from doing output for computation that was not yet checked by
the slow variant, the fast variant performs every externally visible side-effects speculatively.
The output done by the fast variant in epoch ei is held back by ParExC until the checker
(slow variant) explicitly approves ei. This is done without blocking the fast variant, i.e.,
the fast variant gets a speculative return value from ParExC’s runtime system. Because of
the speculative side-effects an attacker cannot exploit a vulnerability and manipulate the
fast variant output without being detected by the slow variant before the output becomes
visible. Because the fast variant cannot be trusted, the ParExC speculation support is
part of the OS.
Our parallelization approach is based on the assumption that the slow variant deter-
ministically replays the same execution as the fast variant. Therefore, the same input
values passed to the fast variant have to be passed to the slow variant too. Our solution
is to record all input pass to the fast variant in a log. Whenever the slow variant reads
input we replay the input from this log. ParExC’s deterministic replay support is also
part of the OS.
For our deterministic replay and speculation support we make the same assumption
as [110, 83]:
Assumption 3.1. All application IO is performed via system calls.
Therefore, we map all user-space non-determinism (such as gettimeofday on some
systems) to system calls. For example, for gettimeofday we provide a wrapper that
always uses a system call.
All system calls executed in the fast variant in epoch ei are put into a log Li. A
log entry comprises the system call ID and the system call’s arguments. System calls
with external effects are also logged in Li but not executed. Most other system calls are
executed immediately. The only exception are system calls the depend on system calls
with external effects. For instance a read system call is performed and the read data
is logged for later replay in the slow variant. On the other hand, a write is only put
into the log but not executed. A close following the write on the same file descriptor
depends on the write. Therefore, the close is treat like the write. When the slow
variant performs a read system call, ParExC replays the result from the log. When the
slow variant executes a write system call sw, ParExC will check that sw used the same
argument values as the fast variant. External events of epoch ei must be externalized
after ei−1 committed. Thus, ParExC cannot yet commit the system call sw if epoch ei−1
has not been committed until the time sw was issued.
To avoid unnecessary delay the replay for the slow variant of ei can immediately start
after the fast variant started with ei. After epoch ei−1 has been committed by the slow
variant, and epoch ei was successfully checked all system calls with external side-effects
in Li are performed.
With the help of log Li ParExC also checks that the slow variant deterministically
replays the fast variant, i.e., the slow variant must perform all system calls in Li with the
logged arguments and in the logged order. In that way an attack that solely compromises
52
3.3 Deterministic Replay and Speculation
the fast variant is detected when it manipulates the fast variants output but not the slow
variants output. An attack on the slow variant should by detected by the slow variants
runtime checks.
The slow variant can perform additional system calls that bypass Li. These system
calls use special system call ids that ParExC excludes from checking. For example, these
special system calls allow to implement logging. The set of system calls, allowed to bypass
replay and checking, can be restricted for security. Without this restriction an attacker
might be able to abuse these system calls for her goals, because, unlike replayed and
checked system calls, the side-effects of theses system calls become visible before the slow
variant approves the current epoch.
Due to executors ran in parallel to each other, system calls at the start of epoch ei in the
slow variant might be executed before system calls at the end of ei−1 in the slow variant.
ParExC supports an out-of-order execution of system calls with an in-order retirement of
system call side effects. We accomplish this by committing all side-effects of Li only after
ei−1, and therewith Li−1, was committed.
The speculation support and the deterministic replay support are both implemented in
a Linux kernel module and do not affect other parts of the kernel.
3.3.1 Interface
Our implementation exports the following interface for checkers and parallelized applica-
tions:
• parexc chkpnt: This function is only allowed in the fast variant. It marks the
border of epoch ei−1 to epoch ei in the fast variant. Additionally, it forks an executor
for the slow variant of ei. Like fork it returns twice. Once, in the fast variant and
once in the newly created executor that will execute the slow variant of ei.
When the fast variant calls exit or exit group the current epoch ei is finished,
but no new epoch is started. The fast variant blocks until the slow variant has
committed ei. Next the whole application terminates.
For each epoch ei a new log Li is created. Every system call in the fast variant until
the next parexc chkpnt is recorded in Li. As described above ParExC replays
and checks all system calls in ei’s slow variant with the help of Li.
This is the only function needed by developers of applications to parallelize, i.e., the
remaining interface is only used by the checkers.
• parexc replay begin: After forking the executor, the executor first switches
with the code generated by the StackLifter to the code base of the slow variant
(Section 3.4). The checker initializes the speculative variables for current epoch
ei. Then the slow variant calls parexc replay begin to start the replay of the
system calls recorded in log Li.
If a system call issued by the slow variant between parexc replay begin and
parexc replay end does not match the next system call in Li the execution
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is aborted. The only exceptions are a restricted set of system calls that may be
issued by the checker, and bypass replay. These system calls use previously unused
system call ids. After executing a set of security checks (to prevent malicious abuse),
these system calls are forwarded by changing their system call ID to the originally
intended. For example, if the slow variant wants to allocate some private memory, it
issues a system call with the ID sys parexc mmap. This system call is intercepted,
checked and then forwarded to system call sys mmap.
If the slow variant issues a system call that is not yet in log Li the slow variant
blocks. That an system call is not yet in Li can happen because: (1) The slow
variant overtook the fast variant or (2) the executions of the slow variant and the
fast variant diverge. In case (1) the slow variant waits until the fast variant has
caught up. In case (2) the execution must be aborted. Therefore, the slow variant
blocks either until the fast variant issues the next system call or the fast variant
ends the current epoch with a call to parexc chkpnt or exit. In the former
case, the execution continues as usual with comparing the system call ID and the
arguments. In the latter case, the execution is aborted because the slow variant
tried to perform a system call in ei that was not performed by the fast variant in ei.
This function is not allowed in the fast variant.
• parexc replay end: The current epoch lasts until the next call to parexc -
chkpnt. Our compiler replaces each call to parexc chkpnt in the slow variant’s
code base with a call to parexc replay end. Hence, instead of calling parexc -
chkpnt the slow variants ends the current epoch by calling parexc replay end.
The function parexc replay end is also only allowed in the slow variant. It
stops replay. If necessary it waits until the fast variant finishes the current epoch
ei. Then it checks that the slow variant has replayed every system call in Li. If the
check fails the application is aborted. Otherwise, the slow variant continues with
checking its speculative variables (see Section 3.5).
The slow variant can execute arbitrary system calls after the call to parexc re-
play end. These system calls might be needed for logging or checking the specu-
lative variables.
• parexc approve: Only if the speculative variables contain no mis-speculation,
the current epoch ei can be committed. To commit ei the slow variant calls par-
exc approve. This function is not allowed in the fast variant.
The function parexc approve first blocks until the preceding epoch ei−1 was
approved. This ensures the in-order retirement of the out-of-order executed system
calls. Then all speculatively performed system calls in Li are performed in the order
they appear in Li. Log Li is then freed.
For deadlock avoidance (Section 3.5.2) parexc approve can also be called before
parexc replay end, i.e., parexc approve can be called within the execution
of the epoch in the slow variant. Then all outstanding external actions up to this
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call are immediately made externally visible. All further speculative system calls of
this epoch are made visible as soon as they are replayed.
• parexc exit: After any outstanding external action of epoch ei has been com-
mitted by parexc approve the slow variant terminates the executor by calling
parexc exit. The slow variant does never call parexc chkpnt.
Before terminating the current executor, parexc exit checks that the slow variant
called parexc replay begin, parexc replay end and, parexc approve.
If not, the application is aborted.
On abort all out-standing external actions are discarded. Hence, no unchecked output
will become externally visible.
3.3.2 Implementation
Our replay and speculation support is implemented as a layer between the user-land
and the system call implementations in kernel space. Our implementation uses the
utrace [72] framework. The utrace interface is very similar to ptrace. In contrast
to ptrace, utrace allows our layer to reside in kernel-space. Thus, we avoid additional
context switches and the expensive copying of data between two address spaces as needed
by ptrace [99].
We hook into syscall enter and syscall exit. Both hooks run in kernel space.
They are called before and after a system call has been performed, respectively. Our
implementation keeps also track of the current Linux task to distinguish the predictor
(fast variant) and the executors (slow variant).
The system call recording can replay needs semantic information about each system
call: What are the number of arguments to record? Does the system call need speculative
execution? And, does the system call write to user space? We have implemented a
secondary3 system call table to dispatch from the syscall enter and syscall exit
hooks into system call specific implementations. The following description generalizes the
specific hook implementations.
System calls are recorded in the fast variant in the syscall enter hook. The sys-
call enter hook allocates a log entry and stores the system call ID and the system
call’s arguments into the log entry. The syscall exit hook stores the return value
and any memory copied user space (for example for read) into the log entry. Next,
syscall exit appends the log entry to the current system call log.
The speculative execution of a system call (for instance write) in the fast variant
skips the actual execution of the system call (a utrace functionality). But, first ParExC
calculates a speculative return value from the arguments. For instance, for a write with
a invalid file descriptor argument EBADF is computed as return value. If all arguments
are valid the length of the data to write is computed as return value. The speculatively
computed return value is stored in the log entry. Second, the system call is skipped and
the pre-computed return value is returned.
3The primary system call table is maintained by the kernel to dispatch system calls.
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Figure 3.4: Translating the call stack at runtime.
For every system call in the slow variant between parexc replay begin and par-
exc replay end: in syscall enter the next log entry is fetched and set as current
log entry. If necessary syscall enter blocks until the next entry is available. The
system call ID and the arguments are checked against the current log entry. Depending
on the system call, the actual system call is either skipped or performed. Most system
calls are skipped. Only calls that read deterministic data or manage process local state
(such as brk, and mmap) are actually performed. If skipped, the return value of the
system call and memory copied to user space (for example for read) are replayed from
the current log entry. If the system call is performed its return value is checked against
the current log entry. In replay speculatively issued system calls (such as write) are
skipped if the current epoch was not yet approved by parexc approve. If the epoch is
approved, speculatively issued system calls are immediately performed when replayed. If
the epoch is not yet approved, the speculatively issued system calls will be performed in
parexc approve (see above).
The interface described in Section 3.3.1 is implemented utilizing unused system call ids.
Because syscall enter intercepts every system call, we reroute the interface’s system
calls in the syscall enter hook to our implementation without passing them further
down into the kernel.
3.4 Switching Code Bases
One main goal of ParExC is to enable the variant generators to instrument slow and fast
variants independently of each other. Therefore, we provide the variant generators with
two separate code bases – one for the fast variant and one for the slow variant. The issue
is that we need to switch from the fast variant to the slow variant at the start of an
epoch. This is difficult because, for instance, a generator might remove some temporary
variables from the fast variant or add new temporary variables to the slow variant. The
StackLifter’s purpose is to instrument the two code bases to facilitate the switch from the
fast to the slow variant.
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Variant generators may instrument a fast function F fast and its slow equivalent
F slow in a way that F fast and F slow have different stack layouts. Figure 3.4 illus-
trates the different stack layouts for three functions: main, F, and G. After the StackLifter
run, a variant generator changed the order of variable definitions in main slow and added
a new variable A to G slow.
The predictor executes the fast variant and the executors the slow variant. An executor
receives its initial state from the predictor. Hence, at that point in time all stack frames
on the stack belong to fast variant. ParExC needs to translate the stack frames of from
fast functions to their slow counterparts. The translation should be transparent to the
application. Therefore, after the translation the call stack has to look like as if only slow
functions had been executed. After translating the call stack, execution can continue
normally. Global data and the heap do not need to be translated, because the state
equivalence property requires the variant generator not to change the heap layout or the
layout of global data.
Stack translation starts with setting the doUnwind flag. Then the call stack is traversed
up to the outermost function, i.e., usually to main, saving all necessary information for
each stack frame to allow reconstruction (Figure 3.4 step (1)). Once the top of the stack
is reached (step (2)), we rebuild the call stack by calling the slow variant of each function.
We use the saved information to rebuild the call stack (step (3)). When reaching the
point where the stack lifting was triggered, execution resumes normally.
We use LLVM to perform the necessary modifications, i.e., to add code that saves and
restores registers. All code modifications are performed statically. The input and output
format is LLVM’s intermediate representation. Therefore, our StackLifter is independent
of the underlying hardware platform.
3.4.1 Example
For an application programmer the main difference between FastTrack and ParExC is
the programming interface. In FastTrack the programmer specifically starts and ends a
fast-track region. This region is translated to an if branch. One branches is executed in
the fast variant and the other in the slow variant.
In ParExC we support application wide instrumentation and do not want to restrict
instrumentation to a set of regions. In our current implementation the programmer has to
mark possible places where a new epoch could be spawned by calling parexc chkpnt.
Listing 3.1 shows an example. Like fork, a call to parexc chkpnt issued in the fast
variant returns twice: (1) in the fast variant, and (2) in the slow variant. When par-
exc chkpnt is called at runtime from the fast variant and returns into the slow variant,
parexc chkpnt needs to switch from the fast variant’s code base to the slow variant’s
code base.
Listing 3.1: API example and the problem of switching code bases.
1 /* application as seen by developer */
2 int foo() { ... parexc_chkpnt(); ... }
3 void bar(char* b) {
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4 assert(b);
5 int i = foo();
6 return b[i];
7 }
8
9 /* fast variant’s code base */
10 int foo_fast() { ... parexc_chkpnt_fast(); ... }
11 void bar_fast(char* b) {
12 int i = foo();
13 return b[i];
14 }
15
16 /* slow variant’s code base */
17 int foo_slow() { ... parexc_chkpnt_slow(); ... }
18 void bar_slow(char* b) {
19 assert(b);
20 int i = foo_slow();
21 return b[i];
22 }
Listing 3.1 gives a small example of how the ParExC API should be used and the problems
that arise. Lines 1 to 7 show an API example. Function foo calls parexc chkpnt to
start a new epoch. Function bar calls foo. In the fast variant’s code base (lines 9 to 14)
the variant generator removed the assert. The slow variant’s code base (lines 16 to 22) is
unchanged apart from function renaming.
For switching the code base from the fast variant to the slow variant it is not enough
to jump from parexc chkpnt fast right behind the call to parexc chkpnt slow
in foo slow. In the code base of the slow variant, b might be loaded into a machine
register in line 19. When foo slow returns b is expected to be in this register in line 21.
Whereas, in the fast variant the assert does not exist and when foo fast returns b is
still on the stack in line 13. That means after the switch from parexc chkpnt fast to
parexc chkpnt slow, b has to appear in the right register when foo slow returns.
The StackLifter adds the necessary code modifications that put b into the right registers.
The general work-flow is that the StackLifter prepares both variants before the variant
generators instrument the variant’s code bases. The next subsections give further details
on each transformation step of the StackLifter.
3.4.2 Integration with parexc chkpnt
The function parexc chkpnt is the programming interface of ParExC. However, while
a developer using ParExC sees one parexc chkpnt only, we have three versions of
parexc chkpnt. The parexc chkpnt inserted by the developer becomes replaced
by parexc chkpnt fast in the fast variant and parexc chkpnt slow in the slow
variant. The third parexc chkpnt is the system call introduced in Section 3.3. The
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system call parexc chkpnt is only called by parexc chkpnt fast, but never directly
by the application developer.
The functions parexc chkpnt fast and parexc chkpnt slow control the code
base switching at runtime. These functions make use of the instrumentations inserted by
the StackLifter.
• parexc chkpnt fast This function is called in the fast variant. It calls the
parexc chkpnt system call (Section 3.3). After forking the new epoch, the flag
doUnwind is set in the executor and parexc chkpnt fast returns. Now the
registers saving blocks of parexc chkpnt fast’s callers including main fast
are executed (see Figure 3.4). The register saving block of a function saves the
current state of the function’s stack frame. Function main fast returns to our
newly generated main function (see Section 3.1.1). Our generated main now calls
the slow variant’s main slow and in this way, the states of all slow functions are
restored until parexc chkpnt slow (see Figure 3.4). The Register restoring basic
block restores the previously saved stack frame of a given function.
• parexc chkpnt slow In parexc chkpnt slow the flag doUnwind is cleared
and execution continues normally in the slow variant. If the next parexc chk-
pnt slow function is reached in the slow variant replay is ended and the epoch
approved. After approval the executor terminates with parexc exit.
3.4.3 Code Transformations
Listing 3.2 shows an example for the input given to the StackLifter. Function main calls
parexc chkpnt. The StackLifter generates two outputs:
• The code base of the fast variant (see Listing 3.3).
• The code base of the slow variant (see Listing 3.5).
Listing 3.2: Input to the StackLifter.
1 int main (...) {
2 ...
3 parexc_chkpnt ();
4 ...
5 }
At runtime, the instrumentation of the fast variant needs to check after each function
call if a code base switching is in progress, i.e., if the global flag doUnwind is set. To
initiate code base switching parexc chkpnt fast sets the doUnwind flag. Function
parexc chkpnt fast is part of the framework code in Listing 3.4. The framework code
is generated by ParExC’s framework generator (see Section 3.1.1). If the code base needs
to be switched, the fast variant saves all currently life registers. The registers are saved
by pushing them to the code base switching stack. This stack is globally allocated. There
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is exactly one code base switching stack for the whole application. After pushing the life
registers an ID for the current location is pushed to the stack too. Next, the function
returns to the caller which repeats the procedure for its stack frame.
Listing 3.3: StackLifter output: Code base of fast variant.
1 int main_fast (...) {
2 ...
3 parexc_chkpnt_fast ();
4 if (doUnwind) {
5 <push life registers>
6 <push location>
7 return;
8 }
9 ...
10 }
Function main fast returns to our main function (see Listing 3.4). Our main is
part of the framework code. At runtime, if code switching is in progress main calls
main slow. Otherwise, main just returns with main fast’s return code.
Listing 3.4: Framework code to combine both code bases at runtime.
1 void parexc_chkpnt_fast () {
2 ...
3 doUnwind = 1;
4 }
5 void parexc_chkpnt_slow () {
6 ...
7 doUnwind = 0;
8 }
9 int main (...) {
10 int res = main_fast (...);
11 if (doUnwind)
12 main_slow (...);
13 else
14 return res;
15 }
Listing 3.5 shows the slow variant’s code base for the input from Listing 3.2. In the
slow code base each function needs to check at its entry if code switching is in progress. If
not, the function continues at its original entry point. If code switching is in progress, the
functions pops the location of the call instruction to switch to from the code switching
stack. Then it restores the life registers from the stack too. The set of life registers
depends on the popped call location within the function. This set is exactly the same as
the one that was pushed in the fast variant for the given call location. After restoring
the registers the slow variant jumps to the call instruction matching the popped location.
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Next, the call is performed and the callee restores its stack frame. The process finishes
with a call to parexc chkpnt slow which resets the doUnwind flag (see Listing 3.4).
Listing 3.5: StackLifter output: Code base of slow variant.
1 int main_slow () {
2 if (doUnwind) {
3 switch (<pop location> ) {
4 ...
5 case call_01_location:
6 <pop life registers>
7 goto call_01;
8 ...
9 }
10 }
11 ...
12 call_01:
13 parexc_chkpnt_slow ();
14 ...
15 }
We have one optimization. StackLifter applies the transformation only to functions
and call instructions that are on a path to parexc chkpnt in the original input. In the
following we give more details about the instrumentation on the LLVM level.
Function Naming
The StackLifter gets the original application’s code base as input. Hence, the first step
is to generate a copy of this code base. StackLifter clones all functions defined in a given
module. Each function then comes in two flavors:
• a fast variant, and
• a slow variant.
The slow variant’s name will be the original name appended with an unique suffix, e.g.,
originalName slow. Hence, all functions ending in slow belong to the set of slow
functions.
Unwind
StackLifter creates a new basic block for each function call. The purpose is to allow us to
use the basic block as a branch label. We call such a newly created basic block function
call basic block. This is necessary when reconstructing the call stack after an unwind.
The new basic block only contains an LLVM call instruction and an unconditional branch
instruction. The branch jumps to the next instruction after the call as defined by the
original application. Basic blocks get a unique name to identify them as “function call”
61
3 Speculation for Parallelizing Runtime Checks
basic blocks, e.g., call X where X is a running number. The basic block reached via the
unconditional branch instructions carries the same name as the function call basic block
plus a suffix, e.g. call Xsucc.
The basic block of a function call in the fast variant carries two additional instructions.
Upon return from each function call, the global doUnwind flag is checked. If the check
fails, control flow continues as in the original program. If the check succeeds we do a stack
translation from the fast to the slow variant. Thus, execution continues with a register
saving basic block (discussed below). Listing 3.6 shows LLVM code of a transformed
function call of the fast variant of a function.
Listing 3.6: Function call transformation for fast variant.
1 call_1: ; name to ID block as a function call site
2 call void @foo()
3 ; check if doing an unwind
4 %doUnwind = load i8* @doUnwind
5 %doUnwindCmp = icmp eq i8 %doUnwind, 0
6 ; branch to register saving code or continue
7 ; execution normally
8 br i1 %doUnwindCmp, label %call_1succ,
9 label %save_regs_1
Indirect Function Calls
The StackLifter ensures that all slow functions only call slow functions. Once switched to
the slow variant, we do not want to leave the set of slow functions. Direct function calls
are changed by altering the name of the called function. The target of an indirect function
call, though, can only be changed at runtime. Hence, StackLifter inserts additional code
before each indirect function call (see Listing 3.7):
Listing 3.7: Indirect call transformation for slow variant.
1 call_3:
2 %castedPtrToOrig = bitcast void ()* %orig to i8*
3 ; @fp2sp translates fast function pointer
4 ; to slow variant’s function pointer
5 %ptrToClone = call i8* @fp2sp(i8* %castedPtrToOrig)
6 %castedPtrToClone = bitcast i8* %ptrToClone to void ()*
7 call void %castedPtrToClone() nounwind
We call our runtime function fp2sp which, given a fast function’s address, returns the
address of the corresponding slow function. Function fp2sp will use the input function
pointer as an index into a map. This map is constructed before executing the main
function by code generated by the StackLifter.
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Saving Registers
During a stack translation each stack frame of a fast function must be replaced by an
equivalent stack frame of its slow variant. Hence, StackLifter inserts register saving code
into the fast functions. During a stack translation – when unwinding the call stack of
the fast functions – for each function F, the state of F fast is stored onto the code base
switching stack. This stack permits the reconstruction of the state in F’s slow counterpart
F slow. The storing of the state is done in the register saving basic block.
For each function call within a fast function, there is a separate register saving basic
block. In LLVM, the state of function F at instruction I is represented by the values of all
live registers in F at I. After each call instruction different registers might be live. Hence,
each function call has its own register saving basic block. We perform liveness analysis
for every basic block containing at least one function call. All registers marked live on
entering the basic block need to be preserved.
An example of a register saving basic block is shown in Listing 3.8. External helper
functions (pushI64 and pushFloat) are called to store all live registers (%reg1 and
%reg2) on the code base switching stack. In the slow function all live registers are
restored from the code base switching stack in reverse order.
Additionally, the label that uniquely identifies the location of function call basic block
is pushed too (pushLabel). This label is of importance when the stack frame is recon-
structed in the slow variant. The end of each register saving basic block is marked by a
simple return instruction. Stack unwinding then continues in the caller.
Listing 3.8: Save register block.
1 save_regs_1:
2 call void @pushI64(i64 %reg1)
3 call void @pushFloat(float %reg2)
4 call void @pushLabel(i32 1)
5 ret i32 undef
Restoring Registers
While a fast function needs to save the live registers, its slow function needs to restore
the live registers with the help of a register restoring basic block.
As with register saving basic blocks, there is a restore basic block for each function
call in a slow function. When entering a slow function, we need to check if this is a call
because of a stack reconstruction. This is done by calling the external helper function
popLabel. It returns zero, if no reconstruction is going on. Otherwise, the return value
is a label identifying a specific function call basic block in the current slow function. A
switch statement will divert control to the correct restore basic block depending on the
return value of popLabel. Listing 3.9 shows an example of a slow function’s entry basic
block.
Listing 3.9: New entry block.
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1 new_entry:
2 %next_label = call i32 @popLabel()
3 switch i32 %next_label, label %old_entry [
4 i32 1, label %restore_regs_1
5 i32 2, label %restore_regs_2
6 ]
If no reconstruction goes on (%next label is zero) execution continues at original entry
basic block %old entry. Using zero as default if no code base switching is in progress
eliminates the additional if (doUnwind) statement from Listing 3.5.
Listing 3.10 shows an example of a register restoring basic block.
Listing 3.10: Restore register block.
1 restore_regs_1:
2 %reg2 = call i64 @popFloat()
3 %reg1 = call i64 @popI64()
4 br label %call_1
The restore basic block calls external helper functions (popI64 and popFloat) to re-
trieve the values of the live registers (compare with Listing 3.8). After all live registers
have been restored, execution continues by branching to the function call basic block iden-
tified by the label popped at function entry. Restoring then continues with the function
called in the function call basic block.
Restoring Static Single Assignment (SSA) Form
LLVM uses static single assignment (SSA) in its intermediate representation: “Each vir-
tual register is written in exactly one instruction, and each use of a register is dominated by
its definition.” [65] All modifications need to preserve SSA. In the slow variant StackLifter
introduces additional definitions for all registers within the register restoring blocks.
Listing 3.11: SSA-Example: before StackLifter.
1 %a1 = load i32* %p1
2 call void @foo(i32 %a1)
Listing 3.11 shows a function call in the original code base before any instrumentations
by the StackLifter. The argument value %a1 of the function call is defined by a load
instruction. This code is in SSA, because the only virtual register %a1 is written by
exactly one instruction (the load) and its use (the call instruction) is dominated by
its definition (again the load).
Listing 3.12: SSA-Example: after StackLifter – in the slow variant.
1 new_entry:
2 %next_label = call i32 @popLabel()
3 switch i32 %next_label, label %old_entry [
4 i32 1, label %restore_regs_1
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5 ...
6 ]
7 ...
8 restore_regs_1:
9 %a1 = call i32 popI32()
10 br call_01
11 ...
12 %a1 = load i32 %p1
13 br call_01
14 call_01:
15 call void @foo(i32 %a1)
Listing 3.12 shows the code from Listing 3.11 after applying StackLifter’s transformations
for the slow variant. This code violates the SSA constraint because virtual register %a1
is defined twice:
1. The original definition is in line 12.
2. The register restoring basic block for the call to foo contains the second definition
in line 9.
Thus, the StackLifter’s transformations temporarily violate the SSA constraint. This
sub-section describes how we restore the SSA form.
We use a modified version of the algorithm described in [31]. The basic idea is to
insert special Φ nodes, that may break SSA in a defined way. In LLVM a Φ node is
represented by a phi instruction. LLVM’s phi instructions do not need to be dominated
by the definition of their used registers. However, virtual registers are still allowed to be
written only by one instruction and the domination rule applies to all other uses of virtual
registers.
Listing 3.13: Example of a phi node in LLVM.
1 Y:
2 %v_2 = phi i32 [%v_1, label %X], [0, label %Z]
Listing 3.13 shows an example of the phi instruction in LLVM. Phi instructions are only
allowed at the begin of a basic block (in this case Y). The arguments of a phi instruction
is a non-empty set of pairs. The first element of each pair is a so-called incoming value
and the second element is the incoming basic block. At runtime, if control branches from
the incoming basic block X to basic block Y, then register %v 2 get assigned the incoming
value %v 1. If control branches from Z to Y, then %v 2 get assigned 0. There has to be
exactly one pair of incoming value and incoming basic block for each direct predecessor
basic block in the control flow of the current function. More details about the phi
instruction can be found in [65].
One assumption made in the algorithm for placing Φ nodes is that all variables are
defined and initialized in the function’s entry basic block [31, pg. 25]. This, however,
does not hold true for programs in LLVM IR. As far as variable-to-register mappings can
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Figure 3.5: Sample control flow graph.
be reconstructed from LLVM IR code at all, variables can be initialized anywhere in the
function.
Using the unmodified algorithm proposed in [31, pg. 25] can lead to wrongly placed Φ
nodes. See Figure 3.5 for an example. Registers v 1 and v 2 refer to the same variable
v. Variable v is defined and initialized in basic block X, and only used in basic block W.
Following the algorithm in [31], a Φ-node for v should be inserted in Y. First, v’s scope
is limited to basic blocks X and W. Hence, the Φ-node in Y has no uses. Second, because
variable v was defined and initialized in X there is no incoming value for this Φ-node for
incoming basic block Z. If v would have been defined and initialized in basic block entry,
as assumed by [31], there would be an incoming value. However, as v’s scope is limited
to basic blocks X and W, the Φ-node in Y is neither possible nor needed.
Our solution is:
1. Apply the algorithm from [31].
2. Remove any illegal Φ-nodes. We use a fix point algorithm and iteratively remove
Φ-nodes. If, during one iteration, we find no Φ-nodes to remove, the algorithm
terminates. We use three rules to detect an illegal Φ-node. A Φ-node is deleted if:
a) It is never used.
b) Its uses are exclusively incoming values for itself.
c) The definition of at-least one of its incoming values does not dominate the
basic block for which the incoming value is specified.
Rule a) is self-explanatory.
Rule b) is a special case of Rule a). A Φ-node according to Rule b) has uses (but
only itself). Therefore, it cannot be removed according to Rule a). But, as the
Φ-node is not used by any other instruction it is nevertheless not needed.
Consider the control flow graph in Figure 3.5 as an example for Rule c). As a
default incoming value for each direct predecessor of Y, the original definition of
v 1 is inserted, i.e.,
%v_2 = phi i32 [%v_1, label %W], [%v_1, label %Z])
When updating incoming values later on, the pair [%v_1, label %Z] would
remain unchanged. As explained above, this Φ-node is illegal. Because of Rule c)
we remove this Φ-node. The reason is that the basic block X (where the incoming
value %v 1 is defined), does not dominate basic block Z (the basic block for which
the incoming value is defined).
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Figure 3.6: The temporal order of A (malloc) and B (the write access) are different
between predictor and executors. Checks use speculative variables to defer
the check of the write.
3.4.4 Stack-local Variables
Addresses of stack-local variables can change during stack translation because additional
local variables might be present in the slow function variant. Therefore, we put all address-
able variables on a separate alloca stack. This stack is not changed by stack translation.
Hence, the address of any variable on the alloca stack is the same for the fast and for the
slow variant.
Technically, we replace all LLVM alloca instructions with our own implementation
that allocates the variables on the alloca stack. On function entry we store the current
frame address of the alloca stack. And on each function exit we restore the previously
stored frame address.
3.5 Speculative Variables
In ParExC runtime checks need to update and read checker specific book-keeping state.
For instance, the out-of-bounds checker (OOB) adds for each executed malloc the ad-
dress and size of the newly allocated buffer to its book-keeping state (Section 3.6.1). OOB
verifies that each memory access reads from or writes to a currently allocated memory
area.
Listing 3.14: Source code for Figure 3.6.
1 char* buf = malloc (10); // A
2 ...
3 buf[5] = ...; // B
Figure 3.6 shows an example for Listing 3.14. In Listing 3.14 and in the predictor (fast
variant) the malloc (A) and the memory write (B) are in a causal order. However, the
malloc and the write may happen in a different order in the executors (slow variant)
as can be seen in Figure 3.6: the write access in the second executor happens before
the malloc in the first executor. Therefore, the OOB checker cannot immediately verify
that the write accesses an allocated region in the memory. Note that the predictor
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also calls malloc to allocates the memory, but the predictor does not update any book-
keeping information about buffer bounds. Thus, the second executor can safely access the
memory, but it does not know its bounds. Previous work [83, 97] streams the meta-data
updates and lookups to a separate core, where all accesses are serialized. This serialization
limits scalability and performance.
We propose to use speculation to decouple the accesses to shared state. Book-keeping
state is stored in speculative variables. At runtime, each executor has a private view of
the speculative variables. After finishing the checking of an epoch, an executor merges
its private view into a shared view. Merges happen exclusively and in the order of the
epochs, e.g., executor Ei has to wait for executor Ei−1 to finish its merge before Ei can
merge its private view into the shared view.
3.5.1 Interface
Speculative variables have a generic interface to allow different checkers to use the same
speculative variable implementation. The semantics of the values stored in speculative
variables depend on the checker. For example, the OOB checker maintains for each buffer
a speculative variable storing the bounds of the buffer. Speculative variables are addressed
by ids. The OOB checker uses the memory address of the buffer as ID.
A speculative variable provides two operations:
• The read (id, ob) operation returns the value of the speculative variable ad-
dressed by id. The read operation only operates on the private view. If no spec-
ulative variable for id exists yet, the value ob is returned. Additionally, a new
speculative variable is created in the private view and its current value is set to
ob. We call ob an obligation. A checker must always provide an obligation to a
read operation. The obligation is calculated by assuming the current check suc-
ceeds. Hence, the obligation is a speculative value. For instance, the OOB checker
speculates that the checked memory access is valid. Therefore, the obligation is the
memory area size at least required by the checked memory access. We explain in
Section 3.6 how to calculate the obligations for our other checkers. The obligation
is also stored within the speculative variable for later validation.
• The write operation write(id, val) stores val in the speculative variable ad-
dressed by id. Writing does neither create an obligation nor does it change or delete
an existing obligation for id. The latter property is important: Consider that the
memory access B in Figure 3.6 would be followed by a realloc in the same epoch.
At the realloc a write is used to update the size of the buffer. Although, we
know the size of the buffer after the realloc, we still do not know the buffer’s size
at the time of the memory access (before the realloc). But we need to check the
validity the memory access. Thus, the obligation has to remain unchanged until it
is verified using the shared view.
After the epoch ei is completely replayed, all its obligations need to be validated. There-
fore, executor Ei that checks epoch ei waits for Ei−1 to finish checking ei−1. After Ei−1
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finished its checking, it updates the shared view. Then Ei validates all obligations of its
private view against the view shared by all executors. The shared view does neither con-
tain speculative values nor obligations. The exact semantics of the validation is provided
by the checker via a callback function. The OOB checker validates that bounds stored in
the obligation of a speculative variable are within the bounds stored in the shared view.
A failed validation is treated as a failed check, i.e., the application is aborted. After the
validation, Ei updates the shared view with its current values of all speculative variables.
3.5.2 Deadlock Avoidance
Because of the use of speculative variables, we need to postpone the commit of external
actions until all obligations are validated. If a checked application in the same epoch
sends out a request to a server and then waits for a reply, it could block forever. The
reason is that the request is held back until all obligations are validated at the end of the
epoch. Hence, it is never made visible to the server and the reply will never be sent.
To overcome this problem, we implemented a second validation scheme. After execu-
tor Ei−1 successfully finished checking epoch ei−1, Ei−1 validates the obligations of the
private view of Ei. As soon as all obligations are validated and no new obligations were
created during the validation, Ei commits all outstanding external actions and also all
new external actions immediately. Executor Ei continues now unspeculatively. Our OS
level speculation supports the unspeculative mode by allowing parexc approve to be
called before replay has finished (Section 3.3.1).
3.5.3 Storage Back-ends
To implement speculative variables, we have to map an ID to a speculative variable
instance. We have two back-ends that implement this mapping:
• Hash-Map The variables are stored in a hash-map. This approach is optimal if
there are not many speculative variables or if the ID space is sparsely populated.
The out-of-bounds checker has one speculative variable per allocated buffer. As the
start address of the buffer is used as ID, the hash-map back-end is best for our
out-of-bounds checker.
• Page Table Speculative variables are grouped by by pages. We use a page table to
map a speculative variable to a page. This approach is useful if a checker maintains
many speculative variables that are near to each other in the ID space. For example,
the Data-Flow Integrity Checker (DFI) has one speculative variable per accessed
memory word, which is optimal for this back-end (see Section 3.6.2).
The two back-ends give the checker developer the possibility to choose the optimal im-
plementation for her checker.
3.6 Parallelized Checkers
To evaluate the ParExC framework, we implemented three checker plug-ins:
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• The Out-of-Bounds (OOB) checker instruments the slow variant with additional
out-of-bounds checks for each memory access,
• The Data-flow Integrity (DFI) checker instruments the slow variant with additional
data-flow integrity checks for each memory access [22], and
• The FastAssert checker removes all asserts from the fast variant.
We use the three plug-ins to evaluate the performance of our framework. We did not try
to push the state-of-the-art of out-of-bounds or data-flow integrity checkers.
Because the plug-ins are applied after the StackLifter (see Figure 3.2), the StackLifter’s
instrumentation is visible to the plug-ins. In general, we found that these instrumentations
are transparent to the plug-ins as the instrumented code is valid LLVM. It is even possible
to change the restored state. In order to do so, a plug-in has to wrap the restoring helper
functions, e.g., popI64 and popFloat.
3.6.1 Out-of-Bounds Checks
In our experience ParExC permits runtime checks to be added by a plug-in in almost the
same way as one would add them to a sequential program. To justify this claim, we first
show briefly how our simple OOB checker is implemented without ParExC and then how
we adapted the OOB checker for ParExC to parallelize its runtime checks. Our goal is to
detect out-of-bounds accesses to buffers allocated on the heap.
OOB without ParExC
The OOB plug-in is implemented as an LLVM pass. At compile time the OOB plug-in
adds a runtime check for every memory access. To keep track of all currently allocated
buffers at runtime, our instrumentation wraps all malloc and free calls of an applica-
tion.
The OOB checks fail if and only if, the checked memory access goes to the heap but not
into a currently allocated buffer. In LLVM, for most memory accesses the base pointer
holding the base addresses (start of an allocated buffer) can be identified at compile
time. In LLVM nearly all pointer arithmetic uses the getelementptr instruction that
expects the base address as first operand. Our current prototype only instruments such
memory accesses with checks. To facilitate the checks at runtime, we keep the size and
base-addresses of allocated buffers in a hash-map at runtime. When using OOB with
ParExC this hash-map is substituted by speculative variables. For every malloc call,
a new entry is added to the map. Consequently, for every free call, the corresponding
entry is removed from the map.
Memory access to the stack are not checked by our OOB checker. Therefore, at runtime
all memory accesses to the stack are filtered out and ignored. When encountering a heap-
access the corresponding buffer bounds are looked up and our checker tests if the memory
access is within the bounds of the allocated buffer. If the lookup or the verification fails,
the whole hash-map is searched for a buffer with matching bounds. For instance, the
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lookup can fail, if the base pointer determined at compile time already points into the
buffer. In this case the access might be valid, but base address in the base pointer is not
the base address of the buffer. Therefore, the first check fails and the OOB checker has to
search the whole hash-map. However, our experience suggests, that this happens rarely
in practice. If no matching buffer is found, the application is aborted.
OOB with ParExC
The instrumentation for OOB with ParExC is the same as the instrumentation without
ParExC except that only slow functions are instrumented. The fast variant does neither
update the map of buffer sizes nor does it perform any checks. The major problem is that
the slow variant at the start of epoch ei+1 is a fork of the fast variant. Therefore, the slow
variant does not know the sizes of all buffers allocated before the start of ei+1.
Listing 3.15: Allocation and memory access in different epochs.
1 char* buf = malloc(20);
2 prospect_chkpnt();
3 buf[0] = ’h’;
For example, in Listing 3.15 the allocation and the memory access happen in different
epochs ei and ei+1. Because the slow variants of ei and ei+1 are executed in parallel to
each other, the slow variant of ei+1 might access variable buf and check its size, before ei
allocates buf and stores the size of buf in the hash-map (see also Figure 3.6). We solve
this problem by using speculative variables as introduced in Section 3.5.
3.6.2 Data Flow Integrity Checks
The motivation of the data-flow integrity checker (DFI) [22] is to protect against memory
access errors. DFI checks that a read value was written from an allowed store instruction,
i.e., variables are only allowed to be written at certain positions in an application. Our
DFI checker conservatively extracts for each memory location m a set of stores that are
permitted to write to m. All loads and stores are instrumented. At runtime, each used
memory location has a speculative variable that contains a unique writer ID. The writer
ID identifies the last store instruction that has accessed this memory location. Hence,
each executed store updates the corresponding writer ID. For each load we check that the
writer ID of the last writer of the read location is within the set of allowed stores for this
load. If we do not find a writer ID for the loaded memory location, the store was executed
in a previous epoch. In that case, our obligation contains the set of allowed stores for
this location. On obligation checking, we verify that the writer ID in the shared view is
indeed an element of the set of allowed stores.
3.6.3 FastAssert Checker
Software developers are encouraged to add runtime assertions to their source code [73].
One of the trade-offs of runtime assertions is their runtime overhead. FastAssert (partly)
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mitigates the negative effects of assertions on the application runtime. The plug-in re-
moves any assertions and functions that neither change the internal nor the external ap-
plication state from the fast variant. The slow variant still contains the assertions. Hence,
assertions are still checked at runtime, but their computational overhead is parallelized.
For each function f, FastAssert computes if f might change the internal or external
state of the application or if f transitively calls a function that might change the inter-
nal or external state of the application. Internal state changes are identified by store
instructions. External state changes are identified by calls to external functions. If a
function f does neither, calls to f are removed from the fast variant. The external func-
tion assert fail is a special case. It is used to implement the assert macro on our
platform. Therefore, assert fail is considered as not changing any state.
By removing not only assertions but also side-effect free computations, we also remove
user defined sanity checking code. We expect that FastAssert not only mitigates the
perceived performance overhead of existing assertions, but also motivates to the inclusion
of more (computationally expensive) assertions.
FastAssert has no additional book-keeping state. Thus, it does not use speculative
variables.
3.6.4 Runtime Checking in STM-Based Applications
In our evaluation in Section 3.7.2 we compare ParExC with checking an application par-
allelized with the help of Software Transactional Memory (STM). For the comparison
we used the OOB checker from Section 3.6.1. This subsection provides details on how
we implemented the OOB checker using an STM. We chose to run the experiments on
STAMP [21] a benchmark from the STM community. This selection restricts the checkers
we can apply. The STAMP benchmarks contain not enough assertions for the FastAssert
checker. The DFI checker cannot be trivially parallelized with STM because of the non-
deterministic reader/writer interleavings. The STM’s inherent non-determinism makes it
difficult to learn all possible reader/writer interleavings for DFI. Hence, we applied only
our OOB checker to the STM parallelized applications.
STM provides transactions at the programming language level. A transaction is a set
of statements that are executed atomically. An STM detects read/write and write/write
conflicts of transactions and aborts or delays conflicting transactions. On abort all state
changes are rolled back and the transaction is then retried. STM requires all shared data
accesses within a transaction to be instrumented. This instrumentation incurs synchro-
nization and book-keeping overhead. However, this book-keeping overhead can often be
amortized by achieving better scalability through speculation.
In our experiments we used a C++ version of TinySTM [40]. Instead of instrumenting
the code by hand, we used Tanger [39] which is an extension for LLVM [65] that auto-
matically transactifies applications. The programmer only has to mark the start and the
end of transactions. The instrumentation redirects all shared data accesses within trans-
actions to an STM. Although an experienced programmer might exploit optimizations by
manually transactifying the application, we do expect that many applications will not be
manually transactified.
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To parallelize an application with OOB checks, we perform two steps:
• First, we apply the same compiler transformations as the ParExC OOB plug-ins.
• Second, we apply the Tanger transformations on the code resulting from the first
step.
Due to this ordering Tanger automatically puts the book-keeping state of the runtime
checks under the control of TinySTM. Therefore, we do not need speculative variables in
this approach.
To parallelize an application together with runtime checks an application developer has
to parallelize the application itself. Parallelizing an application with STM (and with or
without runtime checks) involves two major tasks:
• Insert code to spawn threads.
• Add critical sections and encapsulate these in transactions.
Often an application rewrite is necessary to optimally exploit parallelism. Thus, we believe
that an STM is more difficult to use for the application developer who wants to distribute
the load of runtime checks over many cores than the ParExC approach. Furthermore,
while an application itself must be parallelizable to parallelize its runtime-checks using
STM, this restriction is not the case for ParExC. ParExC can be applied to applications
that are difficult to parallelize or even not parallelizable at all. However, because ParExC’s
scalability is limited by the overhead of the runtime checks an application parallelized with
STM may run faster if it scales very well and runs on sufficiently many cores.
3.7 Evaluation
Our evaluation focuses on the scalability of our checkers, the comparison between Tanger/-
TinySTM and ParExC, as well as ParExC’s overhead. We performed all measurements
using Fedora 10 on a 2xIntel Xeon E5430 with 2.66 GHz (8 cores) and 16 GB RAM.
Like [83], we used the real time reported by the time command to measure the runtime.
3.7.1 Performance
We evaluated ParExC’s performance with the three checkers introduced in Section 3.6:
• OOB: The out-of-bounds checker.
• DFI: The data-flow integrity checker.
• FastAssert
Since we used existing benchmarks, we had to adapt these benchmarks manually. How-
ever, we only needed to add calls to parexc chkpnt. For none of the benchmarks we
needed to add more than 5 lines of code. Every presented value is the average of 3 runs.
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Figure 3.7: Runtime measurements on an 8-core Intel Xeon Server with 16GB main
memory.
Out-of-Bounds Checker (OOB)
To measure the speedup of parallelizing the bounds checks with ParExC, we used five
different benchmarks from different application domains. The first set of benchmarks are
Genome and Vacation that are part of the STAMP [21] benchmark suite for transactional
memory. The performance of both benchmarks is CPU and memory-bound. All STAMP
benchmarks can be executed in parallel using multiple threads (see Section 3.7.2). How-
ever, we run them single-threaded since we want to show the parallelization with ParExC.
The second set of benchmarks are Whetstone and LinPack. Both come from the high per-
formance community and are, at least in our measurements, CPU-bound only. The last
benchmark is bzip2, a real application and not an artificial benchmark.
Figure 3.7 shows the runtime (in s) of the five benchmarks. We run all benchmarks in
four configurations:
1. without OOB: without ParExC and without out-of-bounds checks (OOB) to show
the lower bound for the runtime,
2. ParExC without OOB: without OOB but with ParExC to show the framework’s
overhead,
3. OOB with ParExC: with OOB and with ParExC to show the runtime reduction
by ParExC’s parallelization, and
4. OOB without ParExC: with OOB but without ParExC to show the slowdown
of the OOB without parallelization.
All runs without ParExC are single-threaded, whereas with ParExC we make full use of
all 8 cores. The ParExC overhead (configuration ParExC without OOB relative to
without OOB) is most visible for Whetstone (3.1x) and LinPack (3.0x).
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Figure 3.8: Speedup of out-of-bounds (OOB) with ParExC relative to OOB without Par-
ExC.
In Figure 3.8 we plotted the speedup of OOB with ParExC relative to OOB without
ParExC. To estimate the maximal possible speedup on our 8 core machine, we use the
following upper bound:
slowdown =
runtime OOB without ParExC
runtime without OOB
upper bound =
number of cores
1 + 1
slowdown
The upper bound for the speedup assumes that we can distributed to load of the executors
perfectly over all available cores. Additionally, the upper bound takes into account that
the fast variant needs also a share of about 1
slowdown
of the CPU.
Figure 3.8 shows that we do not reach our estimated upper bound. Hence, there is room
for improvements. However, Figure 3.8 also shows that whenever the speedup drops it
corresponds to a drop in the upper bound too. That indicates that the ParExC framework
itself might introduce some constant overhead. In Section 3.7.3 we analyse ParExC’s
framework overhead in more detail to explains the gap between ParExC’s speedup and
the upper bound.
Data-flow Integrity Checker
To evaluate the scalability of our DFI checker we limit the number of parallel executors
to simulate CPUs with fewer cores. If the maximum number of parallel executors is
reached, the predictor blocks before spawning a new executor until at least one of the
currently checking executors finishes. In our experiments we measured either throughput
or runtime.
Figure 3.9 shows the runtime for parallel and sequential DFI checking of the Vacation
and Labyrinth STAMP benchmarks. For Vacation we plot transactions per second and
for Labyrinth the total runtime. Vacation performs 363, 000 transactions per second
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Figure 3.9: Runtime of sequential vs parallel DFI checker for two STAMP benchmarks.
BOOST words
0.1
1.0
10.0
100.0
ru
nt
im
e 
in
 s
 (
lo
g 
sc
al
e)
  0.2
 87.0
 12.2
without assertions
assertions without FastAssert
FastAssert
upper bound
BOOST words
0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
sp
ee
du
p
  7.2
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BOOST words example.
without runtime checks. Thus, according to the measurements in Figure 3.9, DFI has
a slowdown of 7.26x in the sequential execution, i.e., without ParExC, and 1.91x with
ParExC. Labyrinth runs for 56.21s without runtime checks on a 512x512 maze. The DFI
slowdown without ParExC is 7.14x and 1.37x with ParExC.
FastAssert Checker
We tested FastAssert with real world code. We choose the words unit-test of BOOST’s
multi-map implementation [74]. This unit-test contains a set of very expensive (in terms
of runtime) sanity checks. Figure 3.10 (left) shows the runtime of the test in three con-
figurations:
1. without assertions: without assertions and without ParExC,
2. assertions without ParExC: with assertions but without ParExC, and
3. FastAssert: with assertions and with ParExC.
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Figure 3.11: Throughput/runtime of the OOB checker with ParExC and Tanger/Tiny-
STM. The error bars show the minimum and the maximum of our
measurements.
Configuration without assertions is 458x faster than configuration assertions with-
out ParExC. This is an unusual runtime overhead for sanity checks and assertions.
FastAssert is 7.2x faster than configuration assertions without ParExC (Figure 3.10
right hand side). But the runtime overhead compared to configuration without asser-
tions is still impractical 64x. Nevertheless, we believe that given more cores FastAssert
would reduce the runtime of configuration FastAssert even more. We believe this exam-
ple shows that FastAssert enables the inclusion of heavy-weight user defined sanity checks
into production code.
3.7.2 Checking Already Parallelized Applications
The STAMP benchmarks are explicitly written for benchmarking STM libraries. There-
fore, all shared memory accesses have been marked explicitly by experts. However, as we
focus on as few manual changes as possible, Tanger ignores these markings (except the
transaction boundaries) and puts all potentially shared memory accesses under the con-
trol of TinySTM. We expect different results if TinySTM would be directly called by the
developer, i.e., without Tanger’s automatic transactification. But this would additionally
involve the manual transactification of the OOB checker. We want to avoid any addition-
ally manual and (possibly) error-prone overhead. Every measured value represents the
average of 5 runs.
We measured the percentage of application runtime that is parallelized. In particular,
the startup and the cleanup phase of both benchmarks are not parallelized. In Vacation,
99.84% of the single threaded runtime is parallelized. In contrast, Genome’s startup phase
takes very long, i.e., only 85.7% of Genome’s single threaded runtime is parallelized. While
ParExC can parallelize the checks even if the code is not parallelized, Tanger/TinySTM
can only parallelize the checks in parallelized code.
Figure 3.11 compares the OOB with ParExC and OOB with Tanger/TinySTM. In gen-
eral, OOB with ParExC has better throughput (for Vacation) and shorter runtime (for
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Figure 3.12: Overhead of the system call speculation in the fast variant and the determin-
istic replay in the slow variant for Vacation.
Genome). This indicates that the instrumentation of OOB with ParExC is more light-
weight than the instrumentation of OOB combined with STM (Tanger/TinySTM). In con-
trast to applications instrumented with ParExC, those instrumented with Tanger/Tiny-
STM need to acquire and check locks for every memory access within original transactions
of the application and in the OOB runtime library.
Furthermore, we can see in Fig. 3.11 that both benchmarks scale better when instru-
mented with ParExC than if instrumented with Tanger. Vacation instrumented by Tanger
actually does not scale at all if more threads are used than cores are available. One reason
is increased contention, which leads to higher abort rates. Another reason is the lack of
transaction scheduling by TinySTM. Both issues do not arise if the ParExC approach is
used. First, there is no contention between executors. Second, executors are scheduled
by the OS transparently. However, more measurements are necessary to clarify this issue.
Since only the checks are parallelized, the application parallelized using the ParExC
framework cannot be faster than the original application. Therefore, if the workload is
easily parallelizable, and enough cores are available, the Tanger approach will eventually
result in better scaling applications. On the other hand, the ParExC approach also works
with applications or parts of applications that are difficult to parallelize, as long as heavy
runtime checks have to be applied.
3.7.3 ParExC Overhead
To analyze the runtime overhead introduced by ParExC, we measured the overhead of
system call speculation, deterministic replay, and the StackLifter individually. Figure 3.12
shows the overhead of system call speculation and deterministic replay for the Vacation
benchmark with four different workloads identified by the number of performed transac-
tions. System call speculation and deterministic replay are implemented by our Linux
kernel module. We run Vacation only with the kernel module. The slow variant was
forked right before the execution of the main function. Slow and fast variant share the
same code. To avoid measuring overhead of the StackLifter, the whole execution took
place within one epoch. No further instrumentation (especially no StackLifter) was ap-
plied. The overhead of the smaller workloads is dominated by the start-up time of our
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Figure 3.13: Overhead of the StackLifter instrumentation with three optimizations for
Vacation.
kernel module. For the two larger workloads the overhead is about 2.5%.
Figure 3.13 shows overheads introduced by the StackLifter. Again, we executed Vaca-
tion with the four different workloads. The StackLifter adds instrumentation to both, the
fast variant and the slow variant. In this experiment we measured the overheads intro-
duced by this instrumentation but not the stack lifting process itself. The main sources
of overhead are the check of for the doUnwind flag in the fast variant. The slow variant
has two sources of overhead:
• The new entry block in every instrumented function.
• The look-up of function pointers at indirect function calls.
We ran both variants separately without system call speculation and deterministic replay.
Applying the StackLifter to all code of the fast variant increases the runtime up to 1.8x
compared to vacation without ParExC. If the StackLifter is restricted to functions on the
path to parexc chkpnt, the overhead is below 3%. The instrumentation of the slow
variant introduces a higher overhead. Instrumenting all functions, the overhead is between
2.4x and 4.6x. If only functions on the path to parexc chkpnt are instrumented the
overhead introduced by the StackLifter is between 1.8x and 3.0x.
The overhead of the slow variant can be further reduced by optimizing indirect function
calls. Note that all function pointers (also in the slow variant) point to functions of the
fast variant. Hence, before an indirect call we need to look up the function pointer of
the slow variant. Therefore, we use a map. This map is indexed by a function pointer
to a fast variant function (see Listing 3.7). The look-up can be optimized by caching the
result of the last looked-up element in the look-up function fp2cp. This optimization
is not used in the fast variant. Therefore, it does not influence the overhead of the fast
variant. The slow variant’s overhead is reduced to 1.16x for the largest tested workload.
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Figure 3.14: Time to perform a stack lifting for different stack depths.
In our experience the time needed to switch from the fast variant to the slow variant
is very small. Hence, it is difficult to get reliable measurements from our benchmarks.
Therefore, we built a micro-benchmark to measure the time to switch code bases. The
micro-benchmarks consists of a recursive function that calls parexc chkpnt exactly
once at the deepest nesting level. Apart from StackLifter we did not apply any other
instrumentation. Figure 3.14 shows the time needed to switch from the fast variant to
the slow variant for growing stack depths. Each stack frame contains one label and three
live integer registers. Unsurprisingly, it takes longer to un- and rewind from greater stack
depths. A linear relation exists. This indicates predictable behavior.
The runtime overhead in the slow variant is noticeable for large stack depths. However,
this runtime overhead is already parallelized by ParExC. Ideally, this runtime overhead
could be made negligible by adding sufficiently number of cores.
3.8 Conclusion
ParExC makes heavy use of speculation. Both, the fast variant, and the slow variant are
executed speculatively. While this is easy to see for the fast variant, it is not so obvious
for the slow variant. The slow variant’s execution is split into epochs. At each start of
an epoch the slow variant takes over the speculative state of the fast variant. Only at
the end of the epoch the speculative starting state is compared to the end state of the
previous epoch. Therefore, the slow variant is executed speculatively, too.
Our evaluation in Section 3.7.1 demonstrates that ParExC’s speculation can reduce
the perceived performance overhead of checking (Thesis 1). Our performance evaluation
is also an argument for Thesis 4, which says that parallelization of runtime checks can
speedup checking. The comparison of ParExC with checking STM-based applications in
Section 3.7.2 shows that ParExC’s approach can be faster than parallelizing a checked
application with STM (Thesis 5).
ParExC’s parallelization of heavyweight state corruption sensors (checkers) is clearly
a benefit for approaches like Rx [94] and ASSURE [108]. It allows these approaches
to utilize more heavyweight sensors with low additional performance costs. Furthermore,
ParExC can provide more support to these approaches. Both approaches also make use of
check-points and replay techniques, similar to the techniques used in ParExC. Therefore,
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an appropriately adapted ParExC that exports internal interface for check-pointing and
replay can be used as infrastructure to build system such as Rx and ASSURE on top of
it.
To use ParExC, application developers have to compile their applications with LLVM
and the ParExC compiler and they have to mark potential epoch boundaries in their
source code (using calls to parexc chkpnt). The only difference for the users is, that
they have to start the applications under ParExC’s runtime environment. However, this
startup setup can be automated to hide ParExC from the user. Thus, ParExC can be
completely transparent to the user apart from the performance benefit.
81

4 Automatically Finding and Patching
Bad Error Handling
The previous two chapters discussed approaches needed for error tolerance. Error toler-
ance approaches are the first sub-class of automatic hardening approaches (see Figure 1.1).
The second (and last) sub-class of automatic hardening approaches is bug removal. Bug
removal covers approaches that deal with errors in already deployed software. While error
tolerance tries to detect and mask errors at runtime, bug removel removes bugs after de-
ployment but before using the software in a production environment. By removing bugs
the likely-hood of errors at runtime is reduced. If is, of course, possible to apply bug
removel before integrating a software into a production environment and later at runtime
error tolerance.
Individual bug removal approaches focus in certain bug patterns. This chapter focuses
on bugs in error handling code. The next chapter discusses the removal of bugs from
3rd-party components.
Many service outages are caused by buggy error handling code [29]: the error handling
is often the least tested, least documented, least executed and least understood part
of a software component. Under high load more resources (e.g., more memory and file
descriptors) are needed and errors will occur and will need to be handled correctly when
resources become depleted. Bad handling of resource depletion errors are therefore more
likely to become visible at times when the system is needed the most, i.e., when the load
is high.
Because of economical reasons, most dependable systems cannot be built from scratch.
Instead one has to reuse existing software components. Some of these components might,
however, not been built to the standards required for dependable systems. Developers
can use different static and dynamic analysis techniques that aid them evaluating and
improving the dependability of software components.
Error handling code can be a large part of a code base ([29] reports up to two thirds)
and it can be the cause of a large percentage of outages ([29] also reports up to two thirds
even though error handling code is rarely executed). Therefore, we focus in this chapter on
the problem of how to evaluate and improve error handling code. This chapter describes
the AutoPatch project1 that aims to increase the dependability of software-based systems
by:
• using static and dynamic program analysis to evaluate source and binary code, and
• generating hardening patches to remove certain robustness issues found in the anal-
ysis phase.
1This chapter is based on [117, 118, 116].
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The generated patches can be used in three different ways:
• User can relay on generated patches as temporary solution until the software vendore
makes patches available. This is, for example, important for vulnerability bugs
that can be used to gain malicious control over a system. Generated patches are
immediately available and can protect the system as soon as they are generated.
Nevertheless, patches released by the software vendor usually undergo more testing.
Hence, in the long term users are more likely to apply patches released by the vendor.
• Generated patches can be used to improve the efficiency of application developers
by helping them to correct their code with less effort [131]. Application developers
can uses a generated patch as a template for their bug fix.
• For less critical components generated patches might be used instead of patches
supplied by a vendor. This is especially useful if a vendor is not willing or able to
provide patches.
The approach of this work is to use error injection techniques to discover bugs in the
error handling of programs (Thesis 7: “Fault injection finds failures even in mature soft-
ware.”). We present some of the bugs we found using our error injection in Section 4.7.2.
Our patch generation is based on the following observation: Even though error handling
is the buggiest part of the code, nevertheless most programs handle most of the errors
correctly. We use this observation by trying to map errors that a program cannot handle
to errors that the program can handle (Thesis 8: “Automatic error mapping can mask
failures.”). To do so, we define patch patterns that can be applied in well specified situa-
tions. A patch pattern is code template that can be instanciated to remove certain bugs.
Whether a pattern can be applied in a given situation is verified by using static analysis
of the binary code.
Our approach can be applied at the end-user site without any support from the appli-
cation developer. Because our static analysis works on binary code, we do not require
source code of the applications to harden. Our evaluation in Section 4.7 shows that our
automatically generated hardening patches remove 84% of previously found crash failures
(Thesis 6: “Automatic bug removal based on patch patterns can decrease the number of
failures.”).
4.1 Related Work
The work in this chapter is related to other research in the area of robustness analysis
and patch generation. The Ballista project [62, 63] provides a toolkit to automatically
determine the robustness of POSIX functions using error injection. The functions are
called with extreme values as arguments to determine their robustness. Ballista differs in
two major aspects from our work:
• The error injection is done into POSIX functions using extreme values while we
inject errors into applications.
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• Ballista’s results are used for measurements only while we use them for patch gen-
eration.
The HEALERS project [45, 44, 119] uses a Ballista style error injection approach to
determine safe and unsafe data types for function arguments. Values which belong to
unsafe data types lead to non robust behavior (e.g., crashes) or insecure behavior (e.g,
buffer overflows). A data type can be a value range, e.g., positive integers, or a certain
value, e.g., a NULL pointer. More abstract data types, for example “buffer that is allocated
on the heap”, are also possible. The knowledge about the safety of function arguments is
used to generate various types of wrappers for shared libraries. For example, a robustness
wrapper prevents a library function from being invoked with unsafe argument values.
Similar to the wrappers generated by HEALERS, our patches intercept function calls.
However, in this work we protect the application and not the library as it was done in
HEALERS. Both approaches are complementary: HEALERS makes sure that libraries
return errors instead of exhibiting non-robust or insecure behavior and our approach –
AutoPatch – makes sure that programs can cope with errors returned by libraries.
We reuse some of the techniques that HEALERS uses to determine the type of shared
library functions: We parse the Unix man pages and C header files of the given library
to extract function signatures. HEALERS uses these signatures for selecting the extreme
values to test a function. We, instead, use the signatures for static analysis and for patch
generation.
The FIG project [17] aims at determining the robustness of applications in the presence
of errors returned by system functions. Therefore it uses error injection from the interface
of the Standard C library into the application. FIG generates wrappers to intercept calls
to functions of the Standard C library and to inject errors into the callers. Depending
on the given configuration, either an error value is returned or the wrapped function is
executed. The authors of [17] have found several robustness issues in applications. Like
Ballista, the error injection is done to evaluate the robustness only. We use the approach
of FIG to inject errors. With the error injection we identify calls to library functions for
which an application does not perform proper error handling. In contrast to FIG, we use
the error injection results not only for evaluation purposes but also to determine which
function calls need to be patched.
LFI [70] improves over FIG in several ways. While FIG can only inject faults for calls to
functions of the libc, LFI is a general fault-injector for arbitrary libraries. Therefore, LFI
uses static analysis of the libraries, an application is linked to, to determine fault-injection
profiles. For each exported function of a library LFI extracts constant return values and
other error information transported via side-effects from the library’s binary code. These
constant return values and error information form the fault profile of a library. The fault
profile is used by LFI to control the fault injection. In contrast to AutoPatch that gathers
the fault profile from the documentation of a library, LFI does not rely on documentation
like man pages and header files to build the fault profile. That makes LFI usable even with
library that have not any documentation. While documentation might be incorrect, LFI’s
static analysis is also sometimes incomplete. For instance, LFI cannot handle the rare
cases when a function contains indirect jumps. Which approach is preferable depends
on the requirements. However, LFI, like FIG, is a fault injection tool only. Whereas,
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AutoPatch’s patch generator needs anyhow expert knowledge (such as documentation)
to decide if a certain patch pattern can be used for a given function. For instance, error
handling bugs for calls to write cannot be patched by with the preallocation pattern
(see Section 4.6.2). However, AutoPatch’s fault injector can be substituted by LFI.
The authors of [107] automatically generate security patches for applications. Their
approach tries to patch vulnerabilities abused by exploits. The approach needs access to
the application’s source code. The application’s source code is compiled with a buffer
overflow detector. The buffer overflow detector is similar to our out-of-bounds checker
in Chapter 3.6.1. The application is executed and the exploit is performed on it. The
buffer overflow detector records any buffer overflows. Based on the recorded data the
applications source code is patched to prevent all detected buffer overflows. The authors
introduce a common patch pattern to alter the application’s source code. Although the
patches are also automatically generated our work differs in its focus and requirements.
We focus on robustness issues. As we use error injection, we do not need any knowledge
about robustness flaws of the inspected application. Our requirements are much lower.
We only require the application’s binary, but not the application’s source code. Our
patches are wrappers located between an application and the libraries the application
uses. Using wrappers we do not need to alter the application’s binary or source code.
ASSURE [108] uses error mapping similar to ours. If an error is detected ASSURE rolls
back to a previously determined rescue point. Rescue points are points in the application
execution known to have safe error handling. After the rollback ASSURE triggers this safe
error handling by injecting an appropriate error. In contrast to ASSURE our approach
does not rely on rollback. Rollback is difficult to implement if external actions are involved,
e.g., the deletion of a file or message send via network.
Other approaches like Exterminator [84] and First-Aid [50] also deal with memory
errors. Exterminator uses a randomized heap to probabilistically detect memory errors.
First-Aid relies address space randomization and on the crash detection of the OS to
detect memory errors. The assumption of First-Aid is that thanks to address space
randomization any memory error leads to a crash. Both approaches patch memory errors
by over allocating. Over allocation means that more memory than needed is allocated, but
enough so that the exploit cannot overflow a buffer any more. However, these approaches
do not deal with error handling bugs of code calling the memory API (for instance calls
to malloc).
4.2 Overview
Systems-oriented libraries like the standard C library return error codes when a failure
occurs during the execution of a function. For example, if all file descriptors are currently
in use, an error code is returned by functions that open a file. Dependable applications
need to handle such error codes appropriately. Error handling code is, however, often
buggy. Such bad error handling can be a major cause for service unavailability.
In this work we focus on bad handling of errors returned by systems-oriented libraries.
Figure 4.1 shows the caller/callee relationship. The caller calls the callee (step 1). The
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Figure 4.1: Caller/Callee relationship together with our patch.
callee processes the caller’s request (step 2). Last, the callee returns to the caller. Now,
the caller might need to handle errors of the callee (step 3). Even though, we most often
call the caller application and the callee library, our approach works for any kind of caller
and callee. However, the implementation may be different for other kinds of caller/callee
relationship.
We use systematic error injection to identify function calls that do not handle errors
properly. We understand that under proper handling of errors an application does not
crash if we inject an error, i.e., return an error code instead of calling the original callee.
In this work we do not address other possible consequences of bad error handling like an
incorrect output or application hangs.
To perform error injection into applications on the library level, we intercept calls to
library functions and return in some cases an error code instead of executing the function
that was called. We do this in a systematic way to identify unsafe function calls. Function
calls are unsafe if the application crashes when an error value is returned. These are the
function calls that must be patched. We restrict our analysis to calls to library functions,
which we want to patch. We use the term function of interest to refer to such library
functions.
Patching of the application is based on patch patterns. In this chapter we present two
patch patterns:
Preallocation The basic idea of the preallocation pattern is that one maintains some
reserved resources for calls that allocate resources and for which the application
cannot cope with errors.
Whenever a resource allocation fails and the application cannot cope with an error
for this allocation some of the reserved resources are returned. To counter depletion
of reserved resourced they are refreshed in a fault tolerant way.
Error Value Mapping The error value mapping pattern transforms an error of a func-
tion call that the application cannot deal with, into an error that is returned at
some other function call for which the application deals with errors correctly.
Both patch patterns cannot guarantee 100% robustness for the patched bugs. For instance,
if the reserved resourced are depleted and refresh is not able to allocate new reserved
resources, then preallocation cannot help anymore. However, our evaluation shows that
the patches reduce the number of crashes significantly (see Section 4.7.1).
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Figure 4.2: The data flow of analyzing an application for patch generation.
Figure 4.1 shows the position of the patch. The patch intercepts the call of the ap-
plication (caller) to the library (callee). The patch removes error handling bugs (in step
3) by either masking an error (with the help of preallocation) or by triggering the error
handling of known safe function calls (error value mapping).
Additional information about calls to library functions is needed in order to apply our
patch patterns. The preallocation pattern needs to know the argument values of function
calls. The values are used as parameters for preallocation, which must be done before the
unsafe function call. We use a dynamic and a static approach to obtain these argument
values:
• We record dynamically all arguments for function calls of one or more runs of the
application.
• We do a static analysis of the application’s binary to extract further information
that helps us to generate the patches.
Figure 4.2 shows the data flow of our analysis. The argument recorder and the error
injector are dynamic analysis techniques – they execute the application and observe it.
The user must provide a run configuration (work directory, command line arguments,
etc.) for repeatable execution. Only bugs found by the error injection can be patched.
Thus – like for any dynamic analysis approach – the run configurations should provide
a good coverage of the application’s execution. The static analysis tool works on the
application’s binary. Hence, our approach does not depend on the application’s source
code. If the binary contains debugging information, our system can also extract various
information that will aid a developer in fixing the bugs the system finds.
All data gathered by our analysis tools is stored within a database. There are two
reasons for using a database:
• Some of the data gathered is expensive to acquire and one wants to keep it persistent.
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For instance, the error injection has a quadratic overhead. The error injection tool
has to perform one separate application run for each function call the application
performs. Hence, if N is the number of function calls in the application, then
N2 functions calls are performed by the application under the control of the error
injection tool.
• The error injector and our static analysis need some of the data gathered during
argument recording. Thus, it is very convenient to have the data accessible via the
database.
Please note that our approach does not rely on already found bugs. The only input
our approach needs are the application’s binary and one or more run configurations of
the application. For example, existing unit tests of the application can be used as run
configurations. The error injector needs the names of called functions and the return
values that signal an error for those functions. We call these values error values. Error
values can be obtained in three ways:
• An expert defines them.
• Automatic tools can extract them statically from documentation, specification,
source or binary code.
• They can be automatically learned by injecting errors into system calls (Section 4.3).
The signatures of functions used within the various generated wrappers are derived with
the approach of [45]: we parse header files and man pages to obtain those signatures.
In the following we describe how error values can be extracted using dynamic analysis
(Section 4.3). Then we describe our analysis approaches (Section 4.4). In Section 4.5 we
propose a novel approach for systematic error injection (such as we use in Section 4.4.2).
Section 4.6 describes our patch generation based on the results of the analysis described
in Section 4.4.
4.3 Learning Library-Level Error Return Values from
System Call Error Injection
For our approach we need the error values of the functions of interest. We propose a novel
technique to learn error values of library functions by injecting errors at the system call
level. Therefore, we intercept system calls issued by libraries and return an error instead
of executing the system call. When the library passes the control back to the application,
we record the error return value. This approach has several advantages:
• The system call API is small compared to the number of functions implemented in
all libraries installed on a common system.
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Figure 4.3: Two possibilities for error injection into the application: (1) the direct ap-
proach: from a library into the application, and (2) the indirect approach:
from the operating system via the library into the application.
• The system call API is well defined and sufficiently stable. Hence, a small hand-
written error specification of the system call API is sufficient to derive a sound error
specification for library functions that use system calls directly or indirectly. At the
end of this section we show how to even avoid the hand-written error specification
by mining the error specification of the Linux system call API automatically.
• The learned error specification of a library can be reused for injecting errors in other
applications that use this library. Hence, the learning done with one application
benefits the error injection for many applications.
To derive an error specification of a library, we execute applications that use this library
under the control of our system call error injector. All errors returned by the library are
recorded. We record the function’s return value and value of the errno variable. The
recorded error values form a sound but possibly incomplete error specification. We use this
error specification later on to inject errors into an application when performing library
calls. This is depicted in Figure 4.3: to get the error specification needed for directly
injecting errors from a library into an application (possibility (1)), we inject errors into
the library at the system call level (possibility (2)).
Please note that always injecting errors at system call level only has two disadvantages
compared to our approach:
• It would be more difficult to infer where the actual bug is located. Injecting errors
at the system call level will expose software bugs at the library and application level
while our approach will in general only trigger application bugs.
• The error specification of a library can depend on the library’s version and on the
hardware platform the library runs on. Hence, if we would inject errors only on
system call level the application is only tested against the error specification of the
library currently in use.
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Then again, with our approach we can learn different error specifications for different
library versions and hardware platforms. These error specifications can be merged to
a more useful error specification. For example, with this merged error specification
application bugs can be found that are only triggered on seldom used hardware
platforms.
4.3.1 Components
Our implementation consists of two components:
Recorder Wrapper The recorder wrapper intercepts function calls from the application
into the library. It also records the return values and the errno values returned by
library functions.
Error Injector The error injector intercepts all system calls. Only if the system call was
issued by the library, an error is injected. To know if or if not to inject an error the
error injector relies on the recorder wrapper, because the recorder wrapper keeps
track of the invoked library functions.
The recorder wrapper and the error injector can be implemented as one monolithic wrap-
per.
Our approach can be extended to other programming languages and error handling
paradigms. For example, for Java the recorder wrapper would intercept method invo-
cations to the methods of certain (library) classes. The recorder wrapper would inform
the system call error injector that a library function is going to be executed and then
invokes the wrapped method. The error injector would inject errors into system calls, as
long as the execution is within the wrapped method (signaled by the recorder wrapper).
All exceptions thrown by the wrapped method are caught and recorded by the recorder
wrapper. These exceptions form the error specification of the invoked method.
Note the learned error specification differs from the exception specification that is part
of the method’s signature in Java. First, the exception specification does not contain
runtime exceptions (such as OutOfMemoryError). But the error specification also
contains all recorded runtime exception. Second, some exceptions from the specification
might not be used in practice and, thus, will not be part of the learned error specification.
Two issues are left to be discussed. First, efficiency of the error injection and second,
we show how the error specification of an operating system API can be obtained.
4.3.2 Efficient Error Injection
Just before injecting an error, we take a check-point of the application’s and the library’s
state by forking a new child process. The error injection is done in the child process.
The child process is only executed until the error signals of the library function have been
recorded by the wrapper. The parent process waits until the child process has finished and
continues with normal execution until the next system call is encountered. This approach
is similar to that of [41].
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Without using fork the application would have to be executed once for each error
that we want to inject. If N is the number of system calls performed by library functions
during a certain run of an application, then our analysis would need to execute O(N2)
system calls. With the fork approach the number of system calls reduces to O(N).
However, the forking of a child process introduces a new issue: The child process might
corrupt the external state (like files) so that the parent process cannot continue. We
discuss this problem and a possible solution to it in Section 4.5 in more detail.
4.3.3 Obtain OS Error Specification
For the error injection at system call level we need an error specification of the system
call API. While this API is significantly smaller than the number of library functions, one
might still want to create this error specification automatically. Therefore, we present an
approach that infers this error specification for Linux using the Kernel’s header files and
the system call documentation.
1. We parse the header file of the Linux kernel that defines all system call numbers
(unistd.h). This results in a mapping from numerical system call IDs to textual
system call IDs.
2. We parse the header file errno.h where all error codes of all system calls are
defined. Again, the result is a mapping from numerical errnos to textual error
names.
3. We parse the man pages for each textual system call ID for all textual error names
from the errno-mapping. We assume that all error names mentioned in the docu-
mentation of a system call can be returned by it.
Thus, we automatically obtain at least a subset of all errors that a system call can return.
The result of the last step forms the OS error specification.
4.4 Finding Bad Error Handling
This section introduces the three components of the failure analysis shown in Figure 4.2:
• Argument recording to collect argument values later used to generate patches that,
for example, do preallocation.
• Systematic error injection from the library into the application for finding bad error
handling.
• Static analysis of the binary code to extract constant arguments and to look for
patterns used to apply error mapping.
The first two approaches are dynamic analysis techniques, i.e., they need a run configura-
tion, for instance, unit tests or a testing environment. The third approach only uses the
binary code of the application to patch without executing it.
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4.4.1 Argument Recording
The objective of the argument recorder is to learn common arguments for specific invo-
cations of functions of interest. These common argument values are, for example, useful
for the preallocation patch pattern. The preallocation pattern keeps some preallocated
resources as backup. The typical resource demands to reserve as backup can be derived
from the recorded argument values.
The argument recorder also learns the return addresses of calls to functions. We use
the return address within the application’s binary as an unique identification of a function
call. The advantages of using the return address as identification of function calls are as
follows:
• The return address is independent from a certain execution and the scheduling
behavior of multi-threaded applications. Thus, in multiple runs the same function
calls have the same return addresses. Hence, we can easily combine the results for
several dynamic analysis runs with different run configurations.
• The return address is also used to combine the dynamic analysis results with the
static analysis results, since the return address of a function call can also be extracted
from the disassembled code (see Section 4.4.3).
In summary, our argument recorder works as follows:
1. It generates a wrapper that intercepts all invocations of (library) functions of interest
to record their argument values,
2. the application is executed with this wrapper preloaded, and
3. the recorded argument values are written to our database for the next analysis steps
and patch generation.
Our argument recorder is a dynamic analysis tool and, hence, the recorded arguments
are associated with specific runs of the application. There are two coverage issues with
this approach. First, a call to a function of interest might not be executed in the run we
used for recording the arguments. Second, the argument values of a function call might
be specific to a run and not a good estimate of a typical argument value. Our approach
is to run the application multiple times in different configurations within the argument
recorder. The results of all runs of an application are included in all further analysis and
patch generation.
In the following we describe our argument recorder implementation in more detail.
Before running the application, an argument recording wrapper is generated. The purpose
of this wrapper is to intercept all calls to functions of interest and to write the argument
values and return address of all intercepted calls to our database. For each function of
interest one wrapper function is included in the generated wrapper. The return address
of the current function can be found on the stack. A wrapper function writes the current
argument values and the current return address to the database and then it calls the
function it wraps. Listing 4.1 shows pseudo code to illustrate the operation of a function
wrapper.
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Listing 4.1: The structure of a function wrapper part of the argument recording wrapper.
1 return_type function_name(type1 arg1, type2 arg2, ...)
2 {
3 write_to_db(return_address, arg1, arg2, ...);
4 return original_function(arg1, arg2, ...);
5 }
The argument recorder gets a run configuration from the user. This configuration is
saved to the database to facilitate re-execute of the run within the error injector (see
Section 4.4.2). The run configuration consists of:
• the applications path,
• command line arguments,
• the working directory of this run, and
• optionally a setup script.
The setup script prepares the environment (external state) of the application. For exam-
ple, the setup script can be used to remove files left over from a previous run. Therefore,
the argument recorder runs the setup script and changes the working directory. Then, the
application is run with the configured command line arguments. The argument recorder
inserts the wrapper between the application and the library using the LD PRELOAD ap-
proach of the Linux linker [33] (as shown in Figure 4.1 for the patch).
4.4.2 Systematic Error Injection
Our implementation uses systematic error injection to classify function calls as safe or as
unsafe.
Definition 4.1. A function call is safe, if the application does not crash when the function
called returns an error value. All function calls for which the application crashes at-least
once if they return an error value are unsafe.
Even if a crash was only observed for one invocation in one run and all other observed
invocations of this function call do not crash we treat the function call as unsafe. Unsafe
function calls have to be patched. The results of the systematic error injection runs are
written to the database after the classification.
The analysis works as follows: for each call to a function of interest grouped by return
addresses an error injection wrapper is generated. The wrapper intercepts all calls to the
function of interest. It filters the calls for a given return address. Calls that do not match
the filter are pass through to the original function. For matching calls, however, a given
error value is returned. Listing 4.2 illustrates with pseudo code the operation of an error
injection wrapper function.
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Listing 4.2: Structure of an error injection wrapper function.
1 return_type function_name(type1 arg1, type2 arg2, ...)
2 {
3 if (return_address == error_injection_return_address)
4 return error_value;
5 return original_function(arg1, arg2, ...);
6 }
The error injection return address is constant for a given run of the error in-
jector to filter the calls by return addresses. We repeat the process for all return addresses
seen by the argument recorder.
For each function call the application is run with the corresponding wrapper preloaded.
The same run configuration as for argument recording is used by the error injector. The
error injector uses the same preloading approach as the argument recorder. After running
the application, the error injector waits for the application to terminate. The error injector
records, if the application crashes or exits and then starts the application with the next
wrapper for the next return address.
Our systematic error injection makes four assumptions:
Assumption 4.1. The application behaves good without error injection, i.e., does not
signal errors: our wrappers are the only parts of the system that return error values and
the application will not crash because of other errors.
Note that this assumption can be checked by the wrapper during runtime. It is violated
if the application crashes without error injection.
Assumption 4.2. The system has to know the error return value of functions of interest
a priori.
Error values can be given by experts or automatically extracted using the approach
presented in Section 4.3.
Assumption 4.3. The only bad behavior is a crash of the application.
If this assumption is sufficient, depends on the application. For instance, it might be
useful to check the application’s output for consistency and correctness. Both properties
depend on the application. But it would be unproblematic to aid the classification by a
correctness checking script provided by an expert knowing the application. We omitted
this step to make our approach more generally applicable.
Assumption 4.4. All error handling bugs are triggered by exactly one function call sig-
naling an error.
Our approach misses bugs that are only triggered if more than one function call signals
errors. The systematic error injector can be extended to search for such bugs by testing
all combination of function calls. While this will be simple to implement, the number of
wrappers to generate and the runs to execute will increase exponentially with the number
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of calls to functions of interest. That is why we decided to assume that all bugs are
triggered by exactly one unsafe function call.
As the error injection is a dynamic analysis technique it suffers from the same code
covering drawbacks discussed already in Section 4.4.1 about argument recording.
To aid the developer in locating and fixing the found bugs, our error injector wrappers
catch all signals sent to the application. The signal contains, among others, the address of
the actual crash. Thus, we can provide the developer with the address where the error is
injected and the address of the actual crash. If the applications binary contains debugging
information, these addresses are translated into a source code file name and a line number.
We have used this information to find the bugs presented in Section 4.7.2. Note that the
requirement for debugging information is optional and is not needed for generating the
patches.
Doing systematic error injection has a runtime complexity problem. We give more
details about the complexity of the error injection in Section 4.5. Furthermore, we also
propose a solution for this problem in this section. However, our current implementation
matches the description of this section and is not based on the architecture proposed in
Section 4.5.
4.4.3 Static Analysis
We do static analysis to aid the patch generation. The patch patterns, we are presenting
in Section 4.6, need additional information that is not provided by our dynamic analysis
techniques.
• The error value mapping pattern needs to know, if an unsafe function call is in a so
called call group together with a safe function call.
Definition 4.2. A call group is a sequence of function calls that is executed com-
pletely or not at all.
This implies that there exists no jump statement and no jump target between the
corresponding call statements in the application’s binary code. This pattern is used
to map a failed call from an unsafe to a safe function call, i.e., in case of a failure
at the unsafe call, the safe call will also return an error code.
• For preallocating resources the patch generator needs to know the argument values
of the function call before the call is executed by the application. One way to get
the argument values is to look into the binary code if the argument values for a
specific function call are hard-coded into it.
Definition 4.3. A function call that has hard-coded argument values has static
arguments. Otherwise the function call has dynamic arguments.
Preallocation is only possible if all argument values are know a priori. Thus, we
require that all argument values have to be hard-coded into the binary for a function
call with static arguments.
96
4.4 Finding Bad Error Handling
Our implementation includes a static analyzer to obtain call groups and static argu-
ments from the application’s binary code. To be independent from the access to the
source code of the application, the static analyzer works on the disassembled binary code.
Because disassembling a binary is in general a surprisingly difficult problem, we cannot
always guarantee that we can perform a static analysis on the complete code. We also
check the results of the static analysis by comparing them with the data obtained by the
argument recorder. The static analysis only considers function calls of which function
names and return addresses (the address of the next statement after the call statement)
have been found by the argument recorder. Nevertheless, there is a possibility for both
false positives (false call groups or function calls with false static arguments) and false
negatives (where we miss a call group or a function call with static arguments). We
discuss these issues below.
We use the disassembly output of the GNU tool objdump [52]. Looking for function
calls is simple pattern matching: Whenever a call operation is found, its operand is
inspected. If the operand points to a function of interest, the call itself and its return
address (the address of its successor statement in the disassembly output) is saved into our
database. Since functions of interest are always external functions (functions implemented
in a 3rd-party library), they can be easily recognized because their names must be part of
the binary. The tool objdump includes the function names for calls to external functions
into the disassembled operands of call statements.
Static Arguments
To identify calls with static arguments, we iterate over the predecessor statements of
a function call. Because the Linux IA32 ABI [100] defines that argument values to a
function call have to be passed over the stack, we are looking for stack operations. We
look for two possible stack operations2:
1. push <const> It pushes a constant onto the stack.
2. mov <const>, <offset>(<stack ptr>) It moves a constant onto the stack.
The stack pointer is always %esp and the offset is an integer constant (or zero if
omitted).
The number and types of the arguments of a function are known a priori from its signature.
Thus, the static analyzer knows the number of predecessor statements to inspect (plus
the set of possible offset values if the mov operation is used). Only, if all arguments
of a certain function call are hard-coded into the binary with push or mov operations,
we classify the arguments of this call as static (see Definition 4.3). The arguments are
extracted and saved into the database together with the name of the called function and
the return address of the call.
2All assembler code in this chapter is in AT&T syntax.
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Call Groups
We show a real source code example of a call group in Section 4.7.2. To identify call
groups, we treat all function calls within the disassembly as one single call group. We
then split this call group at the start of functions, so that all function calls within one
function are part of the same call group. Next we identify all jumps and jump targets
within a function and split the call groups further so that they do not contain a jump
or a jump target. We only store call groups with calls to functions of interest into the
database.
The start of a function is detected by the statement sequence shown in Listing 4.3.
Listing 4.3: Statements at the start of a function.
1 push %ebp
2 mov %esp, %ebp
This sequence is generated by common compilers. It first stores the frame pointer of
the caller on the stack and then loads the current frame pointer. For all our analyzed
programs we successfully identified the starts of functions using this approach3.
Jumps are identified as operations that start with a j [57]. If the operand of a jump
is a constant, we record it as jump target. Our implementation treats the ret operation
also as a jump but without a jump target.
False Positives
One prominent source of false positives (misinterpreted call groups and function calls with
static arguments) are indirect jumps. The target of an indirect jump is calculated during
runtime. In general, it is impossible to derive the exact set of possible targets for an
indirect jump from the disassembly. Our current implementation ignores indirect calls.
But it would be possible to add heuristics to determine some indirect jump targets, for
instance for switch-statements. The missed jump targets might lead to too large call
groups, when such an indirect jump goes into a call group. It is also possible that such
a jump target is between a function call and the statements that move its operands onto
the stack. In this case our implementation mis-classifies a function call to have static
arguments.
We did a survey with a set of sample C programs that contained common syntax
constructs. They were compiled with different optimizations options. We inspected the
resulting assembly output of the programs. We found no indirect jump as described
above. Of course, this is only an indication that for the used programs and compiler
indirect jumps are not an issue.
False negatives are also possible. One cause for false negatives that we observed in our
survey is tail recursion. The GNU compiler gcc sometimes generates for function calls
at the end of a function the statements shown in Listing 4.4.
3The GNU compiler gcc inserts sometimes a mov <constant>, %edx statement between the two
statements. Our implementation skips this additional statement.
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Listing 4.4: Tail recursion in assembler generated by gcc.
1 leave
2 jmp <function>
Instead of calling the function and returning to the current function’s callee, the stack is
restored and a jump to the next function is executed. The return address of the current
function is now the return address of the function jumped to. Because we cannot predict
the function’s return address, we skip such tail calls.
If the static analysis completely misinterprets the disassembly (for instance, if the binary
was altered to prevent re-engineering), there is only a little chance that the results of the
static analysis match the argument recording results (remember, we compare function
names and return addresses of function calls). In this case it is theoretically possible that
a generated patch contains code that might be useless or, even worse, could result in some
inconsistencies (for instance a static argument is assumed where there is none). But our
patch generator ensures that a patch stays within the specification of the function that
is called. Hence, our patch might not be able to mask certain existing errors, but the
patch does not introduce additional errors because of a wrong static analysis. Here are
two examples how the generated patch mitigates problems from the static analysis:
• For instance, if preallocation assumes that a function has static arguments, then
it calls this function with the known static arguments to reserve backup resources.
But, the generated patch always checks if the actual arguments match the static
arguments and only in this case uses the reserved backup.
• If call group is analysed to be larger than in reality a error might be mapped from
an unsafe function to a safe function that are not in the same call group. Because
the safe function is allowed to return an error it stays in its specification. However,
if because of the erroneously extracted call group the unsafe function call might
be too far in the past to be handled by the safe function, then the original bug is
triggered. Our patch is ineffective but not worse.
It is also possible that the unsafe function call will never be performed. Then, the
safe function call returns an error where there would be none visible. However, as
this only happens when the patch has a failed preallocation (see Section 4.6.1) the
patch just makes an error visible that would be hidden otherwise.
4.5 Fast Error Injection using Virtual Machines
When doing systematic error injection, one has to do one error injection experiment per
API usage of the application to test. Hence, one needs to run the application once per
error injection. Thus, the runtime of all experiments together grows with O(n2) where n
counts API usages. One can reduce runtime complexity to O(n) by utilizing snapshots and
rollbacks (see Section 4.3.2 and [41]). The idea is to make a snapshot of the application
directly before an error is injected. After the error injection experiment is finished the
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Figure 4.4: An error injection run with three error injection points with two, three, and
two different error values to injection. The execution of the original application
pauses while the fault injection runs.
application’s state is rolled back to the last snapshot. This approach reuses the progress
an application has already achieved until the error was injected.
Figure 4.4 illustrates a error injection run with three API usages in total. The original
error free execution of the application is depicted with a bold line. Each API usage is
an error injection point. Because an API usage, e.g., a function call, can fail for multiple
reasons, usually more than one error needs to be injected per error injection point to do
an exhaustive analysis. In the example, at the first and the third error injection point
two errors need to be injected and at the second one three errors. The different errors are
derived from the specified error values of the called API functions. In our experiments
we are not interested in a complete run after the error has been injected. Therefore, it is
sufficient to execute a limited number of instructions after injecting the error, for instance,
until the currently executed function returns to its caller. Thus, the runtime complexity
is O(n) instead of O(n2) when doing each experiment in a separate run. If every error
injection run would be executed completely until the end, the runtime complexity of the
error injection would be O(n2).
To underpin the complexity issues, we have parsed the documentation of the Linux
2.6.15 system call API. We have found in average 3.3 possible error return codes (errorss)
per system call. The maximum is execve with 22 unique error return codes. GCC per-
forms more than 1, 800 system calls when compiling and linking a Hello World program.
Whereas compiling and linking the GNU Math Library issues more than 2.5 million sys-
tem calls. If one wants to do errors injection for the latter compilation run, one has to run
more than 8 million error injection experiments (3.3 errors × 2.5 million system calls). If
the runtime complexity would grow quadratic, then system calls in the order of 64 trillion
would have to be executed.
4.5.1 The fork Approach
Currently, we do the snapshot by spawning a new child process via fork (see Sec-
tion 4.3.2). The error-free parent process waits until the error injection experiment in
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the child process has finished. If another error has to be injected at the current error
injection point, a new child is spawned. Otherwise, the parent continues the execution to
the next error injection point. In our recent research we found that the snapshots done
with fork are incomplete for various reasons:
Multi-Threading Applications that use multiple processes to implement multi-threa-
ding are not supported by the fork approach.
File System The snapshots do not contain the state of the file system. A error injection
execution might alter files in a way that influences the original execution.
Shared Memory If the snapshot is done via fork, the original execution might be
influenced by changes to shared memory. For example, if an application accidentally
maps private data as shared, then it will see all changes to this data done by the
error injection experiments.
Operation System Resources The error injection execution might bind certain re-
sources – even after its termination – that can therefore not be acquired by the orig-
inal execution. One example for such resources are the System-V IPC Semaphores.
A Semaphore hold by a process is not automatically freed upon its termination.
Indirect Influence Furthermore, a error injection execution might influence another
application which itself influences the original execution again. This can be very
difficult to detect. For instance, because of the injected error a signal could be send
to a third application, which in turn forwards this signal to the original application.
The original application would not see this signal without error injection.
Distributed Applications The fork snapshot captures only one application. Appli-
cations distributed over more than one process or more than one host cannot be
taken into one consistent snapshot using fork.
4.5.2 Virtual Machines for Fault Injection
Because of the described insufficiencies, we propose to include the complete state of one
computer into a snapshot. In the case of distributed applications, the states of all par-
ticipating computers have to be included. In this way, we avoid interference between
error injection execution and original execution. Virtualization tools provide snapshots
of virtual machines that include the states of the CPU, the virtual devices, the volatile
and the stable storage. But there are some problems with current VM toolkits:
• None of the VM toolkits are optimized for fast snapshots and rollbacks, and
• We need to store the analyses of error injection executions outside of the virtual
machine. Otherwise, it will be discarded when rolling back to the last snapshot.
We have implemented fast snapshots and rollbacks for XEN [10]. Our plan is to avoid
snapshots of the file system by splitting it into an immutable part mounted as read only
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Figure 4.5: Architecture of Fault Injection using Virtual Machines.
and a mutable part within a ram disk. Both parts are joined together by UnionFS [134].
The mutable part of the file system is stored in the virtual machine’s RAM. The RAM
itself is saved within a snapshot via copy-on-write. Thus, only modified data is part of
the snapshot.
The pseudo code in Listing 4.5 shows how the error injection – running within a virtual
machine – cooperates with our snapshot/rollback approach.
Listing 4.5: Integrating Error Injection with a VM.
1 set_state (INJECT) # writes to the external state
2 snapshot ()
3 if get_state () == INJECT: # get_state reads external state:
4 # true after the snapshot,
5 # but false after rollback
6 do_error_injection ()
7 log_analysis_results ()
8 set_state (NEXT_ERROR) # writes to the external state
9 rollback () # roll back to line 2
10 end
Because the rollback discards all changes done since the last snapshot, we have to store
the analysis results outside of the virtual machine (log analysis results). Also,
the information about the completion of the current error injection is lost. Therefore, we
need an external state that is not influenced by the rollback. The functions get state
and set state are used to access the external state. Currently we only need one bit.
The snapshot and rollback tool run on the VM’s host (or the privileged domain in
XEN’s case) as shown in Figure 4.5. The host stores also the external state and the error
injection results. The experiments are controlled from within the virtual machine VM1
by the error injection tool. If an experiment is distributed over more than one computer,
all involved computers run as virtual machines on the VM’s host. In this way, a snapshot
of all of them can be created.
4.6 Patching Bad Error Handling
The patches we generate are wrappers. Such wrappers are generated for each application
with unsafe function calls. To apply the patch the generated wrapper has to be preloaded,
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just like the fault injection wrapper, by utilizing the pre-loading feature of the dynamic
linker [33]. The wrappers intercept unsafe and safe functions calls. Each wrapper is a
sequence of instantiations of patch patterns. We have implemented a patch generator for
each patch pattern. A micro-generator architecture [44] integrates the code produced by
these generators into one single patch wrapper per application.
We use two patch patterns to fix unsafe function calls:
• Preallocation tries to ensure that the resources requested by an unsafe function call
are available when the call is executed.
• Error value mapping maps the error value from unsafe function calls to safe func-
tion calls. The assumption is that the unsafe function call’s error can be handled
indirectly by the safe call.
We have observed that both patch patterns work, but they cannot, of course, mask every
failure occurring at an unsafe function call.
To test these patterns, we implemented them for calls to malloc, calloc, and
realloc. The patterns are not restricted to these functions. Hence, we describe them
in a more general way.
4.6.1 Error Value Mapping
We apply the error value mapping patch pattern to call groups with at least one unsafe
function call and one safe function call. In short, whenever one of the unsafe function
calls within a call group returns an incorrectly handled error value, our patch wrapper
ensures that the safe function call also returns an error value.
Assumption 4.5. If a unsafe function call U and a safe function call S are both part of
the same call group, we assume that the error handling of S also handles all errors of U
properly.
The basic assumption of error mapping is that instead of crashing, the application
handles the error of the unsafe function call together with the safe function call. In
Section 4.7.2 we present a bug found in grep where this pattern is applicable.
Figure 4.6 shows how errors of unsafe function calls are mapped to a safe call. Function
calls f1 to f6 belong to the same call group. If a call group contains more than one safe
function call, we choose the last safe function call as target for error mapping. We call this
safe function call error target. Failures of unsafe function calls with dynamic arguments
executed after the error target cannot be mapped back to the error target, because the
argument values of such calls are not known when executing the error target.
The patch works as follows: All return values of unsafe function calls before the error
target are stored within the patch wrapper. When the error target call is executed the
stored return values of all unsafe function calls executed before the error target are checked.
If one of them contains an error value, the error target call returns also an error value.
We call this forward mapping because errors are mapped forward to the error target.
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Figure 4.6: Shows the error mapping patch pattern on a call group: errors of unsafe
function calls f1, f3, and f6 are mapped to safe call f4. Unsafe function
call f5 can not be patched by this pattern.
Errors of unsafe function calls with static arguments executed after the error target
are mapped with backward mapping: Within the intercepted error target call all unsafe
function calls with static arguments after the error target are execute early. The patch
wrapper stores the results of this early executions. If one of the results contains an error
value, the error target call returns an error value, too. When the backward mapped
function calls are performed by the application, the function calls are intercepted and the
stored return values are returned. Unsafe function calls with dynamic arguments (like f5
in Figure 4.6) cannot be patched because their argument values are unknown at time the
error target is executed.
The pattern is applicable if the order in which the function calls are issued does not
matter, i.e., there are no side-effects between these function calls. In the call group in
Figure 4.6 the function call f6 is performed together with f4 and before f5. If the
order of the function calls must be preserved, no backward mapping is possible. Please
note that all calls in a call group can call different functions with different error codes.
Because the failed unsafe function might differ from the error target, the application’s
user might see a wrong error message. To test the influence of the call order one can
generate a special wrapper that shuffles the order of calls in a given function group. If
the application’s results of executions with this wrapper does not differ from executions
without this wrapper, it indicates that the call order does not matter.
Error Mapping without Call Groups
We have also implemented a weaker form of error value mapping: The patch wrapper
can optionally return error values for all safe function calls as soon as one unsafe function
call fails. This variant of error mapping does not rely on call groups. Thus, it is more
generally applicable. In the terms of the previous sub-section: This variant resembles
forward mapping. It maps any error of an unsafe function call to all following safe function
calls.
Our implementation uses an error flag. The error flag is initially not set. When the
patch detects an error return value for an unsafe function call, it handles it and sets the
error flag. All safe function calls are intercepted and the error flag is checked. If it is
set, an error value is returned. The assumption is – like with the previous variant of
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error mapping – that the application handles the error of the safe function call together
with the unsafe one before it crashes. Usually the application will exit returning an error
message to the user. That is why we call this variant early-exit.
4.6.2 Preallocation
The assumption of the preallocation pattern is that one should try to reserve all resources
as soon as possible. This approach can be combined with early-exit to try to gracefully
signal a preallocation error to the application through a safe function call. Preallocation
for unsafe function calls with static arguments can be done without any additional action:
At the start of the patch wrapper it preallocates the resources for all unsafe function calls
with static arguments. Whenever an unsafe call fails, the preallocated resources are used.
Whenever a safe function call succeeds, all preallocated resources are checked if they need
to be renewed. We only renew preallocated resources in safe function calls, because in
safe function calls we can safe signal preallocation errors as errors of the safe function call
itself (see below). There are two options if the renewing fails:
• Use early-exit and signal an error value at the safe function call that does the
renewing.
• Ignore the failure. Ignoring assumes that the renewing might succeed at a safe call
performed later on but before the unsafe call belonging to the resource.
For the second option it would be possible to renew also at unsafe function calls, because
we ignore any preallocation failure.
The argument values of unsafe function calls with dynamic arguments are not known a
priori. So the exact parameters for preallocating the resources are unknown until the call
is performed. Hence, we use the argument values from the argument recorder. Therefore,
we take all argument values recorded for a specific function call and apply a heuristic to
get a set of parameters for preallocation. For example, we take the maximum argument
value seen as size parameter for malloc. Other options are to take the average or the
average plus the deviation. We did not see any different results for these options in our
experiments (see Section 4.7). When an unsafe function call with dynamic arguments
is performed and fails, our patch wrapper intercepts the call. It compares the current
argument values with the parameters used for preallocation. If they do not match, some
corrective actions can be done (e.g., trying to resize a preallocated block).
The preallocation pattern can only be used for unsafe calls to functions which reserve
some resources. So it is much more limited in its use than the error mapping pattern.
Preallocation does not preserve the order of the function calls, because for the renewing of
a resource the corresponding unsafe function call is executed out of order. Thus, preallo-
cation is only possible if the order of execution of the wrapped functions does not matter,
for instance, if the wrapped functions have no side-effects. For dynamic arguments pre-
allocation uses arguments derived from the argument recorder. Hence, corrective actions
must be possible to adapt preallocated resources if the derived arguments do not match
the actual arguments of the unsafe function call. All these assumptions hold for the C API
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for memory allocation: malloc, calloc, realloc, and free. Whenever the size of
a preallocated memory chunk does not fit the current argument values, realloc can be
used to correct the size of the allocated memory. Other functions to which preallocation
can be applied are, for instance, opening files (e.g. fopen) and sockets (e.g. socket,
bind, connect).
4.6.3 Patch Generation
The patch generator classifies all unsafe function calls learned from error injection before
generating the patches.
• All unsafe function calls that can be patched by error mapping using call groups are
assigned to the call group patch generator.
• All unsafe calls to memory allocating functions with static arguments that are left
are assigned to the static preallocation generator.
• All unsafe function calls with dynamic arguments to memory allocation functions
that are left are assigned to the dynamic preallocation wrapper.
We have implemented a micro-generator per patch pattern. Our architecture integrates
all patches generated by the micro-generators into a joint patch wrapper. If there are
more than one function to wrap – like in our case: malloc, calloc, and realloc –
the process is repeated separately for each function. To simplify the presentation we focus
in the following on a single function to wrap.
Listing 4.6: Pseudo code of a wrapper function of a generated patch.
1 return_type function_name(type1 arg1, type2 arg2, ...) {
2 if (early_exit && is_safe(return_address)) return
error_value;
3
4 switch(return_address) {
5 case backward_mapping_group1_call1:
6 return preallocated_value(backward_mapping_group1_call1
);
7 //..
8 case error_target_group1:
9 if (!group_failed(group1))
10 // executed backward mapped unsafe calls with static
arguments
11 if (group_failed(group1) || has_error(
backward_mapping_group1_call1) ...) {
12 set early_exit;
13 unset group_failed(group1);
14 return error_value;
15 }
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16 unset group_failed(group1);
17 break;
18 }
19 return_value = call_to_wrapped_function(...);
20
21 if (return_value != error_value && need_preallocate) {
22 // read need_preallocate and
23 // preallocate static and dynamic buffers
24 // by calling the original function (e.g., malloc)
25 // with the arguments stored in need_preallocate
26 }
27 switch(return_address) {
28 case forward_mapping_group1_call1:
29 if (return_value == error_value) {
30 set early_exit;
31 set group_failed(group1);
32 }
33 break;
34 //..
35 case unsafe_call_static_args1:
36 if (return_value == error_value) {
37 set early_exit;
38 return_value = preallocated_value(
unsafe_call_static_args1);
39 set need_preallocate(unsafe_call_static_args1);
40 }
41 break;
42 //..
43 case unsafe_call_dynamic_args1:
44 if (return_value == error_value) {
45 set early_exit;
46 if (preallocation_params(unsafe_call_dynamic_args1)
!= current_args) {
47 // try corrective actions
48 }
49 if (preallocation_params(unsafe_call_dynamic_args1)
== current_args || correction_successful) {
50 return_value = preallocated_value(
unsafe_call_dynamic_args1);
51 set need_preallocate(unsafe_call_dynamic_args1);
52 }
53 }
54 break;
55 }
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56 return return_value;
57 }
Listing 4.6 shows the pseudo code of a wrapper function of a generated patch. The
only difference between patches with and without early-exit are the lines with references
to early exit. These lines are only part of early-exit patches. The generated function
intercepts all calls to a given function. It identifies certain calls by their return address.
The code generated for a certain call depends on the patch pattern used for that call.
After intercepting a function call an early-exit patch checks if the last unsafe call failed
and the current call is a safe one: if true, the wrapper returns an error value (line 2).
A non-early-exit patch skips this step. The error mapping patch pattern for call groups
inserts some code before executing the wrapped function. The patch returns the return
values for unsafe calls with static arguments executed after the error target (line 6). At
the error target itself, those backward mapped unsafe calls are pre-executed (line 10).
Because the unsafe calls of a call group might invoke functions different from the error
target, library functions that are different from the intercepted one might be invoked for
pre-execution. For instance, the error target can be a calloc whereas the backward
mapped unsafe function call goes to a malloc. If one of the pre-executions fails or one
of the forward mapped calls has marked the group as failed, an error value is returned
(line 14). We assume that the returned error will be handled correctly (Assumption 4.5).
In both cases the flag that marks the group as failed is reset for the next execution
(line 13).
After executing the original function call (line 19) without a failure, preallocation is tried
for following all unsafe calls, that are patched by the preallocation pattern (line 22). if the
original function call returned an error value and the current call is patched by forward
mapping the corresponding call group is marked as failed for this execution (line 28). For
unsafe calls with static arguments the preallocated resource is returned (line 35) and it
is marked for a new preallocation. The next safe function call will try to do the renew
the preallocated resource in line 22. The action for calls with dynamic arguments is
similar. Additionally, the current argument values are checked in line 46 if they match
the predicted arguments used for preallocation in line 22. Corrective actions are taken,
if the arguments do not match. After the optional corrective actions the arguments are
checked again, because the corrective actions might have failed. If the check is true, then
the preallocated resource is used and marked for renewal at the next safe function call. If
the checks fails we are not able to mask this bug, because we must return the error value
for this unsafe function call. In the (common) case that none of the executed upper code
lines have already exited from the wrapper, the wrapper passes the control back to the
caller by returning the return value (line 56).
4.7 Evaluation
We have implemented our approach on top of Ubuntu Linux 5.10. Our four components
(argument recorder, error injector, static analysis, and patch generator) are implemented
in Ruby 1.8 and we use Postgresql 8.0 as database back end. All generated wrapper code
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Figure 4.7: Number of unsafe calls and unsafe calls with static arguments.
is in C. Our implementation is currently restricted to IA32. This is mostly because of
the static analysis component. At least the regular expressions used by this component
would have to be reimplemented for other platforms.
We have applied our approach to ten command line applications that are part of the
standard installation of Ubuntu Linux. Each of the ten applications crashed at least
once during error injection. Our generated patches are able to cope with up to 84% of the
unsafe function calls we have found. The worst runtime overhead of a patched application
was 9.14%.
4.7.1 Measurements
First, we present the number of unsafe function calls we have found for each of the ten
applications. After that we discuss the effectiveness of the generated patches that we
examined with the help of various error injectors. Furthermore, we present measurements
regarding the overhead of the patches. Finally, in Section 4.7.2 we will describe some
concrete bugs that our tools have found.
Unsafe Function Calls
Figure 4.7 shows the number of unsafe calls per application and how many of that calls
have static arguments. Since our patches are currently limited to the function of the C
memory managing API (malloc, calloc, and realloc), we have only simulated errors
of these functions. All applications suffer from at least one unsafe function call. Except
for grep and du, the unsafe function calls are performed by the Standard C Library.
The crashes are also within the library. For sum, uname, wc, df, md5sum, sort, and
touch the crash happens while executing the Standard C Library function setlocale.
Application unzip crashed while executing the Standard C Library function tzset.
Since the unsafe function calls are part of the Standard C Library, they are not taken
into account within the static analysis. Therefore, our tools assume that these calls have
dynamic arguments. In grep 4 of the 6 unsafe function calls have static arguments and
in du 2 of 4 unsafe function calls have static arguments.
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(d) Probabilistic Error Injection
Figure 4.8: Robustness test of unpatched and unpatched applications with 4 different error
injectors.
Robustness Evaluation of Patches
Each patched application was first tested without error injection. All runs had the ex-
pected output. So, none of the generated patches did any harm in the absence of failures
in our test setup. To stress the patches, we run various error injection experiments with
the un-patched and patched applications. The results for patches without early-exit are
shown in Figure 4.8. We used four different error injectors to stress the generated patches:
• Figure 4.8 (a) shows the results obtained with the systematic error injector used to
find the bad error handling in the first place (Section 4.4.2). We made one run for
each function call f and injected only errors that could be returned by f .
• The knock-over error injector simulates complete resource depletion (Figure 4.8 (b)).
It works like the systematic error injector (one run per function call), but after it
returned an error value for the first time, it returns an error value for all following
calls (independent of the return address, i.e., call site) of the current run. This
stresses the error handling code, for example retrying an allocation does not work
with this error injection scheme. Except for grep and unzip, we have found more
crashes with the knock-over error injector than for the systematic error injector.
• In Figure 4.8 (c) we simulated a maximum amount of memory. The amount of
currently available memory is limited by the error injector. Whenever an application
tries to exceed this amount, an error value is returned. We experimented with
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amounts of 100, 1, 000, 10, 000, 100, 000, 1, 000, 000 and 10, 000, 000 bytes. The most
crashes were observed for the limit of 1, 000 bytes. All of these crashes happened
within the C-library at the same return address before the actual application code
got executed. We did not examine this bug any further.
• Figure 4.8 (d) depicts a probabilistic error injection. Error values are returned with
a given probability per function call. We run 12 experiments with a fixed seed for
reproducibility. One bug in the un-patched du results in a crash while our patch
prevents this crash. Within wc none of the 4 found crashes are prevented by the
patch. And even worse for grep our patch introduces an additional crash. We
assume that the additional crash is a result of the preallocation. Our patch alters
the ordering and the amount of memory reserved by the application. That is why
a run with the patch behaves differently from a run without the patch.
We only counted crashes, but not graceful degredation like termination with an error-
code (Assumption 4.3). Overall we found 79 crashes. Our generated patches prevent 64 of
them – that are 81% of all crashes. This rate includes the additional crash of grep with
the patch. We ran the same experiments with the early-exit patch. The numbers are the
same except two additionally prevented crashes for du (with systematic and knockover
error injection). So this patch prevents 66 of 79 crashes (84%).
Performance Overhead
Figure 4.9 shows the run times of the applications with normal and early-exit patches
relative to the run times without patches. All runs were done without error injection.
Each measurement was repeated 25 times and the results were averaged. The largest
runtime overhead is 9.14% (for uname without early-exit). Surprisingly, the smallest is
−4.88% for touch with early-exit, i.e., the generated patch accelerates the application.
Experiments indicate that the wrapper preloading is responsible for the speedup. Running
touch with a wrapper that intercepts malloc without any additional actions takes in
average 16 ms versus 21 ms for running touch without a wrapper. We see no evidence
that the early-exit patch outperforms the normal patch or vice versa. We conclude that
our patches add little to no runtime overhead.
4.7.2 Bugs Found
In this section we present a few of the error handling bugs we have found with our tool.
We explain the bugs and how the generated patch masks them.
Missing Error Handling
We found a common bug pattern in grep:
Listing 4.7: grep-5.2.1 src/search.c:152
152 char *mb_properties = malloc(size);
153 mbstate_t cur_state;
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Figure 4.9: Runtimes relative to the unpatched application in %.
154 wchar_t wc;
155 int i;
156 memset(&cur_state, 0, sizeof(mbstate_t));
157 memset(mb_properties, 0, sizeof(char)*size);
Memory is reserved in line 152 and it is accessed without any error handling in line 157.
Error mapping will not be successful here as there is no safe function call between the
unsafe call and the memory access to map to. The only thing the generated patch can
do is preallocation. It tries to ensure that the unsafe call to malloc in line 152 always
returns a pointer to a preallocated buffer. Of course, that might not be possible under
all circumstances. It gets even more difficult because the argument of the unsafe call
is dynamic. Our patch can prevent some crashes but we cannot guarantee that we can
prevent all. The general solution is of course that the developer adds proper error handling
code.
Error handling can be done in many ways. Two common strategies are:
Test Early This strategy should be sufficient for the bug described above.
Test before every use This could be the strategy the developers had intended for the
next bug. But at least before one usage, the error handling is missing.
The next bug is in the hash table implementation used by du:
Listing 4.8: coreutils-2.5.1 lib/hash.c:537
537 Hash_table *
538 hash_initialize (size_t candidate, const Hash_tuning *tuning,
539 Hash_hasher hasher, Hash_comparator comparator,
540 Hash_data_freer data_freer)
541 {
542 Hash_table *table;
Listing 4.9: coreutils-2.5.1 lib/hash.c:578
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578 table->bucket = calloc (table->n_buckets, sizeof *table->
bucket);
Listing 4.10: coreutils-2.5.1 lib/hash.c:591
591 return table;
In function hash initialize the memory for a hash table is reserved and initialized.
While for the table itself a proper error handling is performed, there is none for the call
to calloc in line 578. We found no code that accesses table->bucket directly outside
of the hash implementation. So it might work if before each use of table->bucket the
hash implementation would check for an error value. But the next function in the source
code file accesses the bucket without any check:
Listing 4.11: coreutils-2.5.1 lib/hash.c:602
602 void hash_clear (Hash_table *table)
603 {
604 struct hash_entry *bucket;
605
606 for (bucket = table->bucket; bucket < table->bucket_limit;
bucket++)
607 {
608 if (bucket->data)
Error value mapping with early-exit can prevent a crash. This call has also dynamic
arguments. Thus, preallocation might not work, if the predicted arguments are wrong
and corrective actions fail.
Bad Error Handling
The last bug we present tries to handle all possibly failing function calls:
Listing 4.12: grep-5.2.1 src/dfa.c:3423
3423 mp[i].in = (char **) malloc(sizeof *mp[i].in);
3424 mp[i].left = malloc(2);
3425 mp[i].right = malloc(2);
3426 mp[i].is = malloc(2);
3427 if (mp[i].in == NULL || mp[i].left == NULL ||
3428 mp[i].right == NULL || mp[i].is == NULL)
3429 goto done;
Listing 4.13: grep-5.2.1 src/dfa.c:3622
3622 done:
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Listing 4.14: grep-5.2.1 src/dfa.c:3633
3633 for (i = 0; i <= dfa->tindex; ++i)
3634 {
3635 freelist(mp[i].in);
3636 ifree((char *) mp[i].in);
3637 ifree(mp[i].left);
3638 ifree(mp[i].right);
3639 ifree(mp[i].is);
3640 }
But the error handling itself contains a bug :
Listing 4.15: grep-5.2.1 src/dfa.c:3240
3240 static void freelist (char **cpp)
3241 {
3242 int i;
3243
3244 if (cpp == NULL) return;
3245 for (i = 0; cpp[i] != NULL; ++i) {
3246 free(cpp[i]);
3247 cpp[i] = NULL;
3248 }
3249 }
The error handling starts in line 3427 directly after reserving some memory. If one of
the reservations fail already reserved resources are freed and the current function returns.
But what if only one of the three calls from line 3424 to line 3426 fails? The error
handling code is executed and freelist tries to free the uninitialized list mp[i].in.
If mp[i].in itself is NULL, i.e., malloc in line 3423 failed, freelist returns. But
if mp[i].in is allocated it is not initialized in this context. Hence freelist walks
outside of mp[i].in and the applications crashes (see for loop in freelist from line
3245 to line 3247).
A developer would possibly fix this bug by changing the call in line 3423 from malloc
to calloc. Function calloc initializes the allocated memory with zeros. Hence, the
list will be initialized and the for loop (line 3245) will not leave the list. But our static
analysis finds a call group with one safe call (line 3423) and three unsafe ones (lines 3424–
3426). The unsafe calls have static arguments. Thus, the error value mapping within a
call group can be applied. When the call in line 3423 is issued, the memory allocations of
the next three calls are pre-executed. When one of this four calls fail the patch returns an
error value. This error value will be handled properly. For the other three calls it returns
the memory allocated via pre-execution. In this way the generated patch prevents the
crash by mapping the error values from three unsafe calls to a safe one.
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4.8 Conclusion
We have introduced a novel approach to detect and patch bad error handling. The basic
idea is to use error injection to locate calls to library functions that do not perform proper
error handling. We then use static analysis to determine if and what type of patch can be
used to correct such a call. We show the effectiveness of our approach regarding several
open source programs: we can reduce the number of potential crash failures without
introducing any unacceptable performance penalties.
Our evaluation shows theses 6, 7, and 8. We found bugs in real world applications
with error injection (Thesis 7: “Fault injection finds failures even in mature software.”).
Our patches can mask up to 84% of the failures introduced by these bugs (Thesis 6:
“Automatic bug removal based on patch patterns can decrease the number of failures.”).
The examples in Section 4.7.2 and our evaluation of our patches in Section 4.7.1 show the
usefulness of error mapping (Thesis 8: “Automatic error mapping can mask failures.”).
Patching of bad error handling is orthogonal to the problem solved in the next chapter:
patching of (library) functions called with unsafe arguments.
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5 Robustness and Security Hardening
of COTS Software Libraries
When building dependable systems, one can rarely afford to built everything from scratch.
This means that one needs to build systems using software components implemented by
third parties. These software components might have been designed and implemented for
less critical application domains. The use of such components without further hardening
is therefore not recommended for dependable systems.
Third party software components are often provided in form of libraries. In this chapter
we focus on crashes within a 3rd-party library when given certain input arguments. For
instance, some implementations of the C function free crash when the input to free is
a NULL pointer. In the previous chapter our goal was to harden applications by working
around buggy error handling in the application. In this chapter we want to harden 3rd-
party libraries against crashes because of invalid input.
Experience with an existing library hardening tool HEALERS [45] has shown that such
tools can help users and developers to harden libraries. The idea of HEALERS is to use
automated fault injection experiments to determine automatically the robust argument
types of functions. Any argument that does not belong to the given robust argument type
will result in a crash of the function. The robust argument types of a function are derived
from fixed hierarchy of predefined robust argument types. The predefined robust argument
type hierarchy itself is part of the derivation algorithm. For example, HEALERS is able
to automatically determine that the C function strcpy(d,s) requires s to be a string
and d has to be a writable buffer with a length of at least strlen(s)+1 bytes.
Based on the extracted robust argument type a hardening wrapper is generated. This
wrapper filters the input values for any call to a hardened function. If not all argument
values of the called function have robust argument types the original function is not called.
Instead an error code is returned. Thus, this hardening wrapper is a patch that removes
bugs from the library (Thesis 6: “Automatic bug removal based on patch patterns can
decrease the number of failures.”).
Our experience with HEALERS shows however deficiencies regarding
1. the extensibility, and
2. the performance of the tool.
These deficiencies need to be addressed to make such hardening tools more widely
applicable. Our new tool Autocannon1 addresses these issues by facilitating
1This chapter is based on [119].
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Extensible fault injections New test case generators can be added, e.g., to test new
handle types more carefully (Section 5.3).
Extensible runtime checking New checks for arguments can easily be added (Section 5.4).
Flexible computation of robust argument types These are computed without a given
type hierarchy and can be automatically extended with new runtime checks (Sec-
tion 5.5).
Performance The use of static analysis can reduce the number of fault injections dra-
matically (Section 5.6).
We applied our approach to the Apache Portable Runtime (APR) [2]. Our fault injec-
tion experiments found bugs in over 80% of the 148 analyzed functions (Thesis 7: “Fault
injection finds failures even in mature software.”). However, our hardening patch is able
to prevent of 56% of all crashes seen without the wrapper (Thesis 9: “Automatic filtering
can mask a high percentage of failures injected by bit-flip faults.”).
5.1 Related Work
In this chapter, we combine dependability benchmarking [62, 63, 17, 70] and automatic
patch generation [45, 132, 117, 107]. HEALERS [45] already presents a general approach
to harden COTS libraries. But HEALERS contains an inflexible type system that couples
test types and checks: that makes it very difficult to extend. The mapping from argument
types to test types is done via a predefined map. Thus, HEALERS is not able to test
functions that have unsupported argument types. For example, HEALERS is only able to
test four functions of the Apache Portable Runtime. All other functions contain unknown
argument types. Furthermore, HEALERS cannot tolerate contradictions. But all of those
four testable functions produced contradictions. Hence, HEALERS is unable to generate
any protection hypothesis for the APR.
AutoPatch (Chapter 4) presents an approach to patch bad error handling. Autocannon
might introduce unexpected error values when a wrapper filters a function call and returns
an error value. The application might not be able to deal with this unexpected errors and
might itself behave unrobust or insecure. One can apply the bad error handling patching
to counter this problem. Thus, Autocannon and AutoPatch are orthogonal to each other.
Stelios et al. [107] introduced an approach to automatically patch buffer overrun bugs in
applications. They also evaluated their approach with Apache. But they fix bugs within
the application and not at the interface to dynamic libraries. Hence, their approach is not
comparable to ours. Furthermore, the approach needs some code that exploits the bug to
patch, for instance a zero-day exploit. We are, in contrast, able to detect bugs and patch
them without any exploiting code as input for our approach.
Our current work is based partly on Ballista [62, 63], a dependability benchmark for
POSIX implementations. We present in Section 5.3 in detail how we extended Ballista
to our test system that is part of Autocannon. The biggest difference is, that Ballista is
bound to a specific API while Autocannon is more general and can test arbitrary APIs.
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Figure 5.1: Workflow of Autocannon.
Other dependability benchmarking tools such as FIG [17], LFI [70] and also AutoPatch
from Chapter 4 focus on fault injection in the opposite direction. Our approach inject
faults into the library. FIG, LFI and AutoPatch inject faults from the library into the
application. While FIG is a fault injector bound to the libc, LFI is a generic fault
injector for arbitrary library. LFI uses, like Autocannon, static analysis to determine
which faults can be injected. However, LFI does a static analysis on the library’s binary,
and Autocannon does static analysis on the library’s bytecode. Bytecode analysis is
in general robust to disassembly mistakes, which can happen when dealing with native
binaries. Furthermore, LFI is also able to do fault injection into the library, but cannot
automatically mine the fault profile for this direction of fault injections.
We also contribute to improving the availability. An unrobust system has a lower
availability than a robust system in an adverse environment. By increasing the robustness
we increase the mean-time-to-failure. This is orthogonal to increasing the mean-time-to-
repair, for instance using micro-reboots [20]. Both approaches can be used together to
increase availability.
5.2 Approach
Our goal is to automatically increase the robustness and security of third-party libraries.
To be applicable for users without expert knowledge, we want to minimize the required
user input. However, most developers will want to have control over the generation
of protection wrappers. Hence, we permit developers to verify and modify the robust
argument types that our tool system derives. The tool also provides developers with
evidence (in form of a truth table) about why it derived certain robust argument types
and that these are reasonable for the wrapped application.
To improve the applicability of our approach, we do not require access to the source
code of the applications and libraries that need to be hardened. Source code might not
always be available. And dealing with source code that was written for different compilers
and even for different programming languages is very difficult and time consuming to get
right (e.g., see [35]). However, we demonstrate in Section 5.6 that static analysis helps
to reduce the complexity problem of fault injections. For doing the static analysis we
assume that we have access to the intermediate bytecode of libraries and applications.
Since intermediate languages like MSIL [16] and LLVM [65] become more widespread, we
believe to have access to the bytecode is a reasonable assumption.
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Figure 5.2: Autocannon injects faults into the input of a library.
In this chapter we focus on the interface between an application and its dynamic linked
libraries. Our approach protects the libraries used by an application from unrobust and
insecure input from the application. In contrast to Chapter ?? we want to protect the
library from the application’s input and not the application from the library’s output.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the work-flow of our approach. In the analysis stage the libraries
used by an application are first statically analyzed to reduce the number of test inputs used
during the dynamic analysis phase. In the following dynamic analysis phase the library’s
functions are exercised by fault injection. Based on the observed behavior of the libraries
protection hypotheses are generated. A hypothesis is a boolean expression over predicates
of the arguments to a function. We refer to these predicates as checks. In the second stage
a protection wrapper is generated. The wrapper protects the library functions at runtime
from being called with unrobust or insecure argument values. Therefore, the wrapper
intercepts all function calls from the application into a library. The protection wrapper
only forwards the current argument values to the wrapped library function, if they satisfy
the protection hypothesis. If the argument values do not satisfy the protection hypothesis
an error code is returned instead of executing the wrapped function.
The two main contributions of this chapter are a new flexible fault injection tool for
libraries (compared to HEALERS [45] and Ballista [62, 63]) and a table-based approach
to generate the protection hypotheses for the protection wrapper.
We evaluate the robustness of a library with fault injection. Figure 5.2 shows that
Autocannon’s fault injector calls the library’s functions with different inputs. For each
executed call the fault injector measures the robustness. Autocannon makes use of static
analysis to determine the set of input values for fault injection on arbitrary functions.
For each library function a table like the one in Table 5.1 is built in the analysis stage.
One row represents one fault injection experiment with the function. The input vectors
(italic) are not part of the truth table. They only denote where the rows come from. All
test values used in the dynamic analysis stage are classified by boolean checks. A 0 means
the check evaluates to false, 1 to true. A check is a predicate over one or more argument
values form the test case. For instance, string?(a) evaluates to true if argument a is a
pointer to a 0-terminated character buffer (a string). The right most column contains the
boolean result of the call: either robust or unrobust (1 or 0, respectively). A function’s
execution is robust, if the function does not crash (e.g., by a segmentation fault). We
show in Section 5.3.3 how to create test values in a way that security violations (like buffer
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overflows) are converted into robustness issues, i.e., a crash. Our approach to generate a
protection hypothesis is to minimize the truth table to a boolean expression. We view this
truth table as a boolean function f(check1, . . . , checkn). A truth table minimizer computes
a boolean expression of f . This boolean expression is the protection hypothesis. It takes
the role of HEALERS’ robust argument types but it is much more flexible because it is
an arbitrary boolean expression over a set of given checks.
Table 5.2 sketches the truth table for the Standard C function strcpy. The truth
table is first preprocessed before minimizing it. In the preprocessed step amongh others
removes the redundant row 3 from Table 5.2. Check check1 is true if argument src points
to a string, check2 is true, if the first strlen(src) + 1 bytes of the buffer pointed
to by dest are writeable. The resulting protection hypothesis is: string?(src) AND
buf write?(dest, strlen(src) + 1). The protection wrapper will reject all in-
puts for which the protection hypothesis does not evaluate to true.
The protection wrapper prevents calling a function f with unsafe arguments. Therefore,
it evaluates the protection hypothesis of f on the current argument values given by the
caller of f . Only if the evaluation yields true, the control is passed to f . Otherwise the
wrapper returns with an error code without executing f .
In order to use our approach, some knowledge about the library functions used by
an application is needed: we need at least to know the return type and the types of
the arguments of a function to perform the dynamic analysis. Depending on the target
platform, this information might already be included within the library (e.g., a library
given in LLVM bytecode). Otherwise, some other form of specification (such as C header
files) is needed. In the following we will refer with public source to files that contain this
information. Note that even if this is part of the source code of the library, it must be
also available for developers using the library. Whereas private source is the source code
of the library implementation, which is typically not available to all users and third-party
developers.
Even though our approach is independent of the programming language and platform
of a library, we will focus in the following on libraries implemented in the programming
language C.
input vector check1 check2 ... checkn robust?
test case1 0 1 ... 0 1
test case2 0 0 ... 0 0
test case3 0 1 ... 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ...
test casem 1 0 ... 1 0
Table 5.1: Table based approach to generate robustness and security checks. For a check
the 0 means that a given check evaluates to false. A 1 means true.
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check1 check2 robust?
0 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
check1 = string?(src)
check2 = buf write?(dest, strlen(src) + 1)
Table 5.2: Part of truth table for the function strcpy(char* dest, const char*
src).
5.3 Test Values
Test values are used in the analysis phase as input values for performing fault injection
experiments with the libraries functions. For each of a function’s arguments a set of test
values is generated. The set of input vectors is the cross product of all test value sets. For
example, for function void* calloc(size t nmemb, size t size) Autocannon
computes first the test values for argument nmemb based on its type size t and then
for argument size. In this case the test value sets of nmemb and size are the same,
because both arguments have the same type size t. The cross-product of the two test
value sets is the set of input vectors for doing fault injection into calloc. If the test
value set of type size t is {0, 10}, then Autocannon calls calloc with the input
vectors {(0, 0), (0, 10), (10, 0), (10, 10)}. In reality the test value set
for type size t is much larger.
The test value sets must be large enough to exercise the function under analysis in a way
that the resulting truth table is sufficiently complete. Of course, executing the function
on all possible input values is in general infeasible, e.g., a function with two 32-bit integer
arguments has more than 1.8 · 1019 possible input vectors.
In comparison to HEALERS and Ballista, we want Autocannon to handle arbitrary
functions. Therefore, Autocannon has an extensible test type system. New test types
can be added without any further change to the generation of the protection hypothesis.
Each argument type of a function is mapped to a test type (see Section 5.3.5). A test
type has one or more representative test values. The test type system is richer than the
argument type system of C in the sense that the test type system has more semantics.
For instance, the C type char* can be a pointer, a string, a file name or a format string
depending on its usage. Generic pointers, strings, file names and format strings are test
types. Some test types contain other test types (e.g., file names and format string are also
plain strings, which itself are pointers). We call file names and format strings special test
types. In general, special test types have very clear semantics. They are often “sub-types”
of more generic types with more vague semantics.
Our test type system is based on Ballista’s test type system [62, 63]. Ballista is a
dependability benchmark for POSIX implementations. Ballista’s test type system can
handle a predefined fixed set of argument types and functions. In order to test arbitrary
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libraries, we extended it to handle arbitrary argument types. We use argument type
characteristics to map an argument type to a test type (e.g., its size, if an argument type
is a pointer, or if it can be casted to an integer). The argument type characteristics are
extracted using static analysis on the public sources (e.g., C header files or bytecode).
We introduce meta types, type templates, and feedback with Autocannon. A meta type
combines a set of Ballista’s specialized types into one general type. A specialized test type
implements applications semantics. For instance, a test type that represents pointers to
a time data structure time t* is a specialized test type. However, Ballista has some
specialized test types like file name that cannot directly be used without further semantic
knowledge of an argument type. For instance, when Autocannon sees the argument type
char* it needs to test this argument as a generic string. Since Autocannon does not know
any further semantics, the argument type may be also more specialized than a generic
string. We want Autocannon to test this argument also as file name and format string.
We show in Section 5.3.2 how a meta types combines several specialized test types. For
char* Autocannon uses the meta test type meta string that includes generic strings,
file names and format strings.
In Section 5.3.3 we discuss how Autocannon uses feedback regarding test types to
further refine the test types’ test values. We use this feedback mechanism to detect
conditions for buffer overruns.
We do not want to rely in Ballista’s specialized types only. That’s why we introduce type
templates to generate specialized test types from type characteristics (see Section 5.3.4).
We use these templates to generate test types for handles of abstract data types and for
data structures.
The meta types have only predefined test values. Meta types come from two sources.
Some are predefined meta types and are shipped with Autocannon. The others are dy-
namically generated after the static analysis. Feedback types adapt dynamically while
performing fault injection. Template types are dynamically generated from the results of
the static analysis phase.
In the following part of this section we first briefly introduce Ballista’s test type system
before we present Autocannon’s improvements to Ballista: meta types (Section 5.3.2),
feedback (Section 5.3.3), and type templates (Section 5.3.4). The second part explains
the mapping from argument types to test types (Section 5.3.5), and how we deal with a
large set of input vectors (Section 5.3.6).
5.3.1 Ballista Type System
Ballista is a test system for measuring the dependability of POSIX implementations. It
contains a flexible test type system that we have extended to meet our requirements.
Ballista’s test type system is extensible: one can easily add new test types to it. All test
types are arranged in a single type tree. Part of this tree is shown in Figure 5.3. The
root is the most general type, the leafs are the most special ones. A child type can also
a parent type. For instance, on one hand, the string type is a child of the more general
pointer type. On the other hand, the string is also a parent of the more special file name
type. Each type has a set of test values that are representatives of this test type. The
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Figure 5.3: A part of Ballista’s test type system with a meta type.
root’s set of test values is empty.
A child type inherits all test values of its parent. For instance, a function expecting a
file name is also tested with plain string values and general pointer values, but not with
format strings. But a function whose argument is mapped to the plain string type is
not tested with file names and format strings. Ballista contains already fixed mappings
for a given set of functions. This mapping was generated manually with regard of the
function’s semantics. For instance, for function open the first argument must be a file
name. Whereas, it does not give any additional value to test function strdup with
something more special than a generic string.
To test a function with usual and exceptional values a Ballista type has more than one
test value. For example, the Ballista type for file names has 432 test values. These 432 test
values are the result of all possible combinations for the content (empty, non-empty), the
file permissions (readable, writeable, etc.), the file state (existing, non-existing, directory,
etc.), and the file name (local, temporary, with spaces, etc.).
5.3.2 Meta Types
The mapping between test types and argument types is predefined within Ballista. It is
done by an expert knowing the function’s specification. In order to test arbitrary libraries,
our system works without such a predefined mapping. In Autocannon, we introduced meta
types to combine specialized Ballista types into more general types. A meta type has more
than one parent. So our type system is a directed acyclic graph instead of a tree. For
simplicity meta test types do not contribute test values. They join the test values of their
parents.
For example, the test values of the meta type meta string in Figure 5.3 are the
union of the test values of Ballista’s test types file name, format string, string, and
pointer. Because we do not know the specification of a function foo(char*), we map
the argument type char* to meta string. Hence, foo will be tested with file names,
format strings, and their parents.
We have defined 4 generic meta types:
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Figure 5.4: Feedback loop: For buffer test types the test system uses the addresses of
illegal memory accesses to refine test values.
Meta string combines all special string types.
Meta pointer combines all specialized pointer types including meta string.
Meta integer combines all integer types with width 32 bit.
Meta short combines all integer types with width 16 bits.
More meta types are generated dynamically when needed to combine generated types
(such as instantiated type templates from Section 5.3.4) with Ballista types or predefined
meta types.
5.3.3 Feedback
Autocannon uses feedback to determine the minimal size for buffers arguments. Since our
goal is to protect arbitrary functions Autocannon must be able to derive the size of a
buffer argument. Consider function int sum5(int buf[]) that returns the sum of
the first five integer values of buffer buf. Autocannon does not know the semantics of
sum5. However, Autocannon needs to know the minimal size of buffer buf (in this case
five integers) in order to protect sum5 from inputs with too small buffers. The key idea
is to use the feedback loop from Figure 5.4. This feedback loop is originally a part of
HEALERS [44].
Feedback is used to convert buffer overruns into robustness issues. Test types that
represent buffers, for instance pointers, have additional dynamic behavior to adapt their
test values while doing fault injection. We guard any buffer used as test value with
unaccessible guard memory pages. Hence, a buffer overflow results in a segmentation fault.
Autocannon catches the segmentation fault and the address of the erroneous memory
access. If the bad memory access occurred within the enclosing memory pages of the
current test value, then Autocannon gives feedback to the test type. The test type
enlarges the test value (the buffer) and the test is repeated. If the memory access is
outside of the guard pages the current test case is treat as unrobust. The feedback cycle
goes on until either the function executes without a segmentation fault or the test type
is unable to allocate more memory.
The test system itself does not detect the conditions for buffer overruns. This is done
by the checks. Let us illustrate this using function strcpy(char* dest, const
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char *src). The test system tests strcpy with a string (src) provided by Ballista’s
string test type and a read/write buffer of size 1 byte (dest) provided by Autocannon’s
feedback test type. Function strcpy will overrun dest and cause a segmentation fault
if the length of src’s string is larger than 1 byte. Successively, the feedback type for
argument dest will enlarge dest’s buffer until its size equals src’s string length + 1.
The check correlate the buffer’s size and the string’s length so that the hypothesis sizeof
(dest) > strlen (src) will be finally extracted.
We have added a test type to Autocannon that (1) accepts and responds to feedback
and (2) generates different representatives: buffers of different size (1 byte, 4 kbytes, 64
kbytes), content and protection (read only, read/write). Beside this one feedback test
type, templates are used to generate special feedback test types for data structures.
5.3.4 Type Templates
We use type templates to generate specialized test types for arbitrary argument types.
Type templates are parameterized test types. Currently, we have two kinds of type
templates: one for Abstract Data Types and one for data structures. The data structure
type gives feedback back to the testing environment (see Section 5.3.3).
Abstract Data Types
Abstract Data Types (ADT) are often implemented by a set of functions operating on
some hidden state. This hidden state, the instance of the ADT, is referenced by a handle.
Examples for such handles are file descriptor handles, socket handles, or a handle to a
random number generator.
The Ballista type system already includes a set of test types generating handle values.
But this handles refer all to ADTs implemented by the POSIX API. To test libraries
implementing arbitrary APIs, we generate a test type for each kind of handle we identified
(see Section 5.3.5). In this way, functions expecting handle values are not only tested with
extreme values, but also with input values that might appear in a non-faulty execution.
For generating a test type of an ADT, we need all constructor functions that create
handles to this ADT instance. Currently, we detect handles by static analysis applied
on the public source code of the analysed library. Our static analysis uses some simple
heuristics like the ones used in [36]. For example, we only consider functions as construc-
tors if they follow our naming convention (see below). We can combine our static analysis
with dynamic analysis like temporal specification mining [137] or the data-flow analysis
used by the dynamic learner of SwitchBlade (see Chapter 2.4.2).
Our static analysis is based on the following assumption:
Assumption 5.1. Each ADT is represented by a handle implemented by a unique C type.
The constructors and destructors of an ADT fulfill our naming convention.
First, we extract all signatures of the functions implemented by a library using Doxy-
gen [125]. Our heuristic is that we examine only functions that fulfill our naming conven-
tion for potential constructors and destructors:
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Constructors The function name must contain alloc, create, new or open.
Destructors The function name must contain close, destroy, delete or free.
A constructor passes a handle to its caller as return value or via call-by-reference. We
treat every C type that fulfills all of the following properties as handle:
• There is at least one potential constructor function that returns this C type or has
one argument that is pointer to this C type.
• There is exactly one potential destructor that has this C type as argument.
So our tool does not extract the ADT itself but the implementing handle.
For example, the libapr [2] contains the ADT socket. Autocannon has extracted the
handle type apr socket t* that represents this the socket ADT. The ADT has two
constructors:
1 apr_status_t apr_socket_create_ex(apr_socket_t**, int, int,
int, apr_pool_t*)
2 apr_status_t apr_socket_create(apr_socket_t**, int, int,
apr_pool_t*)
Both constructors return the handles by reference. We have found 44 functions (including
the destructor) that have an argument of type apr socket t*. These functions will be
tested with test values we generate with the help of the found constructors.
We create test values for the handle types by calling the constructors of the handle.
In addition to the constructors, we need input vectors to call them for creating test
values. Before we create test values for handle types we first do the fault injection for
the constructors. Then, we do look into the truth tables used to compute the protection
hypotheses of the constructors. We extract all input vectors for which the constructor
function did not crash. These input vectors are inserted into the type template for the
handle type to call the constructors.
Data Structures
The data structure template complements the feedback giving test types. Because C
is weakly typed a data structure (defined by keyword struct) can also be treated as
buffer. Therefore, argument types that are data structures are among others tested with
the feedback type to determine the size of the underlying buffer. Usually, the feedback
cycle starts with buffers of size 1 byte. However, data structures have a fixed size. It
would be reasonable that most often instances of this data structure need to used as test
values. Therefore, we start a feedback loop with the size of the data structure. In other
words, the size of a data structure s is put into the data structure template to generate
an adaptive feedback test type for s*.
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5.3.5 Type Characteristics
Autocannon uses static analysis on public source code to extract the type characteristics
of a function’s argument types. With the help of this characteristics it maps argument
types to Autocannon’s test types. The type characteristics are:
pointer? True if the argument type is a pointer value.
sizeof Size of the argument type in bytes.
converts to int? True if argument type can be interpreted as an integer.
signed? True if argument type is signed.
content size Size of the dereferenced type in bytes (for pointers, only).
ishandle? True if at least one constructor function and exactly one destructor function
for this type exist.
Pointers to bytes are treated as strings. They are mapped to the meta string type.
For other pointers, a data structure type template is instantiated and with the help of
a generated meta type combined with meta pointer. If the type is not a pointer, it
is mapped to one of Ballista’s integer types depending on its size and if it is signed.
An exception are signed types of size 2 and 4. They are assigned to meta short and
meta integer, respectively. If the argument type is also a handle, the handle type
template is instantiated and combined with the test type computed up to now.
For example, type size t is not a pointer, has a “sizeof” 32 Bit (on x86), “con-
verts to int”, is not signed and is not a handle. Therefore, size t is mapped to meta in-
teger. An other argument type we already introduced is apr socket t*. It is a
pointer, has a “sizeof” 32 Bit (on x86), “converts to int”, is not signed (actually this
property will not be queried for pointers), has a “content size” of 44 bytes (on x86) and
is a handle. For apr socket t* Autocannon instanciates a feedback type with “con-
tent size” and a handle type. Both types are combined with meta pointer by creating
a new meta type. The test values of this new meta type are the test values for argument
type apr socket t*.
5.3.6 Reducing the Number of Test Cases
Ballista’s produce up to 1000 test values (including parents) for a test type. However,
the average is per test type is much lower. Both the size of the set of input vectors
and, hence, the number of test cases increase exponentially with the number of function
arguments. Therefore, it might be infeasible to test all input vectors for functions with a
large number of arguments. Ballista introduced an upper bound u on the number of tested
input vectors. If the set of all input vectors is larger than u, then a uniform distributed
sample set of size u of the input vectors is computed.
Autocannon uses typically larger input vector sets than Ballista because of the use
of meta types. The average size of an input vector set in our evaluation is larger than
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3.45 · 1016 and the maximum is 5.9 · 1018. Ballista iterates over the set of input vectors
and decides per input vector with the help of a random number if this vector is tested.
But it consumes too much time to do 3.45 · 1016 iterations. Therefore, we introduced
a new sampling algorithm. The algorithm computes the sample by choosing randomly
u input vectors. In contrast to Ballista’s sampling, our new sampling approach has the
disadvantage of possibly testing an input vector twice, But our algorithm is fast. The
larger the set of input vectors the smaller the probability of testing an input vector twice.
To combine both advantages, we introduced a threshold level. If the size of the set of input
vectors is smaller than this threshold, Autocannon uses Ballista’s algorithm. Otherwise,
our new sampling is used. Currently our threshold level is 100, 000 input vectors.
A small number of Ballista’s test values are not computable (e.g., a file handle with
write permissions on a read only file). Thus, Ballista accepts that some input vectors
cannot be tested. However, Ballista’s sampling algorithm does not take into account
the computability of a test value. Whereas, Autocannon’s sampling skips uncomputable
input vectors. Hence, Autocannon can test more input vectors than Ballista. In that
sense, Autocannon has a better test coverage than Ballista, because it reduces the size
of the set of input vectors by removing not computable test values. Test coverage is the
number of performed tests over the size of the input vectors set.
Another way to reduce the size of the set of input vectors is to exclude special types that
will not contribute to the results from the generic meta types. For instance, a function
operating on strings but not on files does not need to be tested with file names. We
perform static analysis using the LLVM framework [65] to determine which special test
types can safely be removed. The LLVM byte code of the library might be provided by its
vendor (if the library should run on LLVM) or can be compiled from the library’s private
source code.
As mentioned above, Ballista contains a predefined mapping from POSIX functions to
their specialized Ballista test types. Our assumption is that we do not need to test a
function f on special test types designed for a POSIX function, if this POSIX function is
not called by f . But if a function f calls some POSIX functions, we test f also with the
special test types of the POSIX functions because f might pass some argument values
directly to this POSIX functions. Of course, this assumption is not restricted to POSIX
functions. In general, we can apply our reduction approach as long as a mapping exists
from functions to special test types exclusively provided for these functions.
For each function to test we compute the transitive set of called POSIX functions.
To simplify our analysis, we exclude functions, if they might perform indirect calls using
function pointers. The set of called functions is compared with the list of POSIX functions
specified by Ballista. We only include special test types that are related to the POSIX
functions called by the analysed function into the set of tested types. To return to the
previous example: a function f(char*) that transitively calls no other function than
printf is not tested on file names because printf expects only format strings. To
avoid exclusion of exceptional values, we only exclude types that are leafs in Ballista’s
original type tree that is a subgraph of Autocannon’s type graph. Therefore, f is also
tested on plain string and pointer values.
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5.3.7 Other Sources of Test Values
Because each new input vector adds just another row to the truth table, the table can be
extended by other inputs. One can do other kinds of fault injection, like the once we use
to evaluate Autocannon in Section 5.6. An additional source are traces of runs of some
application utilizing the library to protect. The advantage of these traces is that they
contain (mostly) input vectors for which the library function behaves robustly. Thus,
these trace avoid false positives (see Section 5.5.2). The disadvantage is that one has to
set up the application to do the tracing.
Currently, we do not use any additional sources of test values to keep the implementation
effort at a reasonable level. However, we use bit flips and application traces for evaluating
the generated hypotheses (see Section 5.6). It would be reasonable to use these techniques
to help in the generation of the hypotheses. But then our evaluation would be less
meaningful.
5.4 Checks
Checks are used in the analysis stage to build the truth table that is used to derive the
protection hypothesis. While input vectors represent the rows of the truth table, checks
represent the table’s columns. Checks are used to classify the input vectors in the truth
table. Because they become part of the protection hypothesis, they are also used at
runtime in the wrapper to check the current input vector.
Definition 5.1. A check is a predicate over one or more argument values.
For instance, for function foo(void* p), the check null?(p) computes whether p
is or is not a NULL pointer. This example illustrates that checks must be instantiated for
specific arguments of a function.
While checks are instantiated for given argument types, checks and test types are not
coupled. In this way, our approach is easily extensible. One does not need to consider
the test type system when adding new checks and vice versa. Checks may employ more
than one argument of a function. Checks employing only one argument are called basic
checks all other checks are compound checks. We have a set of check templates that are
instantiated depending on the type characteristics of the functions arguments. Hence, the
applicable checks depend on the argument types of a function. For example, some checks
are only applicable on pointers, e.g., if a pointer is NULL, or even only to pointers to
characters (char*). Checks that apply on integers (such as if an integer is negative) will
not be instanciated for a pointer type. We use the type characteristics from Section 5.3.5
to instantiate for each argument type all applicable checks. Some check templates are
additionally parameterized. For instance, for each handle type we parameterize a more
general check template to derive a specialized check template for this handle type.
On one hand, we only add instantiated checks to the truth table. Consider function
void foo(void*, void*). Function foo has no integer arguments. Hence, no inte-
ger checks will instantiated or added to the truth table of foo. On the other hand, checks
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Check Type Description (true, if ...)
isNull any pointer pointer value is NULL
isString char* pointer points to zero terminated buffer
isReadable any pointer buffer pointed to is readable
isWritable any pointer buffer pointed to is writable
onStack any pointer pointer points to stack
onHeap any pointer pointer points to heap
isBufferStart any pointer pointer points to start of an allocated buffer on the
heap
isZero any integer integer = 0
isPositive any integer integer > 0
isNegative any integer integer < 0
isFileName char* string represents an existing file name
isDirectory char* string represents an existing directory name
isFormatString char* string contains %n
Table 5.3: Basic checks of Autocannon.
can be instantiated multiple times. Since function foo has two pointer arguments, each
pointer check will be instantiated twice, once for each argument.
All checks are tested on the input vector directly before testing the function. This
introduces an additional testing overhead. The reason is that checks have to be indepen-
dent of the test values to facilitate the extensibility. For example, one can in this way
add new test cases that might satisfy checks that one has not been aware of. Technically,
it would be possible to precalculate the results of all applicable checks on known test val-
ues off-line. In this way we could safe some time otherwise needed in the fault injection
stage (dynamic analysis stage). For instance, the test type meta integer contains only
a static set of integer values. However, we have not implemented this precomputation
to simplify our implementation. Beside that, it would be difficult to apply compound
checks off-line. This makes the on-line evaluation, i.e., as part of the fault injection, very
convenient because Autocannon might generate new test types depending on its static
analysis.
5.4.1 Check Templates
Our current implementation includes a set of predefined check templates. We use “check”
to refer to check template whenever it is obvious that we mean a check template. Checks
test general properties of the argument values independent of the concrete function’s ar-
gument types. We start with presenting the basic checks before discussing our compound
checks.
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Check Buffer pointer to by p has at-least...
bufReadable(p, a) a readable bytes
bufWritable(p, a) a writable bytes
bufStrReadable(p, s) strlen(s) + 1 readable bytes
bufStrWritable(p, s) strlen(s) + 1 writable bytes
bufReadable2(p, a1, a2) a1 * a2 readable bytes
bufWritable2(p, a1, a2) a1 * a2 writable bytes
bufStrReadable2(p, s1, s2) strlen(s1) + strlen(a2) + 1 readable bytes
bufStrWritable2(p, s1, s2) strlen(s1) + strlen(s2) + 1 writable bytes
bufStrReadable3(p, s, a) strlen(s1) + 1 + a readable bytes
bufStrWritable3(p, s, a) strlen(s1) + 1 + a writable bytes
Table 5.4: Compound checks of Autocannon. Argument p have a pointer type, arguments
with prefix a have an integer type, and arguments with prefix s are of type
char*.
Basic Checks
Table 5.3 shows all basic checks of Autocannon. Column Type refers to the argument types
for which the corresponding check can be instantiated. Any pointer gets instantiated for
any type where the type characteristics pointer? is true. Any integer gets instantiated
for any type where converts to int? is true. For char* pointer? must be true
and content size must be 1. Column Description states when a check evaluates to
true.
Compound Checks
Compound checks test the relations between more than one argument value. The strcpy
example from Section 5.2 contains the compound check buf write?(dest, strlen
(src) + 1). It relates the size of a buffer (pointed to by dest) and the length of
string (src). This check evaluates to true, if dest points to a buffer where at least
strlen(src) + 1 bytes are writable. We derive all compound checks from existing
function specifications (e.g., the C standard library specification).
Table 5.4 gives an overview of our compound checks. All compound checks are relate
the size of an argument, which is a pointer to a buffer, with one or two other function
arguments. It is checked, if a buffers has at least the size of another string argument
or an integer value. Additionally, the product of two integer arguments, the sum of
two string lengths and the sum of a string length or an integer to the buffer size. The
check buf write?(dest, strlen(src) + 1) introduced above is implemented by
bufStrWritable from Table 5.4.
Compound checks are instantiated for any possible argument combination of a function.
For example, for function char* strcpy(char* dest, char* src) the following
compound checks are instantiated by Autocannon:
• bufStrReadable(dest, src)
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• bufStrWritable(dest, src)
• bufStrReadable(src, dest)
• bufStrWritable(src, dest)
Of course, Autocannon will also instantiate basic checks for strcpy after Table 5.3.
5.4.2 Parameterized Check Templates
Like we have type templates for generating specialized test values, we need specialized
checks for testing for these test values. Parameterized check templates are checks used to
test properties that cannot be predefined because these properties depend on the func-
tion’s argument types or the function’s semantic.
We have four kinds of parameterized checks:
• The feedback buffer check gets the parameter from the feedback experiments of the
fault injection phase: It checks if a given buffer is at least as large as the smallest
buffer for which the function did not crash for values of the feedback type. Consider,
for example, function void foo(char* p). Consider furthermore, in the fault
injection with the feedback type for argument p Autocannon derived that p must
point to a readable buffer of at least n bytes. Hence, Autocannon instantiates the
check bufReadable n bytes(p) that checks if p points to a buffer of at least n
readable bytes.
• The second check is similar to the feedback check, but it relies on static analysis only.
It checks, if the buffer pointed to by a pointer is at least as large as the data structure
of the corresponding argument type. For instance, for function void bar(struct
foo* p) Autocannon instantiates bufReadable n bytes(p) and bufWrit-
able n bytes(p) where n is sizeof(struct foo).
• Another parameterized check is also derive with static analysis. If an argument
type is an enum, then the enum values are extracted from the public sources.
The check tests, if an argument value is within the set of possible enum values.
Consider function char foobar(enum Color c). Autocannon instantiates a
check isEnum Color(c) that checks if c has valid value of type Color.
• The counterparts of the ADT test types are ADT checks. For each argument that
has a handle type a parameterized ADT check is instantiated. For function int
fileno(FILE* f) Autocannon instantiates isHandle FILE(f) that checks if
f is an instance of ADT FILE.
At runtime an ADT check maintains a set of all valid handles for the corresponding
ADT. For each ADT there is at most one check that might be instantiated multiple
times (i.e., for different functions). Each parameterized ADT check has its own
handle set. Therefore, each execution of a constructor function is intercepted. After
running the original constructor, the returned handle value is put into the set. Every
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destructor execution is also intercepted and the passed handle value is removed from
the handle set. The check for the handle queries the corresponding handle set. If
the value is in it, the check evaluates to true, otherwise to false.
5.5 Protection Hypotheses
The analysis stage yields one protection hypothesis per library function. A protection
hypothesis is evaluated on a given input vector.
Definition 5.2. An input vector is safe if the library function evaluated on it will behave
robust and secure. Otherwise, an input vector is unsafe.
Note that our definition of a safe input vector is similar to the definition of a safe
function call (see Chapter 4.4.2).
Definition 5.3. A protection hypothesis of a library function f is a function that maps
the set of input vectors of f to {true, false}. If it evaluates to true, the given input vector
is considered to be safe. Otherwise, the hypothesis evaluates to false.
To enforce that a library function is only executed on safe input vectors, Autocan-
non generates a protection wrapper. The protection wrapper is inserted between an
application and its dynamic linked libraries. Our current implementation achieves this
by utilizing the pre-loading feature of the dynamic linker [33] (similar to AutoPatch in
Chapter 4.6). We could also insert the wrapper by instrumenting the libraries or the
application.
The first part of this section shows how to derive protection hypotheses and the second
part discusses possible failures of the protection hypotheses. We review two kinds of
failure:
Definition 5.4. A false positive happens if a hypothesis rejects a safe input vector. A
false negative happens if a hypothesis accepts an unsafe input vector.
5.5.1 Minimizing the Truth Table
The protection hypothesis for a function f is derived from the truth table built while
testing f . The truth table is not yet a boolean function. It might contain redundant
and even contradicting rows. Also some rows might be missing. A row r is redundant
if there is another row p with p = r. Redundant rows are the result of input vectors
that are indistinguishable from each other by our checks and the functions behavior is
the same for both input vectors. Redundant rows have two sources: an under fitting set
of checks or an over fitting set of input vectors. Contradicting rows are rows that are
classified equally by the checks but for which the function behaves differently (i.e., one
crashes the other does not). They indicate that the set of checks is too small. Hence, this
can be countered by adding new checks. Note however that removing input vectors from
testing reduces the probability to find contradictions too. Because the lower the number
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Row no. check1 check2 robust?
1 0 0 1
2 0 1 1
3 0 1 1
4 1 0 0
5 1 0 1
Table 5.5: Example truth table with redundant, contradicting and missing rows.
of rows the lower the number of contradictions. Additionally, some rows might be missing
because of the sampling and because the test types might not exercise all checks with an
uniform distribution.
In our current implementation we drop redundant rows before passing them to the
minimizer. We want to minimize false positives. Thus, for contradicting rows a warning
is logged and only the row for which the function behaved robustly is passed to the
minimizer. On one hand, this prevents the protection wrapper from producing a false
positive. But on the other hand, it introduces the possibility for false negatives. Therefore,
a protection hypothesis generated from a truth table containing contradictions might not
prevent all crashes or buffer overruns. As already introduced above it is very unlikely,
that the truth table has a row for all possible combinations of evaluation results of checks.
It is not known whether these missing rows behave robustly or not. To minimize false
positives, we treat all missing rows as robust. But this might increase the number of false
negatives.
Table 5.5 shows an example truth table. Rows 2 and 3 are redundant, and rows 4 and
5 are contradicting. Hence, we remove row 3 and 4 before minimizing the table. The row
where both checks evaluate to true is missing, we treat this row as robust.
Some minimization strategies for truth tables trade correctness for small expressions
and computational overhead of the minimization problem. We require a hypothesis that
describes the truth table exactly. But we do not need necessarily a minimal expression
but one that prevents crashes.
5.5.2 Discussion
As described above a source of false negatives and false positives is if too few input vectors
are tested. Simply adding new test types may not help: The resulting set of input vectors
might become too large to test it within a feasible time. Counter-intuitively, we have
found that reducing the set of input vectors is a good approach if the set of input vectors
is too large. It increases the coverage provided by the tested sample of input vectors. Of
course the reduction algorithm should only remove input vectors that do not contribute to
the protection hypothesis. In Section 5.3.6 we show one example for a reduction algorithm
using static analysis.
If the protection wrapper evaluates a protection hypothesis on an input vector to false,
the original function is not called. Instead the wrapper passes the control back to the
caller. Therefore, a value has to be returned. Our current implementation returns a
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predefined error value depending on the return type of the wrapped function [107]. The
predefined value is not guaranteed to be an legitimate return value of the original func-
tion. Instead, the AutoPatch approach described in Section 4.3 can be used to determine
error return values that are guaranteed to be legitimate return values of the original func-
tion. However, we have not added this approach to keep the implementation effort for
Autocannon at a reasonable level.
In spite of every effort to reduce false positives in the analysis stage, it might be possible
that some generated hypotheses are too restrictive and produce false positives. Such
an hypothesis will evaluate to false for valid input vectors when used to protect the
application. To finally detect such hypotheses before generating the wrapper, we generate
an intermediate wrapper. Instead of enforcing the protection hypotheses, it only logs
whenever a hypothesis is evaluated to false. This wrapper is used to gather false positives
in one or more test runs with real applications. Hypotheses that are found to produce false
positives are excluded from the protection wrapper. In that way it might be possible that
some functions are not protected at all. But our evaluation shows that only a minority of
hypotheses had to be excluded from the protection wrapper, i.e., our false positive rate
was already very low.
Because our approach does not guarantee the absence of false positives, we discuss now
how to handle them. Note that in case of a protection hypothesis being evaluated to false,
the protection wrapper returns an error code instead of calling the library function. First,
if the application is robust enough, it might perform some graceful degradation in the
presence of a false positive. Thus, the application will provide a reduced functionality.
Second, if an application performs retries of failed library calls and if we are mainly
worried about transient errors, we could use a similar approach as [88]: On re-execution
of a failed function, we would allow its execution and if it passes, we white list arguments
with the same check vector.
The false positives are a sign that we do not have enough checks to distinguish between
unrobust and robust input vectors. But our approach allows us to add more checks in the
future without any redesign. The false negative rate might also benefit from new checks.
For the same reason it is useful to add more test types. But as long as a function is only
tested on a small sample of all test types we need better strategies to choose the “right”
input vectors for fault injection.
5.6 Evaluation
We have evaluated our approach by hardening the Apache Portable Runtime library
(APR) [2]. Among the applications that use this library is the web server Apache. We
have tested our protection wrapper for the APR by executing it with Apache. To reduce
the overhead, we only have hardened functions that are called by our executions of Apache.
These are 148 APR functions including some without arguments. Functions without
arguments where not tested and no protection hypotheses are created for these function.
Our test system, Autocannon, was able to perform about 1000 tests per minute on our
computers. That means we can add about 1000 rows to the truth tables per minute.
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Figure 5.5: The coverage of executed test cases compared to the set of all possible input
vectors in different test configurations.
Because functions can be tested independently from each other, it is possible to parallelize
the analysis stage. We have done all experiments on two virtual machines with the same
configuration (running on an Athlon 64 3200+ with 1 GByte of RAM and an Intel Core
Duo with 2 GBytes of RAM, respectively, both with Ubuntu 6.06).
First, we discuss the results of Autocannon’s fault injection tests. We will focus on
test coverage and the results of the dependability benchmark. To check the correctness
of hypotheses, we run Apache with the APR. To test the effectiveness of the generated
hypotheses we injected bit-flips into Apache’s execution.
5.6.1 Coverage
Some of the hardened functions have more than 3 arguments. Because the set of input
vectors grows exponentially with the number of arguments, such functions can only be
dynamically analyzed to a very small extent. We tested all functions on at most 10, 000
test cases and less if the set of possible input vectors was smaller. This number of test
cases was chosen to perform our evaluation in a feasible time. In Figure 5.5 we depict
the coverage for four different test configurations. We tested the combinations with and
without test types for handles and with and without reduction of test types by excluding
special test types via static analysis. The functions are grouped into 15 coverage classes.
The coverage of a function is the number of tested input vectors over the size of the set of
all input vectors of the test system for this functions. The class of a function f is derived
from the order of magnitude of f ’s test coverage. The functions of class 0 have 100%
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Test config Avg. Coverage Avg. Incomplete Coverage
with Reduction with Handle
x 0.442 0.071
x 0.276 0.023
x x 0.439 0.067
0.276 0.023
Table 5.6: The average coverage per test configuration, and the average incomplete cov-
erage that is the average coverage over all functions that have a coverage < 1.
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Figure 5.6: Comparing number of crashed and robust test cases.
coverage, functions of class 1 have 10%, functions of class 2 have 1% coverage, and so on.
The Y-axis depicts the number of functions per class.
Adding the handle test types (see Section 5.3.4) has no visible impact. The average
coverage of the two test configurations with handles differs slightly from the average
coverage for test configurations without handles as shown in Table 5.6.
The impact of excluding some test cases via static analysis (see Section 5.3.6) is visible.
In the two configurations, where the number of test cases is reduced with static analysis,
more functions have a higher coverage than in the two configurations without reduction.
Some functions do not benefit from the reduction because they perform indirect function
calls via function pointers. These functions were excluded from the static analysis (see
Section 5.3.6). We were able to reduce the number of test cases for 76 of the analysed
148 functions.
5.6.2 Autocannon as Dependability Benchmark
Autocannon is not only useful to generate protection hypotheses. The analysis stage of
Autocannon alone is a flexible dependability benchmark for arbitrary C libraries. Fig-
ure 5.6 gives a summary of the benchmark results for the APR. The figure only covers the
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Figure 5.7: Variation in percentage of unrobust test cases per function.
functions that we have tested. More than half of the test cases resulted in robust behavior.
The gap between the number of robust and unrobust test cases is about 70, 000 function
calls. Figure 5.7 shows how the robustness is distributed over the tested functions. The
majority of the functions can be put in one of two sets:
• 67 functions crashed in at least 90% of the test cases.
• Whereas, 66 functions crashed in at most 10% of the test cases.
Between these two classes are 40 functions that crashed for more than 10% but for less
than 90% of their test cases. Functions without arguments are not included in the Tests.
5.6.3 Protection Hypotheses
We evaluated the correctness of the generated protection hypotheses in two directions:
• Do we produce false positives?
• How good do we prevent crashes?
We generated two wrappers:
• W was generated from fault injection experiments with lower test coverage, and
• WSA was generated from fault injection experiments with higher test coverage using
static analysis.
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W WSA
# of Hypotheses 77 95
False Positives in normal Run 0% 6.17%
Predicted Crashes in Bit-flip Benchmarks 56.81% 51.39%
False Positives in Bit-flip Benchmarks 1.7% 0.6%
Table 5.7: Correctness of our Approach with different protection wrappers: W is gener-
ated from test cases without reduction, and WSA is generated from test cases
with reduction.
We switched the handle test types on for both wrappers. In practice a developer can
manually correct any protection hypotheses. However, for this evaluation we did not do
so. Table 5.7 shows that W protects 77 functions whereas WSA protects 95 functions. For
all other functions no hypotheses could be generated.
We first executed Apache with the protection wrapper and logged all failed hypotheses.
We assume that Apache does call all APR functions with valid arguments as long as
no faults are injected by a third party. Thus, any failed hypothesis is a false positive.
The results are shown in the first two data rows of Table 5.7 in row “FP normal Run”.
W produced no false positives. WSA had 10 functions leading to false positives (6.17 %
of all function calls). 3 of these functions were also wrapped by W , but with different
hypotheses.
Additionally, we implemented a bit-flip benchmark with fault injection to test our pro-
tection in the presence of failures. Therefore, we run Apache with our protection wrapper
and injected bit-flips into this execution. We injected probabilistically bit-flips [58] into
argument values of the protected functions. Whenever a bit-flip was injected when calling
a function f , we compared the result of f ’s hypothesis and the behavior of f . Not all
bit-flips resulted in a crash of f . Apache was restarted after the bit-flip to prevent further
propagation of the fault. The results show a trade-off between W and WSA (see Table 5.7
last two rows). A successfully predicted crash is prevented by not calling the crashing
function. Thus, W prevents 56.81% of all crashes and WSA prevents 51.39% of all crashes.
However, W has also more false positives than WSA.
5.7 Conclusion
We have presented a flexible approach to hardening arbitrary libraries for robustness and
security. Our contributions are:
• A new dependability benchmark that can measure the robustness of arbitrary library
utilizing static analysis, and
• a truth table based approach to derive protection hypotheses from the benchmark’s
results.
Therefore, the benchmark’s test data is classified using checks. The difference to previous
work, such as HEALERS, is that our approach is easily extensible. One can add new
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checks and test types for the dependability benchmarks as needed.
Our evaluation shows that Autocannon as dependability benchmark can find bugs in
real world software (Thesis 7: “Fault injection finds failures even in mature software.”).
The protection wrapper implements the filter patch pattern. Unsafe input values to a
function are filtered. Our protection hypotheses were able to predict up to 56.85 % of
the crashes in our evaluation (Thesis 6: “Automatic bug removal based on patch patterns
can decrease the number of failures.” and Thesis 9: “Automatic filtering can mask a high
percentage of failures injected by bit-flip faults.”). The drawback is that our hypotheses
misclassify a low number of robust argument values as unrobust. But we believe that we
can overcome this issue by adding more appropriate checks and test types.
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6 Conclusion
In this thesis we introduce automatic hardening as a tool to tolerate software bugs at the
end-user site. Automatic hardening techniques use either error tolerance or bug removal.
With SwitchBlade (Chapter 2) we contribute to error tolerance. SwitchBlade uses spec-
ulation in a novel way to detect malicious 3rd-party control flow manipulations (Thesis 1:
“Speculation can be used to reduce the perceived performance overhead of error detec-
tion mechanisms.”). We show that fine-grained system call interposition techniques alone
cannot be used to reliably detect control flow manipulations (Thesis 2: “The system call
model of an application depends on the environment.”). But in combination with taint
analysis fine-grained system call interposition provides good means to detect control flow
manipulation based attacks (Thesis 3: “System call model enforcement combined with
taint analysis can detect control flow manipulation with in average low performance over-
head, low false positive, and low false negative rate.”). We use SwitchBlade to protect
the web-server Apache. By small changes to Apache’s code base, SwitchBlade is not only
able to detect control flow manipulation in a 3rd-party plug-in, but also tolerates these
attacks by dropping the current connection. For applications that are not able to tolerate
detected control flow manipulations by themselves, SwitchBlade can be combined with
Rx [94] or ASSURE [108].
ParExC, presented in Chapter 3, contributes to the state of the art of parallelized
runtime checking (Thesis 4: “Parallelization of runtime checks can (partly) mitigate the
performance costs of expensive runtime checks.”). ParExC parallelizes runtime checks
speculatively (Thesis 1). Our measurements indicate that parallel runtime checking can
compete with and sometimes even outperform checking of already parallelized applica-
tions (Thesis 5: “Parallelizing runtime error checks themselves can scale better than
parallelizing an application with runtime checks.”). ParExC itself is an error detection
approach. To achieve error toleration it needs to be combined with approaches such as Rx
and ASSURE. However, these approaches make use of check-pointing and replay. Both
techniques are already part of the ParExC framework. Thus, we believe a combination of
ParExC with the orthogonal approaches of Rx and ASSURE is feasible.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we contribute to the state of the art of bug removal. In both chap-
ters we use fault injection to find bugs in real world code (Thesis 7: “Fault injection finds
failures even in mature software.”). We introduce patch pattern to remove some of the
found bugs (Thesis 6: “Automatic bug removal based on patch patterns can decrease the
number of failures.”). However, both chapters are orthogonal to each other. AutoPatch
(Chapter 4) uses a technique called error mapping to remove bugs in error handling code
(Thesis 8: “Automatic error mapping can mask failures.”). Error mapping is similar to
the error virtualization used by ASSURE. If 3rd-party libraries do not check their input
carefully, they can crash the whole application. Autocannon (Chapter 5) uses filtering
143
6 Conclusion
to remove “missing input checking” bugs in 3rd-party libraries (Thesis 9: “Automatic
filtering can mask a high percentage of failures injected by bit-flip faults.”).
Future research in automatic hardening should try to target distributed applications (for
instance streaming application). While AutoPatch and Autocannon are generic enough to
be applied out of the box to distributed applications, SwitchBlade and ParExC are mainly
focused on protecting applications running on a single node. Distributed applications
introduce new challenges (for instance partial failures and partitioning), but also new
opportunities (such as node replication and distributed speculation).
6.1 Publications
Chapters 2 to 5 are partly based on published papers. In this section we want to clarify
the mapping between this thesis and those papers.
Chapter 2 is an extended version of
• Christof Fetzer, Martin Süßkraut: SwitchBlade: Enforcing Dynamic Personalized
System Call Models in the proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS EuroSys, 2008 [42].
This paper was republished as
• Christof Fetzer, Martin Süßkraut: SwitchBlade: Enforcing Dynamic Personalized
System Call Models in SIGOPS Operation Systems Review, 2008 [43].
ParExC’s StackLifter (Section 3.4) will appear in
• Martin Süßkraut, Stefan Weigert, Thomas Knauth, Ute Schiffel, Martin Meinhold
and Christof Fetzer: Prospect: A Compiler Framework for Speculative Paralleliza-
tion in the proceedings of The Eighth International Symposium on Code Generation
and Optimization (CGO), 2010 [120].
The Speculative Variables (Section 3.5) were introduced in
• Martin Süßkraut, Stefan Weigert, Ute Schiffel, Thomas Knauth, Martin Nowack,
Diogo Becker de Brum and Christof Fetzer: Speculation for Parallelizing Runtime
Checks in the proceedings of the 11th International Symposium on Stabilization,
Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems (SSS), 2009 [122].
The comparison of ParExC with checking applications parallelized by Software Transac-
tional Memory (Section 3.6.4) is published as
• Martin Süßkraut, Stefan Weigert, Martin Nowack, Diogo Becker de Brum and
Christof Fetzer: Parallelize the Runtime Checks – Not the Application at the
Workshop on Exploiting Concurrency Efficiently and Correctly – (EC)2 (CAV),
2009 [121].
The Chapter 4 about AutoPatch is widely based on
• Martin Süßkraut and Christof Fetzer: Automatically Finding and Patching Bad
Error Handling in the proceedings of the Sixth European Dependable Computing
Conference (EDCC), 2006 [117].
Section 4.3 about Learning Library Level Error Values was publication as
• Martin Süßkraut and Christof Fetzer: Learning Library-Level Error Return Values
from Syscall Error Injection (Fast Abstract) in the proceedings of the Sixth Euro-
pean Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC), 2006 [118].
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6.1 Publications
Section 4.5 about Fast Fault Injections with the Help of Virtual Machines was published
as
• Martin Süßkraut, Stephan Creutz and Christof Fetzer: Fast Fault Injection with
Virtual Machines (Fast Abstract) in the Supplement of the 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP
International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), 2007 [116].
Chapter 5 about Autocannon is an edited and extended version of
• Martin Süßkraut and Christof Fetzer: Robustness and Security Hardening of COTS
Software Libraries in the proceedings of The 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP International
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), 2007 [119].
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[117] Martin Süßkraut and Christof Fetzer. Automatically finding and patching bad error
handling. In Sixth European Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC’06), pages
13–22, October 2006.
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